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This research addresses the establishment of the “Jiang Zemin Era” 
whereby Jiang Zemin, and the Chinese Communist Party, have attempted to re-
legitimise the Party and have attempted to make the Party meaningful to the 
Chinese populace.  What is fundamental to this research is how Jiang Zemin, as 
the “core leader” of the third generational leadership, incorporated the political 
thought of neo-conservatism (xin baoshouzhuyi) into the framework of Marxist-
Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought (MLM) ideology in order to re-legitimise the CCP.  
The timeframe within the research is from Jiang’s appointment as the General 
Secretary of the CCP in 1989 until 1995.  It is important that this was a time 
period whereby Jiang had to consolidate, and therefore legitimise, his “core 
leadership”, and provide a theoretical platform in order to bring forth his own 
“era”. 
The research is predominantly a historiographical narrative, utilising both 
primary and secondary sources, that examines the mechanisms Jiang utilised in 
order to create a strong government, with himself as the “core”, which pursued 
increased levels of marketisation.  
Indeed, after being appointed General Secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party in 1989, Jiang Zemin had to achieve two goals in order to 
sustain and legitimate his position as “the core of the third generational 
leadership”.  First, he had to secure his position as “the core” through the 
creation of secured networks and alliances as well as legitimise of his “informal” 
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and “formal” positions in the CCP hierarchy.  In order to achieve this, Jiang had 
to first create a sustainable power base in order to retain, and therefore 
legitimise, his formalized positions as General Secretary of the CCP, Chairman 
of the Chinese Military Commission and the Presidency.  In addition, he needed 
to be able to create alliances with both allies and protégés as well as differing 
power factions, be they conservative/elder or reformist, and with other leading 
figures like Li Peng and Zhu Rongji. Second, in order to further reinforce and 
legitimize his position as “the core”, Jiang had to develop his own “theoretical 
framework” for governing the country – much as Mao and Deng had done 
previously. 
 
Therefore, the research also examines Jiang’s usage of the neo-
conservatism as a means of not only legitimising the CCP’s ideological 
framework but also as a means of providing his own “guiding thought”, thus 
enabling him to establish his own “era”. Indeed, after establishing himself as the 
“core” through the aforementioned processes, Jiang had to develop such a 
theoretical framework that complimented Deng’s economic reforms, especially 
as he was designated by Deng, yet one that retained a smattering of Mao 
Zedong’s “Thoughts” that could be applied pragmatically during the 1990s. 
 
It can be seen that Jiang Zemin successfully incorporated the political 
thought of “neo-conservatism” within his platform in order to achieve these ends 
– including the establishment of a “Jiang Zemin Era”.  This political thought, a 
successor to the political theory of “neo-authoritarianism”, already had several 
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adherents within the higher echelons of the CCP. Indeed, it would be Jiang’s 
1995 speech, entitled “Stressing Politics”, that would signify the incorporation of 
neo-conservatism within Jiang’s platform of (self) legitimation that would initiate 
the successful implementation of a “Jiang Zemin Era”. 
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Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (MLM) is still the official 
ideology in the People's Republic of China (PRC).  However, due to the 
increasing modernisation of the Chinese economy, with its capitalist orientations 
under the banner of "socialism with Chinese characteristics", it appears that the 
elite political actors within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) no longer 
adhere to Marxist or Leninist doctrine and are no longer inspired by Mao Zedong 
Thought.  Therefore, although MLM retains its official status as the state's 
ideology, MLM within contemporary China is viewed as being an “ideological 
vacuum”.  As such, there are arguments that the CCP has lost its legitimacy to 
rule China.  Indeed, China observers reacted to the 1989 Tiananmen Incident as 
an example of the CCP’s inherent lack of legitimacy.    
Since 1989, however, the CCP has attempted to re-legitimise the Party 
and has attempted to make the Party meaningful to the Chinese populace. As 
Fewsmith (2001, p.88) notes: “to state that ideology plays a diminished role in 
the present era is not to say it plays no role, a mistake frequently made”.  What 
is evident is that the CCP has incorporated the political theory of neo-
conservatism (xin baoshouzhuyi) into the framework of the MLM ideology in 
order the re-legitimise the CCP, especially during the tenure of Jiang Zemin’s 
“core leadership” of the third generational leadership1. 
                                                          
1 The “first generation” was based on the leadership of Mao Zedong, the “second generation” 
was based on the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the third on Jiang Zemin and the current “fourth 
generational leadership” under Hu Jintao. 
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It could be argued that the incorporation of the political theory of neo-
conservatism enabled Jiang to legitimise the Party and ensure its survival.  
Jiang fashioned an ideology that retained Marxism-Leninism ideals, and which 
could be relevant for China in the new millennium.  Furthermore, as Jiang 
commandeered the three highest positions in China - namely General Secretary 
of the CCP, Chairman of the Chinese Military Commission (CMC) and the 
Presidency - it appeared that with the creation of this new hybrid ideology that 
there was an emergence of a "Jiang Zemin Era"; an era which Sinologists were 
heralding even before the February 1997 death of the Deng Xiaoping, the 
unofficial leader of China. 
 
It is important to note that there could not be a "Jiang Zemin Era" 
without an orchestrated platform of goals.  In addition, there could not be a 
"Jiang Zemin Era" without an incorporation of another political discourse, albeit 
unofficially, within the framework of the Party's official ideology of MLM. 
This was necessary nominally for two reasons.  First, as the appointed 
successor by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang could not adroitly continue Deng's 
fundamentally economic drive to modernisation without substantial changes.  
This is because without changes to Deng's pragmatic economic legacy, 
accusations could arise that Jiang was merely another somewhat ill-fated Hua 
Guofeng2.  In addition, after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, there were still some 
stalwarts within the CCP who were ideologically against the promotion of the 
                                                          
2 This statement is in reference to Mao’s last designated heir who continued to pursue Mao's 
ambitious, but eventually chaotic, "class struggle" until being overthrown by Deng in 1978-79. 
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economy over the furthering of China's "politicalisation".  For Jiang to initially 
champion Deng's economic drive would alienate him from the conservative 
faction within the CCP thus hampering any chance of his securing any power 
within the factions of the CCP.  Second, nor could Jiang characterise his power 
with a resurgence of Maoist dogma in an attempt to reinvigorate China with 
ideological themes reminiscent of the "class struggle" experienced during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).  Purely concentrating only on Marxist politics, it 
was deemed, would destabilise the successful economic "open-door" and 
modernisation policies initiated by Deng.  Furthermore, as Deng's successor, 
such a push to the ideological left could not be undertaken whilst Deng was still 
alive. 
 
Therefore, with his appointment as General Secretary in 1989, Jiang 
was in the perilous position of harmonising Mao's excessive "leftism", in order to 
appease the conservative faction within the CCP, with Deng's excessive 
"rightism", in order to appease the reformist faction. Indeed, it would appear that 
Jiang successfully oscillated between both camps during the period under study 
(1989 – 1995). Essentially, to institute a "Jiang Zemin Era", an ideological 
"balance" needed to be created that absorbed the best features of both Mao and 
Deng.  Therefore a new political discourse was required that incorporated 
centralism and strong government (which were central elements of the "Mao 
Era") as well as establishing capitalistic-orientated economic policies and a 
market economy (which were central elements of the "Deng Era").  Furthermore, 
Jiang needed to be able to successfully utilise theses features without 
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undermining the legacies of either Mao or Deng.  This is because undermining 
the legacies of Mao and/or Deng would create a Chinese Communist Party that 
contradicted its own purposes.  It would appear, then, that the most appropriate 
features, given the demands and “agenda” of the day, of Mao's and Deng's 
legacies were entwined in the central tenets of the political theory of neo-
conservatism.  
Indeed, Pye (2001) is incorrect to categorise elite politics in the “Jiang 
Era” as “contradictory”, yet easily label Mao’s China as “an essence of 
sovereignty of ideology”, and Deng’s China as being “captured by the concepts 
of pragmatism”.  Oscillations in policy occurred in the Mao and Deng eras just as 
much as in the Jiang Era.  The Jiang Era encapsulated a period of consolidation 
and neo-conservatism. 
 
 It is an objective of this thesis to examine the influence of the political 
theory of neo-conservatism in the establishing of a "Jiang Zemin Era", and how 
pivotal this theory has been in the re-legitimisation of the CCP.  The period 
under study is from Jiang’s appointment as General Secretary in 1989 until 
1995. The period can be defined as one of “pre-mortem succession” (as defined 
by Dittmer, 2001), whereby Deng and other elders still controlled power outside 
the legitimate political institutions, and Jiang had to establish himself as the 
“core leader”, maintain a power base, appease the Party elders, and provide the 
Party with an ideological outlook.  It was Jiang’s speech on “Stressing Politics”3 
                                                          
3 The full title of Jiang’s speech was Leaders Must Stress Politics, the terminology of “Stressing 
Politics” is used for brevity. 
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that revealed he had provided the Party with an ideological outlook.  This 
speech, neo-conservative in nature, heralded the beginning of the “Jiang Zemin 
Era”. 
 
THE POLICAL THEORY OF NEO-CONSERVATISM 
 
The theory of neo-conservatism emerged as a notable discourse in 
China in 1989 and constituted the adapted theory of the political discourse of 
neo-authoritarianism that made inroads in China from 1986-1989.  Both theories 
are quite similar in their central tenets of a strong government and a market 
economy. Furthermore, both theories follow the developments of Asia's “mini-
dragons” before the 1997 Asian economic slowdown, notably in South Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore.  These countries’ economic developments were 
contrasted with the economic development that was taking place in China during 
the time, as it was believed that the rapid economic development that had 
occurred within these countries was a product of authoritarian, or quasi-
authoritarian, regimes that were deemed similar to the system of governance in 
China. 
 
However, there are three fundamental differences between the two 
discourses.  First, neo-authoritarianism, while recognising the importance of a 
strong government, evidently placed more importance of the creation of a 
market economy; whilst the political theory of neo-conservatism, being more 
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"conservative in orientatation", focused more on the creation of a strong 
(political-ideological) state rather than on market reforms.   
Second, neo-conservatism was inclined to incorporate the notion of 
political reform and political institutionalisation within its structure more clearly 
than that of neo-authoritarianism.  Neo-authoritarianism merely advocated the 
general proposition that neo-authoritarianism was a means of achieving a 
semblance of “democracy” in China.  
Third, due to the implications of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and the 
"major shift in the power configurations within elite political circles" (Sullivan, 
1995, p 325), factions within the CCP were aligned to the conservatives/elders 
faction (with its allegiance to MLM), to the reformist camp (influenced by Zhao 
Ziyang and other neo-authoritarians), or to a faction that was a coalition of both 
conservative and reformist factions and influenced by neo-conservatism.  
Furthermore, neo-authoritarianism was predominantly a political discourse.  
Adherents utilised the Chinese media and journals to debate the differing 
ideological theorems of both the Marxists and the reformers, yet neo-
authoritarianism did not pivotally shape decisions by the CCP.   Neo-
conservatism, on the other hand, did not receive the wide and varied debate that 
neo-authoritarianism received from 1986 – 19894, yet the political thought of 
neo-conservatism was adapted and utilised by Jiang Zemin.  
  
                                                          
4 See Rolls (1998) for a detailed examination of the intellectual debates on neo-authoritarianism 
from 1986 1989. 
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Whilst neo-authoritarianism influenced some within the CCP in the 
period from 1986-1989, notably the then General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and his 
faction due to the Tiananmen Incident and Zhao's involvement in it, after 4 June 
1989, discussion of the political theory of neo-authoritarianism was subsequently 
banned.   
Neo-conservatism, believed to be originally encouraged by the taizidang 
(or the "Princes Party", those being predominantly sons of the then current CCP 
leaders), emerged in the place of neo-authoritarianism in 1989.  Although 
discussed in detail in Chapter Two, neo-conservatism influenced the CCP after 
1989 and helped establish the "Jiang Zemin Era".  Whilst the majority of the 
current leadership may be deemed to be neo-conservative, the leadership does 
differ on its interpretation of the theory.  The research here suggests that 
advocates of neo-conservatism have to be divided in to “hard” adherents of neo-
conservatism and “soft” adherents. Indeed, it appears that the "hard" adherents 
of neo-conservatism were under the leadership of Li Peng and the "soft" 
adherents were under the "quasi" leadership of Zhu Rongji.  
Yet it is important to note that implicit in the theory of neo-conservatism 
is that as China moves into the new millennium, the further momentum of 
continual, if not eventual, democratisation shall be maintained.  Indeed, at the 
1997 Fifteenth Congress, Jiang stated that by the middle of the twenty-first 
century "China will have become a prosperous, strong, democratic, and 
culturally advanced socialist country" (Oksenberg, 1998, p.30).  Jiang, however, 
avoided specifics; he gave no explanation of what he meant by "democratic" and 
made clear in his speech that he was committed to preserving the supremacy of 
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the CCP at all costs, through the continuation of Deng Xiaoping’s “Four Cardinal 
Principles”5. 
 
Therefore, another objective of this research is to evaluate the factional 
influences of the “hard” and “soft adherents of neo-conservatism within the CCP 
after 1989.  This is important as this factionalism was utilised by Jiang Zemin in 
his creation of the "Jiang Zemin Era", and in his attempt to create power bases 
as a foundation for it. Furthermore, it is important to examine the political theory 
of neo-conservatism and how it differed from that of its predecessor, neo-
authoritarianism, and to examine aspects of the differences between "hard" and 
"soft" types of neo-conservatism.   
 
ESTABLISHING A “JIANG ZEMIN ERA” 
 
It is proposed that the Jiang "era", after a “formulative stage”, began to 
emerge in 1995, even though Jiang had been the General Secretary since 1989.  
There are four predominant reasons for this.  First, Jiang was Deng's protégé.  
Indeed, at least until his "Southern Sojourn" in February 1992, Deng was still the 
"supreme leader" of the Chinese leadership, whilst Jiang was officially the 
“core”.  Second, the consequence of the Tiananmen Incident resulted in China 
being more politically conservative, at least for a time after 1989.  In addition, as 
the communist structures fell throughout Eastern Europe and culminated in the 
                                                          
5 Introduced at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978, the Four Principals 
are: the affirmation of the leading position of the CCP; the role of Marxism-Leninism and Mao 
Zedong Thought; the peoples’ democratic dictatorship; and adherence to the socialist road. 
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collapse of Communist system in the Soviet Union, the thought that China could 
move strongly towards full democratisation was crushed.  Third, an essential 
condition before there could be any emergence of a "Jiang Zemin Era" was that 
Jiang needed time to develop his own power base.  Although appointed General 
Secretary in 1989, Jiang initially lacked any strong power bases within the 
Chinese hierarchy, from the military, government or other major bureaucratic 
bodies.  His power was derived from Deng, as Deng's designated successor. 
Jiang, however, did have the makings of a power base, or at least a network of 
alliances at this time, due to his work at the First Automobile Plant in Changsha, 
the Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics (MMBE), and as Mayor of 
Shanghai.  But unless Jiang was able to cultivate additional power bases, his 
position as the "core" would be weak and he might have been easily removed 
from his positions. Jiang eventually utilised his “connections” and moved key 
personnel associated with him to key governmental and Party positions.  Fourth, 
the political differences reflected the "soft" and "hard" factions of neo-
conservatism resulted in power constellations within the CCP that Jiang needed 
not only to manoeuvre between but also to manipulate for his own purposes. 
 
From 1989 until 1995, evidence shows that Jiang attempted to 
consolidate his power.  It was to be Jiang's speech entitled "Leaders Must 
Stress Politics", delivered at a meeting for the coordinators of the Fifth Plenary 
Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP on 27 September 
1995, which was to delineate the beginning of the "Jiang Zemin Era", 
differentiating this era from the previous ones of either Mao or Deng. Indeed, the 
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speech appears to be clearly "neo-conservative" in its orientation.  This is 
because the integral notion of "stressing politics" was the issue of political 
reform within China - "political reform with Chinese politics".  Therefore, this 
speech was one of the first indications that the leaders of the CCP at this time 
tended to adopt neo-conservative thinking. 
 
It is clear that Jiang did not wish to go down in CCP history as "China's 
Gorbachev", in reference to the ex-Soviet leader's attempt at political reform 
ahead of economic reform.  It has been the opinion of the CCP that it was 
Gorbachev's reforms that destabilised the central government of the Soviet 
Union and was one of the factors responsible for the demise of communist 
system there. 
Essentially, then, Jiang wished to continue Deng's economic reforms, 
and introduce legislation to protect them, whilst strengthening the Party’s control 
over China's evolving political institutions and central government.  This would 
then legitimise Communist rule in China, at least for the short term.  It was seen 
that this would then further legitimise Communist rule in China, at least in the 
meantime. In doing so, Jiang would be balancing the legacies of both Mao and 
Deng whereby ensuring that he could leave a mark - his "era" in China's history. 
This ambitious task of Jiang's - stabilising a strong central government 
whilst pursuing continual economic marketisation – has lead him to be labelled a 
"neo-conservative" having neo-conservative policies, and enabled him to ensure 
the stability and legitimacy of the Party for a time. 
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 Another sub-objective of this thesis, then, is to delineate the "Jiang 
Zemin Era" and establish the neo-conservative elements within Jiang's platform.  
Therefore, the study examines the mechanisms Jiang employed in order to 
create a strong government and pursue marketisation, dividing the period into 
two distinct sections: from the 1989 Tiananmen Incident to the 1992 Fourteenth 
Congress and from the 1992 Fourteenth Congress to Jiang’s 1995 speech on 
“Stressing Politics”.   
 
THE ARGUMENT OF THE STUDY 
 
Essentially, this research evaluates the usage of the theory of neo-
conservatism by the CCP, under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, in the 
ideological foundations and policy framework for creating a "Jiang Zemin Era", 
and the re-legitimisation of the CCP to maintain its dominance in China in the 
new millennium. 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyse this theory, and compare the basic 
elements of neo-conservatism with those of its predecessor, neo-
authoritarianism.  As stated previously, neo-conservatism was splintered into 
"hard" and "soft" streams within the CCP.  It is important to recognise these 
“persuasions” and their factional groupings and to evaluate them in terms of the 
roles they had in the establishment of the "Jiang Zemin Era". 
These factions, and Jiang's utilisation of them to solidify his power base 
from the time of his “dubious appointment” as General Secretary in 1989, need 
to be ascertained.  This is because Jiang's success as the "core" can be related 
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to his ability to "juggle" these factions to create equilibrium, or at least 
manipulate them for his own needs.  Such actions were needed by Jiang in 
order to begin his "era" in 1995.  This is not unlike Deng's necessity of balancing 
the power and policy stances within the CCP between the reformist and 
elder/conservative factions from 1986-89 (Chan and Unger, 1990, p.44). 
The examination of the period before the establishment of the "Jiang 
Zemin Era" analyses the mechanisms Jiang utilised, and continued to utilize, in 
order to create a strong government that pursued increased levels of 
marketisation so as to enhance China’s “prosperity and prestige”.  This 
assessment allows a focus on the central element of this thesis:  an examination 
of the development of the theory of neo-conservatism from 1989 - 1995.    
 
It can be asserted that neo-conservatism has assisted in filling the 
ideological vacuum within the socialist dogma of the CCP and among the 
Chinese populace.  Due to the legitimisation crisis experienced after the 1989 
Tiananmen Incident, "there is considerable evidence that China has entered into 
the phase of cynical rejection" of MLM dogma (Kelly, 1998, p.58). In addition to 
filling this “ideological void”, the political theory of neo-conservatism became an 
integral component in the re-legitimisation of the CCP.  Indeed, though the 
Marxist-Leninist creed remains the official ideology in China, neo-conservatism 
(along with nationalism) has become the tool for creating a strong government, 
pursuing economic reforms and maintaining the legitimacy of the CCP. 
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Although Sinologists have embarked on an examination of post-
Tiananmen China, none have provided an in-depth analysis that clearly 
delineates the methods by which the government and Party have attempted to 
re-legitimate the CCP. The problems of legitimisation have been discussed to a 
limited extent in the literature (see, for example, Kelly [1998], Young [1998] and 
Yang [1996]).  For example, Young (1998) has explored the State's 
reinterpretation of "socialism", concluding that it is "crucial…to the Party's 
fundamental vanguard leadership claims".  However, Young laments that the 
contradiction between "socialism" in its current usage in comparison to Mao's 
interpretation of "socialism" must therefore mean that the CCP has lost its 
legitimacy.  Yang, in his article "Legitimacy Crisis and Legitimation in China", 
has examined the continuing leadership of the CCP in the nineties, whereby the 
"survival of the CCP regime against all odds is in itself no small miracle".  Yet, 
neither Yang nor Young (amongst others) have proposed that there has been a 
reinterpretation of "socialism" by the CCP, or that the CCP has utilised any other 
ideology or discourse for the purpose of religitimisation.  Rather, Yang and 
Young infer that the CCP has just injected simplistic, capitalistic economic 
policies to propel economic modernisation. 
  Kelly (1998), however, has noted that "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong 
thought continues to operate as an integral part of a tension-ridden political 
mechanism of self-legitimation" (pp. 57-58). Kelly (with Gu Xin, 1995) has not 
only identified the neo-authoritarianism debates between 1986 – 1989, but has 
also examined neo-conservatism (especially in his capacity as editor of a series 
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of essays on the topic in Chinese Law and Government6).  However, he was 
inclined to examine only the "hard" neo-conservatism that was predominant in 
China from 1989 to 1992 as a result of the discourse initiated be the taizidang 
(see Chapter Two).  Sullivan (1995), in his doctoral thesis, Democracy and 
Developmentalism: Contending Struggles Over Political Change in Dengist 
China, 1978-1995, has stated that neo-conservatism "fell out of vogue”.  
Unfortunately, then, both Kelly and Sullivan have overlooked what is here called 
the "soft" neo-conservatism that has also evolved from 1989. 
  
Few China observers have suggested that Jiang Zemin has utilised neo-
conservatism in his creation of a "Jiang Zemin Era".  Those who have (such as 
Lam, 1995) stop short of providing a detailed examination of how Jiang has 
utilised the theory to promote the CCP, the legitimacy of the Party and, of 
course, his leadership. 
Therefore the importance of this research resides in identifying, 
analysing and evaluating how the political theory of neo-conservatism has been 
adapted into the Marxist-Leninist dogma to help create and sustain a "Jiang 
Zemin Era". 
 
This research is in some aspects a continuation of Rolls' (1998) thesis, 
An Examination of the Promotion and Development of the Political theory of 
Neo-authoritarianism in the People's Republic of China from 1986-1989.  
However, that thesis examined the casual effects of the political reality of the 
                                                          
6Chinese Law and Government6, vol. 29, no. 2, 1996.  
 22
CCP on the development of the neo-authoritarianism.  In addition, neo-
authoritarianism did not play such an influential role within the CCP as neo-
conservatism has since 1989.  In his thesis, Sullivan (1995) has come close to 
proposing this in his examination of neo-conservatism, but dismisses it as a 
spent force by 1994.  In addition, whilst Karmel (1995), in his doctoral thesis The 
Neo-Authoritarian Contradiction  Developmentalism Dictatorships and the 
Retreat of the State in Mainland China, correctly correlates the developments in 
China in the early 1990s to that in East Asia, he has not yet been able to  extend 
his focus beyond 1995. 
 
It would appear, in addition, that Western observers, exiled Chinese 
dissidents, and some “China watchers”, have been primarily concerned with the 
prospects of China becoming more democratic.  Indeed, journals, such as the 
Journal of Democracy, devote their existence to ascertaining the possibilities of 
democracy in various countries throughout the world.  Whilst some merely 
hypothesise about this possibility (for example, Metzger, 1998; and Scalapino, 
1998), others point to a distinction between prospects for democracy in given 
countries.   Such debates over the process of democratisation emerged from 
O'Donnell's examination of the process of democratisation in South America in 
the 1970s7.  These debates have allowed for a further focus on the economic 
progress of the "mini-dragons" of East Asia in the 1980s, and the 
                                                          
7 Followed by O'Donnell's and Schmitter's (1986) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, “democratisation” discourse has also been 
undertaken by others, such as Sahlin (1977), and continued by conservative theorists such as 
Huntington (1968, revised in 1984) and Shils (1991). 
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democratisation processes that occurred in South Korea and Taiwan have also 
swayed advocates of democratisation in China, such as Pei (1994).  However, 
the majority of China analysts note the real differences between these countries 
and China, such as sizes and populations of the states, and the interactions and 
trade with Western nations.  Although this is helpful to our understanding of the 
usage of the political theory of neo-conservatism in China, and of other political 
discourses utilised in the East Asian models, the focus is predominantly on the 
advent of democratisation.  For example, He Baogang (1996) has produced an 
excellent, and comprehensive, examination of China in his book The 
Democratisation of China, whereby he examines the usage of "paternalism" to 
describe Deng Xiaoping's leadership.  He's book follows his 1994 article, 
"Democratisation:  Antidemocratic Elements in the Political Culture of China" in 
which he examines the anti-democratic elements of Chinese politics and asks 
where democratic rules may be adapted.  Others, such as Tong Yan (1998) and 
Oksenberg (1988), also examine the democratisation process in China and 
provide hypothesises regarding the prospect of democracy in China.   
 
Other China analysts have directed their expertise into specified areas 
of study.  For example, Joseph Fewsmith (1994; 1995; and 1997) has explored 
the succession crisis following the demise of Zhao Ziyang after the Tiananmen 
Incident. For a further example, Fewsmith’s (1998) article “Jiang Zemin Takes 
Control” begins to explore, and assert the role of Jiang Zemin as the “core” 
leader.  The article examines his position, which is useful in interpreting Jiang’s 
neo-conservative actions.  As with others, such as Bachman (1991) and Lam 
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(1995), Fewsmith (1994) initially put forward the hypothesis of the "eventual fall 
of Jiang Zemin" and suggested that other leaders would replace him.  Although 
such interpretations have been shown to be incorrect, they assist in providing an 
understanding of the mechanisms of the CCP in the 1990s and the “obstacles” 
Jiang has had to deal with.  Indeed, although these analysts do not 
predominately focus on the political theory of neo-conservatism, their 




This thesis adopts a historiographical narrative that evaluates and 
analyses China’s political culture in the 1990s. The usage of secondary 
resources is therefore important in this study.  Being archival in nature, the 
research has examined the literature available.  The majority is written by other 
Sinologists identifying events and situations within China, which is then analysed 
and interpreted according to the central questions and prepositions set-out for 
this research. 
  
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
Thus this dissertation is essentially an examination of the period 
beginning with the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. It evaluates the development and 
impact of the political thought of neo-conservatism, and its role in the creation of 
a “Jiang Zemin Era”.  
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The second chapter details the political theory of neo-conservatism.  It is 
important that the theory is understood, as it differs from its neo-authoritarian 
predecessor. One on the objectives of the study is to ascertain how Jiang Zemin 
has utilised the political theory of neo-conservatism to support the creation of a 
"Jiang Zemin Era".  Pivotal to the creation of this "era" was the need to re-
legitimise the CCP.  Therefore, it is necessary to have an understanding of the 
rule, and function, of legitimacy in China, which is contained in Chapter Four.  
Many China experts contend that since Deng's economic reforms began there 
has been a vacuum of ideological dogma as MLM has been largely discarded or 
de-emphasised for economic gain.  Indeed, the 1989 Tiananmen Incident 
appeared to rapidly escalated the need for another political theorem to fill this 
void.  Given that the logic adapted in framing the hypothesis is within the context 
of the re-legitimisation of the CCP utilising the political theory of neo-
conservatism, it is important to understand the requirements of political 
legitimacy in China.  As Yang (1996, p.202) states, "literature has, by and large, 
neglected the dynamic development in the re-legitimisation process by the CCP 
and the consequences of that process".  Furthermore, the impact of neo-
conservatism within the re-legitimisation process has been ignored.  The Third 
Chapter of this study therefore examines the role of legitimacy in a one-party 
state, and the problems encountered by the Chinese government and Party with 
its official adherence to MLM. 
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Chapter Four and Five identify and analyse the processes introduced by 
the Party that have assisted in the creation of the "Jiang Zemin Era" that 
occurred after 1995, with its incorporation of the political theory of neo-
conservatism.  Due to the duration of the period under study, the fourth chapter 
focuses on the period from the 1989 Tiananmen Incident until the 1992 
Fourteenth Congress, which shall be defined as the "pre-mortem" succession 
period (as termed by Dittmer, 1990 [in He, 1996, p.210]).  The fifth chapter, 
beginning after the 1992 Fourteenth Congress until the Jiang’s 1995 speech on 
“Stressing Politics”, examines the beginnings of the establishment of the "Jiang 
Zemin Era". 
Chapter Four, moreover, investigates the "pre-mortem" succession.  
This period can be deemed "pre-mortem" succession due to the fact that "Deng 
still dictated the parameters of policy debates and determin[ed] who [was] 
permitted into the inner circle of power" (Shambaugh, 1993, p.254).  Although 
within this period Jiang was the designated heir, and held the positions of 
General Secretary and Chairmanship of the CMC, Bachman’s (1991, p.252) 
view holds that: 
 
To maintain his position as designated heir, the leader-to-be must 
maintain the trust of the top leader.  Yet [during this period] Jiang 
[lacked] some of his patron's resources, and thus [needed to] 
develop independent power bases.  The dilemma arises from the 
fact that it [was] all but impossible for the successor to maintain the 
trust of the top leader and build independent power bases. 
In addition, there was the prospect that the] old guard [would] 




This chapter, then, examines the balance-of-power between the 
reformists and conservative factions in China.  Within this period many issues 
arose:  the direction towards "hard" ideology and "hard" neo-conservatism after 
the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and the fall of the communist systems in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union; Deng's early 1992 Southern Sojourn (nan 
xun), which unleashed a new round of power struggle; and, the Fourteenth 
Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 1992. Also, in this period, Jiang 
began to assert his position as designated heir within the hierarchy of the CCP, 
and as the "core" of the third generation leadership.  Jiang formed the "Jiang-Li" 
axis; began the creation of the "Shanghai Faction", or Shanghaibang, which 
pursued a conservative approach to the ideological line whilst remaining 
committed to the open door policy; started to create power bases for himself; 
and began to adopt measures for strengthening the Party.   
Chapter Five examines the emergence of the "Jiang Zemin Era".  As 
previously mentioned, although Deng was still alive in 1995, Jiang maintained 
his position as the "core" with his speech "Stressing Politics".  Indeed, it was this 
speech which marks the beginning of the Jiang Zemin Era.  As will be shown, it 
is during this period the Jiang readily utilised the "soft" formation of the political 
theory of neo-conservatism.  Although Yang (1998, p.111) posits that the Party 
was then plagued by indiscipline and organisational weakness despite continued 
efforts at "Party-building", "rectification" and "improving style", Jiang attempted 
to institutionalise the governance of China, albeit slowly.  Unlike Shambaugh's 
comments in 1993 (p.254) where he states that  
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The [Chinese] leadership does not have a coherent vision for the 
nation's future or a plan to solve its myriad problems, reacting 
instead to developments in an ad hoc fashion. 
 
Jiang, utilising neo-conservatism, did have a vision for China. 
 
Chapter Six, as the concluding chapter, evaluates the validity of the 
hypothesis, namely whether or not the political theory of neo-conservatism 
assisted in the establishment of the “Jiang Zemin Era”.  As the summative 
chapter, it also considers the possibilities of continual reform in political theory 
within the CCP, as well as the possibility of eventual democratisation there. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF NEO-CONSERVATISM 
 
Several China scholars, such as Kelly (1998) and Lam (1999) for 
example, have posited that many influential leaders of the CCP aspire to the 
political theory of neo-conservatism.  As such, and due to the nature of the 
research here, it is imperative that the political thought of neo-conservatism is 
delineated and understood to provide an insight into the key tenets of this 
political thought within the PRC.  In addition, although Kelly (1998) and Lam 
(1999) have argued that many influential leaders are adherents of the political 
theory of neo-conservatism, scholars have not clarified that there appears to be 
two differing branches of neo-conservative thought, that is “hard” conservatism 
and “soft” conservatism.  This is important as differing political leaders within the 
CCP adhere to different variants of the political theory of neo-conservatism.  
Therefore, the nature of change and reform within the CCP is dependant upon 
the variation of neo-conservatism that a certain leader of the CCP aspires to.
  
  
Neo-conservatism is based on the political theory of neo-
authoritarianism, a political theory that made inroads into academic discourse in 
China during the period from 1986 to 1989.  Yet, as mentioned above, due to 
the advent of the Tiananmen Incident, and the belief that the former General 
Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, was a supporter of the theory, after 4 June 1989 all 
discourse on neo-authoritarianism was effectively banned. 
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Essentially, neo-conservatism has two central tenets:  the maintenance 
of a market economy and the political stability of China, both of which are 
backed by the concept of “strongman politics” or “enlightened dictatorship”.  
These central tenets are fundamentally similar to those of neo-authoritarianism. 
As Kelly (1998, p.70) notes, the central argument for both the neo-authoritarians 
and neo-conservatives was, at least for the short term, that China would be best 
served by an authoritarian government.  Both schools of thought referred to the 
experience of East Asian nations, such as Taiwan and South Korea, and 
Western academics, such as Samuel Huntington, to justify their claims. 
However, it must be noted that whereas neo-authoritarians were pushing for 
increasingly radical economic reform and eventual democratisation, neo-
conservatives were emphasising the necessity of a politically stable 
environment, and that the economic reforms needed to be maintained but 
slowed.   
Similar to neo-authoritarianism with its two schools of thought, a 
“northern” school and a “southern school”, neo-conservatism has its “hard” and 
“soft” variations.  For both of these neo-conservative schools of thought, 
emphasis was placed on re-centralising the authority of the CCP which was 
deemed to have suffered with the onslaught of economic reforms and 
decentralisation in the late 1980s.  On the one hand, “hard” neo-conservatists, 
who wished to shape the economic and political policies after the Tiananmen 
Incident, wanted to limit economic reform.  On the other hand, “soft” neo-
conservatives, as a result of Deng’s “Southern Sojourn” in 1992, wished to 
continue Deng’s more rapid and progressive economic reforms.  These two 
 31
theoretical factions oscillated, with differing responses, within the higher 
echelons of power within the CCP throughout the 1990s.     
  
This chapter examines several key issues:  the origin of the political 
theory of neo-conservatism as a result of the Tiananmen Incident, the 
examination of the central tenets of the theory, as well as a brief examination of 
East Asian authoritarianism.  Furthermore, this chapter differentiates between 
the “hard” and “soft” forms of neo-conservatism. This is done by utilising two key 
primary sources: Realistic Responses and Strategic Options for China After the 
Soviet Upheaval, published in 1992 by the taizidang (princelings) elite and Jiang 
Zemin’s “Stressing Politics” (1995) speech as an exemplar of the leadership’s 
emphasis on political stability. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF NEO-CONSERVATISM AND CENTRAL TENETS OF THE 
THEORY 
 
It is assumed by some academics that the theory of neo-conservatism 
was introduced by the taizidang, or princelings – sons of past and present CCP 
leaders - in the early 1990s (Tsai, 1992; and Kelly, 1996). Their article was 
published in response to the failed Soviet coup of August 1990, with the title 
Realistic Responses and Strategic Options for China After the Soviet Upheaval. 
This work is explored latter in this chapter.  Although this article does indicate a 
renewed emphasis placed upon a stable government, neo-conservatives were 
generally neo-authoritarians who were not associated with the Zhao Ziyang 
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faction before the Tiananmen Incident.  For example, Xiao Gongqin is seen to 
be a leading academic purporting neo-conservatism, yet Xiao, an associate 
professor at the Shanghai Normal University, has been credited by many China 
analysts as having constructed the terminology, neo-authoritarianism, in 1988 
(Gu Xin and Kelly, 1995, p.222; and Tsai, 1992, p.3). Gu Xin and Kelly (1994, 
p.221) state that Xiao Gongqin first used the terminology “neo-conservatism” at 
an informal conference on “China’s traditional culture and Socialist 
Modernisation” in early 1990. Indeed, whilst this conference was informal, it had 
a degree of support from the CCP Ideology and Propaganda Department. Ruan 
suggests that theorists who had called themselves the “southern school’ of neo-
authoritarianism merely renamed themselves neo-conservatives (1996, p.59; 
and also in Kelly, 1998, p. 70). 
 
Neo-conservatism emerged in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, and 
the banning of neo-authoritarianism.  It emerged as an “immediate ideology”; a 
choice for those who were no longer willing to rely solely on MLMT, but who 
also, for one reason or another rejected any attempt at political liberalisation.  
Neo-conservatism offered nationalism and traditional culture as a replacement 
formula for renewing Party legitimacy.  Indeed, Gu Xin and Kelly (1994, p.222) 
differentiate between neo-authoritarianism and neo-conservatism by the degree 
to which neo-conservatism accommodates traditional values and Chinese 
nationalism.  Yet neo-conservatism rejects liberal democracy, not on the 
grounds of any ideological conviction (in their theory, neo-conservatists “allude 
to democracy’s admittedly ideal form”) as it is deemed impractical given China’s 
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dire “national conditions” (Gu Xin and Kelly 1994, p.230, and, Kelly, 1998, pp.69-
70). 
As mentioned above, the two important tenets of neo-conservatism are: 
one, the political stability of China; and, two, the creation of a market economy.  
However, unlike neo-authoritarianism, emphasis is upon stability8, which is 
evidenced in articles such as the princelings’ “Realistic Responses” and Jiang’s 
“Stressing Politics” (which are examined later in the chapter).  It must be noted 
that democratisation is seen to be a distant goal of neo-conservatism.  Even 
though neo-conservatism purports to defuse the threats of liberalism, the theory 
makes crucial concessions to liberal values and practices (Kelly, 1998, p.70).  
Xiao Gongqin, and Jiang Yihua, a history professor at the Fudan University, 
have both argued that the “masses” would require a period of tutelage before 
democracy could work in China (in Kelly, 1998, p.70; and, Yang, 1996, p.215)9. 
Most neo-conservatives in China believe that democracy would only 
succeed in China if it were preceded by the development of a market economy 
and that only an authoritarian government could impose a market on unprepared 
and unwilling Chinese population (Kelly, 1998, p.70).  Therefore, many Chinese 
scholars have drawn similarities between China’s development and that of other 
Asian nations in the region, and these scholars have used these similarities as a 
basis for neo-conservatism (as examined further in this chapter). 
                                                          
8 When used in the article “Realistic Responses”, the importance of stability was used to 
illustrate the negative development that occurred in the former USSR and Eastern Europe after 
democratisation. 
 
9 The needing of a period of “tutelage” was also used by Chiang Kai-shek in his attempt to retain 
the Guomindang’s monopoly of power in Taiwan. 
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Many in the CCP, though not endorsing neo-conservatism, appear to 
welcome this line of thought, as long as it does not challenge the legitimacy of 
the CCP or become part of a conspiracy to promote “Peaceful Evolution” 
towards capitalism, along with which would come “democracy” (Tsai, 1992, p.2).  
Indeed, the appointment of Wang Huning, an associate of Jiang’s, to the Central 
Committee Policy Research Office’s Political Group was taken as a return to 
favour of neo-conservatives amongst the CCP Leadership (see Chapter Five for 
details).  This is because Wang belonged to a “policy faction” which included 
Xiao Gongqin as a member (Kelly, 1998, p.71). 
 
After the Tiananmen Incident and the Soviet crisis, the dilemma faced 
by Deng’s reformist faction and the conservatives was the question of extending 
economic reform whilst preserving the unchallenged rule of the CCP (Tsai, 
1992, p.19).  Neo-conservatives realised that trying to reverse Deng’s economic 
reforms was unrealistic. However, they wanted the reforms to be slowed.  Bo 
Xicheng, a princeling, argued that the only way to maintain the Party’s 
supremacy was to ensure its control over the financial and the business empire, 
whereby the neo-conservatives claimed that the fusion of party and business 
would facilitate political reform because it meant that the Party would have to 
consolidate its power and implement reforms (Lam, 1995, p.70).  As Watson 






China’s economic reform process has been a pragmatic drive to 
strengthen state power.  The economic reforms were not a key 
goal themselves, but were seen as the means through which the 




Efficient economic growth would generate the resources to enable the 
state (hence, the CCP and its leadership) to become more powerful.  In this 
view, the result was an experimental process of economic reform in the absence 
of major political change.   In the early 1990s, the princelings voiced their 
concern over accelerating economic reform without re-centralising power and 
control.  These “hard” neo-conservative princelings advocated the strengthening 
of the SOEs (State-Owned Enterprises), whose taxes supported the central 
budget; the reinforcement of the government’s control over the provinces; and 
emphasis on nationalism as means to legitimise CCP rule.  In addition, some 
neo-conservative writings opposed corruption and wanted to control peasant 
migration to the cities (Fewsmith, 1995, p.253). 
Therefore, when economic reform was a matter of concern, neo-
conservatives came to advocate “gradualism” and oppose “radicalism”.  They 
rejected economic or political “shock therapy” which could lead to an “abyss of 
perpetual chaos” (Lin, 1996, p.79).  Indeed, for the majority of Chinese, and 
advocates of neo-conservatism, the negative developments in the former USSR 
and Eastern European countries after democratisation have been often used a 
examples to illustrate the importance of stability (Yang, 1996, p.215).  For them, 
a strong, stable government is necessary for China to further open its economic 
reforms. 
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The Issue of the Political Stability of China: A Theoretical Perspective 
 
A core tenet of neo-conservatism is the belief that China needs strong 
leaders maintain political order and to guide its economic reform from a planned 
to a market economy.  Inspired by the 1986 publication into Chinese of Samuel 
Huntington’s Political Order In Changing Societies (1968), Chinese theorists 
utilised his central theoretical premise: that “the most important political 
distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but the 
degree of government” (1968, p.1). Ma (1991, p.4) states that Huntington’s 
emphasis on political order was becoming increasingly relevant in China, 
whereby central control over local authorities was eroding, the ability of the 
government to implement policies was being declining, and social unrest was 
increasing.  According to White (1994, p.87), however, while the political 
rationale for a “new” conservatism was based on an attempt at “hard-headed 
Huntingtonian realism” about the need to tackle the difficulties of development, 
the theory would have to be translated into something which was ideologically 
more palatable to politically assertive and influential constituencies both within 
and outside China. 
Conservative theorists such as Huntington (1968, revised in 1984) and 
Edward Shils (1991) argue that authoritarianism may be a necessary or 
inevitable stage on the road to capitalism, and thus democracy.  
Authoritarianism is widely recognised as a form of state power endemic to 
capitalist societies prior to the emergence of a cohesive and hegemonic 
bourgeois (Hewison, Robinson and Rodan, 1993, p.11).  However, Huntington 
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argues that the task of managing economic growth and political order could be 
best achieved by an authoritarian regime, whereby authoritarianism becomes a 
functional response to social disintegration and economic malaise.  Hewison, 
Robinson and Rodan (1993, p.13) further argue that authoritarianism creates the 
basis for capitalism, and in the long run democratic institutions.  This is because 
the political dynamics involved are systemic, with integration necessarily 
triumphing over disintegration, and authoritarian rule being the appropriate 
instrument for integration.  Authoritarianism does this by developing institutions 
capable of integrating civil society into the political process without falling into 
revolution and by providing the conditions for investment and rapid 
industrialisation.  They conclude that the authoritarian regime fulfils its historic 
mission by eventually integrating all social groups into the increasingly 
democratic process and eventually relinquishing its role to the middle class. 
According to Huntington (1984, p.212), if democracy were to eventuate 
in China, the process must begin from the top down, although democracy may 
develop as much from the top-down as from the bottom-up.  Thus, for the 
supporters of neo-conservatism in China, it is held that an “enlightened dictator” 
is required to force the necessary breakthrough, so the reforms could gain new 
momentum (Ma, 1991, p.1).  The “supreme leader”, could, in addition keep in 






Production of a Market Economy: A Tenet of Neo-Conservatism 
 
Initially, young intellectuals like Wang Huning and Xiao Gongqin 
examined the economic success stories of several of the “four” mini-dragons, 
Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, to assist Zhao Ziyang in the promotion of 
his economic reforms.  These scholars noted a correlation between the 
economic development of these countries under one form or another of 
authoritarian rule, contrasted with the economic development of many other 
developing nations.  They found that developing countries with strongman rulers 
had all been able to achieve a much higher rate of economic growth than those 
ruled by either a democratic government or by a totalitarian regime (Tsai, 1992, 
p.5).  This led them to conclude that authoritarianism might be particularly 
applicable in China (Petracca and Mong, 1990, p.1101). 
It should be noted that several studies of Latin American nations were 
also critiqued, especially those by the political writers Sahlin (1977) and 
O’Donnell (1993), and that Chinese intellectuals utilised this Latin American 
experience to assist in the development of both neo-authoritarianism and neo-
conservatism.  Due to the fact that successful neo-conservative states in both 
Latin America and South East Asia contain the feature of protecting market 
forces by the state, it was deemed that this system of government was 
appropriate for China.  Woo-Cummings (1994, p.414) posits that the Chinese 
did not emulate the bureaucratic authoritarianism of Latin American state, but 
rather the strong states of South Korea and Taiwan and the industrial might of 
Japan.  Woo-Cummings concedes that for the Chinese, openly emulating Japan 
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is “difficult for anyone to do in post-war Asia, which is why the Beijing leadership 
has made Singapore the shining example of neo-conservatism and its presumed 
economic payoffs” (1994, p.414). 
 
Essentially, then, economic modernisation and authoritarianism under 
an “enlightened dictator” are intertwined.  Chinese national leaders must be 
committed to modernisation and they must advance market-orientated reforms 
to bring China’s economy into line with dominant trends throughout the world.  
Since the legitimacy of neo-conservatism rests on a dual mixture of nationalism 
and economic development, political leaders must expand political education, by 
educating people of the benefits of nationalism and economic development, so 
as to gain the support of the majority of people (Petracca and Mong, 1990, 
p.1106). 
China is currently in a mix of both planned and market economies.  The 
high degree of control necessitated by such an economy inevitably leads to 
some dictatorial policies.  Neo-conservatives are in favour of replacing the 
planned economy with a market economy (marketisation) and state-ownership 
with private ownership (privatisation).  They argue that marketisation can bring 
about the separation between the economy and politics, through preventing the 
over-concentration of political power in the hands of a small number of 
individuals thus reducing the tendency towards dictatorship.  Additionally, neo-
conservatives argue that a market economy reduces the importance of political 
power and public policy, therefore minimising the number of people who seek to 
use political power for economic gain; thus reducing corruption. 
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Theoretically, neo-conservatism will eventually assist in the creation of a 
more democratic environment in China.  There are three reasons for this.  First, 
in a market system, people are more certain about their responsibility.  With the 
creation of mechanisms of popular participation in the affairs of the government, 
voters will not elect officials who are unable to protect (or not interested in 
protecting) the best interests of the citizenry.  As a result, bribery and corruption 
in a market economy are thought to be minimised.  Second, the growth of a 
market economy helps to build a differentiated social structure that serves as the 
basis for a modern political party system, electoral competition and, hence, the 
existence of mechanisms for democratic governance.  The spread of market 
relationships will establish relationships aimed at mutual benefit, which will 
improve the tolerant co-existence of members of society, creating the 
indispensable cultural conditions for democracy.  Additionally, marketisation, 
with its diversity of economic interests, will lay a solid basis for political pluralism 
and a modern multi-party system.  The third reason is that a market economy 
will give birth to a new society dominated by the middle class. 
As all the markets in China cannot be considered “free markets” in the 
Western sense, an “enlightened dictator” is required to force the separation of 
politics from the market, to overcome the forces that disrupt the market and 






EAST ASIAN AUTHORITARIANISM 
 
Neo-conservatives draw on other forms of East Asian authoritarianism 
as models to inform China’s political and economic development.  The political 
theory of neo-conservatism resembles the initial development of countries such 
as Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and to a lesser extent, Japan.  Indeed, the 
Asian monetary crisis of 1997-1998 did not stop neo-conservatives utilising 
these East Asian states as models for development (possibly due to China not 
being as affected by the monetary crisis).  As Woo-Cumings notes: “The 
Chinese have not shrunk from proclaiming that Singapore-style authoritarianism 
is the formula for political and ideological stability” (1994, p.413). 
Several of these East Asian countries have been described as strong 
“developmental” states, distinguished by high level commitment to economic 
objectives from powerful leaders.  There are four “explanations” of the factors 
that caused accumulation and productivity to be so strong in East Asia, as 
identified by Petri (1997, pp. 545-548).  These are: one, neoclassical; two, 
structuralist interpretations; three, cultural explanations; and, four, interaction 
effects (contagion).  The neoclassical approach has emphasised the outward 
orientation and macroeconomic discipline of these nations.  They have invested 
vigorously in human capital and maintained competitive markets.  Structuralist 
theorists have singled out the type of governance, being typically one-party 
states or one-party dominate states.  Culturalists have focused on both the 
governance and societal characteristics, based loosely on Confucianism.  Most 
nations in the region emphasise “community” over individual values, and these 
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nations have also developed meritocratic institutions and legitimised 
authoritarian rule.  The interaction effects, or contagion, focused on the 
promotion of the initiation of foreign technologies and business strategies, and 
encourage the initiation of policies, facilitated direct investment and trade (Petri, 
1997, pp.545-548). 
 
Academics, such as Robinson (1996), have focused exclusively on the 
presumption of specific “Asian values” that these nations might possess which 
have assisted in their economic advancement and political stability.  Factors 
similar to Petri’s culturalist explanations (as mentioned above) are raised.  
However, it is important to note that Asian nations in the region, including China, 
have utilised the “Asian values” mantra to differentiate themselves from the 
West, and to stop the “spread” of Western cultural influences, such as 
democracy.  Robinson states that this nationalistic usage of “Asian values” is a 
combination of an “organic-statist variant of political conservatism with a market 
economy” (1996, p.313).  Furthermore, governments utilising this “pervasive 
anti-Westernism” within its concept of “Asian values” allows the authoritarian 
regime to claim the mantle of nationalism and, thus, brand reformers, or those 
espousing democratic notions, as being “un-Asian” (Robinson, 1996, p.316; and 
also Min, 1993, p.1).  
 
The interesting notion is that most of these nations followed the path 
that neo-conservatives in China see as the desired goal:  economic reform with 
a stable (one-party) government.  The governments of Japan, South Korea, 
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Taiwan and Singapore were, at one time, not only either one-party or one-party 
dominant states which allowed for political stability, but they were also 
interventionist governments:  actively playing an economic and industrial role in 
their country’s development (Dutt, Kim and Singh, 1994; Roumasset, 1992; and 
Wade, 1992) 
As Zheng notes (1994, p.248), a precondition of political development is 
the provision of very favourable conditions for economic progress, thus, political 
stability must be given the highest priority.  Huntington (1991, p.26) noted that 
the “interactions of economic progress and Asian culture appears to have 
generated a distinctly East Asian variety of democratic institutions”, whereby the 
dominant-party states of the region “spanned a continuum between democracy 
and authoritarianism”.  As such, the system may have met the formal 
requirements of democracy, but differed from its Western counterparts.  
Huntington posits that the East Asian dominant system seems to involve 
competition for power but not alteration of power; and that there was the 
participation in elections for all, but only participation in office for those in the 
“mainstream” party.  Essentially, Huntington believes that the system represents 
an adaptation of Western democratic practice to serve not Western values of 
competition and change, but Asian values of consensus and stability (1991, 
p.27) 
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REALISTIC RESPONSES AND THE TAIZIDANG (PRINCELINGS)10 
 
Scholars, such as Tsai (1992) and Kelly (1996), posit that neo-
conservatism emerged from the taizidang (princelings) of the CCP, the children 
of the leaders of the CCP.  Both Tsai and Kelly draw on the article Realistic 
Responses and Strategic Options for China After the Soviet Upheaval published 
in the China Spring (Zhongguo Zhichuan) in 1992, and the taizidang’s 
involvement in the creation of this article, as an exemplar of the emergence of 
the political theory of neo-conservatism. 
 Indeed, the period from 4 June 1989 to the failed Soviet coup in August 
1991 was a “transitional period” (Ruan, 1996, p.60) for the CCP, in which neo-
authoritarians were in need of readjusting their policies and forces.  Pan Yue, 
who was the son-in-law of Liu Huaqing, and Yang Ping, the ideology and theory 
editor of the China Youth Daily, drew a number of princeling theoreticians 
together for a theory conference in late 1990 to discuss China’s place in the 
post-Tiananmen era.  The princeling invitees included Chen Yuan, son of Chen 
Yun, Bo Xicheng, son of Bo Yibo, Chen Xiaolu, son of Chen Yi, and a son of Li 
Peng and He Xin (Lu, 1996, p.33; and Kelly 1996).  Noticeably, the princelings 
were sons of hard-liners within the CCP. 
The article Realistic Responses was a result of this conference.  In fact, 
Realistic Responses was pushed as an antidote, if not a solution, for the CCP’s 
continual dominance in China. Indeed, Realistic Responses was printed by the 
                                                          
10 Taizidang is used instead of Taizi, as the princelings never represented a monolithic 
organisation but rather a form of various factions fighting for wealth and power. 
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CCP Central Office11 as an internal document (neican) for circulation amongst 
the top leadership (Tsai, 1992, p.16).  Chen states that Realistic Responses 
“represents in broad terms the mainstream CCP ‘princeling faction’s’ political 
philosophy and program of rule” (1996, p.39). Gu and Kelly (1994, p.220) have 
summarised Realistic Responses as: 
 
An adoption of a philosophy that is somewhat confusingly known in 
Chinese as “new conservatism”, together with “Western 
rationalistic philosophy”.  Along with a tough attitude to control the 
masses and some very Realpolitik specifications in foreign policy, 
these prescriptions tried to supplement a perceived deficit in the 
Party’s legitimacy, and to ward off the temptation of radical 
reformism, particularly in the political sphere. 
 
Furthermore, and more importantly, Realistic Responses emerged 
before the Fourteenth Party Congress (1992).  Realistic Responses’ status, 
even notionally, was as a preliminary document for the Fourteenth Party 
Congress. It can be assumed that the princelings were jockeying for positions 
within the Politburo, and utilised the article to show their “ideological” and 
“performance” credentials.  Realistic Responses, with its warnings against 
accelerated economic reform and further decentralisation, could be further used 
by the princelings if the economic problems that beset China in the 1980s 
returned.  
Chen Yun wrote to the CCP Politburo suggesting that the children of 
high-ranking cadres should be recruited into the leadership.  As he wrote, “with 
our children [in charge], our hearts are at ease.  At least they will not totally deny 
                                                          
11 The article may have also been printed by China Youth Daily at the same time. 
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their own fathers” (Tsai, 1992, p.16).  This was because it was believed that 
students, intellectuals and technocrats were seen to have been “polluted” by 
Western liberal capitalist ideology, and only the children of the CCP leadership 
could be trusted to uphold the absolute power of the CCP (Tsai, 1992, p.16). 
 Ironically, due to swift manoeuvring by Jiang Zemin, the taizidang faction 
linked with Realistic Responses failed to be elected to the Central Committee at 
the 1992 Fourteenth Congress (Kelly, 1998, p.70).  Realistic Responses was an 
attempt by the princelings to influence economic and political policy in the lead-
up to the Fourteenth Congress.  If the economic problems that beset China in 
the late 1980s had returned to China in the mid-1990s (before Zhu Rongji’s 
introduction of the austerity program in 1993), however, the taizidang could have 
stated that their previous warnings were evidence of foresight, prudence and 
leadership (Gu Xin and Kelly, 1994, p.219). 
 
REALISTIC RESPONSES AND NEO-CONSERVATISM 
 
An examination of Realistic Responses is useful to China scholars as it 
does provide the earliest theoretical construction of the political theory of neo-
conservatism.  Furthermore, Realistic Responses verifies the differentiation 
between the theory of neo-conservatism and that of its predecessor, neo-
authoritarianism, notably, the inclination of neo-conservatism towards political 
conservatism, unlike the emphasis placed upon furthering economic reforms in 
the political theory of neo-authoritarianism.  In addition, Realistic Responses 
reveals the advent of the branch of “hard” neo-conservatism that would flourish 
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in China until 1992, especially when Li Peng was in charge of the economic 
arena (see Chapter Four).   Yet, advocates of “hard” neo-conservatism would 
continue to make an impact upon political and economic decisions in China. 
 Kelly (1996) in his editorship of the journal Chinese Law and 
Government (vol. 29, no. 2), has included not only the Realistic Responses 
article, but also critiques of that article by dissident/overseas Chinese.  Kelly 
adds that the authors of the critiques were all living in the United States, but 
before the Tiananmen Incident were, for the most part, highly regarded and well 
connected individuals (1996, p.9).  It should be noted though, that the exiled 
Chinese dissidents in the United States were “democrats” and opposed to the 
political theory of neo-conservatism, which is evident in their critiques. 
Chen (in Kelly, 1996, p.9) has analysed Realistic Responses to reveal 
the political conservative direction of the princeling faction.  To him, Realistic 
Responses revealed essentially that the neo-conservatives’ political framework 
was: one, for statism to replace communism as the ideology; two, for right-wing 
autocracy to replace left-wing totalitarianism; three, that the principles of 
geopolitics replace ideological principles; four, for the romantic egalitarian 
revolutionary party to be replaced by a ruling party defending its power with 
Realpolitik; fifth, party ownership to replace public ownership by the state; and, 
sixth, the recentralisation of power. 
 
However, the authors of Realistic Responses see neo-conservatism as 
a: 
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Reform [that] is distinct [to] that of the traditional diehard 
conservative forces; [neo-conservatism] calls for using rational 
elements in both the traditional and the present order, and the 
gradual introduction of elements of Western institutions to bring 
about China’s modernisation [whereby] we should combine neo-
conservatism and Western rational philosophy as targets of the 
Party’s united front in the new era.  Western rationalist philosophy 
advocates proof, instrumental reason, and orderly, gradual 
process. 
 
[With neo-conservatism] emphasis [is] on nationalism and 
patriotism…[and] the creative transformation of traditional Chinese 
culture [which] is a rich spiritual resource for safeguarding the 
socialist system, protecting the interests of the state and nation, 
and promoting the cause of modernisation. 
 
Long term strategy (study and development of scientific socialism) 
should take precedence over short term (repressing rightist 
ideology) and should be carried out with utmost vigour. [As] neo-
conservatism has long existed as an antithesis to radicalism (1996, 
pp. 21-22). 
 
Realistic Responses appealed to Chinese cultural nationalism and to the 
maintenance of a market economy.  By appealing to cultural nationalism, 
Realistic Responses rejects the universal validity of Western values.  Traditional 
values, especially Confucianism, have been utilised, and the Western model of 
development has been questioned as to whether it has any applicability to China 
(Kelly, 1996, p.7).  Ruan’s response, as a critique of Realistic Responses, sees 
the return to “traditional values systems, ideologues, and authorities as the 
positive mediators for modernisation” and only because, as Ruan continues, 
“Oriental despotism is on the verge of extinction and Western democracy and 
free enterprise [are deemed] so awful [by the princelings]” (1996, p.67).  
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 As Kelly correctly concludes, Realistic Responses essentially reveals the 
neo-conservatives’ “break” with MLM, whilst seeking to preserve by other means 
those aspects of MLM, such as Leninism, that support the Party’s claim to 
legitimacy (1996, p.6). Yin (1996, pp. 77-78), one of the authors of another 
critique of Realistic Responses, states that: 
 
Neo-conservatism differs from the unchangeable old conservatism 
that clings obstinately to Marxist dogma and is also opposed to 
“institutional determinism”. 
 
Neo-conservatism is opposed to Marxism-Leninism, but in the 
development stage, in order to maintain the existing order, it is 
obliged to agree to make use of ‘certain value systems from 
traditionally revolutionary ideology having an inhibitory function. 
[Yet]  neo-conservatism supports/defends the status quo, defends 
the authority of CCP domination in politics, supports market 
reforms in economics and places hope in the growth and 
strengthening of a middle class  
 
 
 Indeed, for the authors of Realistic Responses, economic reforms 
must not impinge on political stability: 
 
We must also tactfully tell the people that many problems facing 
the economy are connected to China’s national condition, and not 
all questions can be solved by reform, raising the popular masses 
expectations excessively regarding the results of reform is 
dangerous…as soon as the public’s excessive expectations fail to 
be met, serious political disturbances might develop (1996, pp. 24-
25). 
 
Ruan, another overseas dissident, states that neo-conservatism, as 
presented in Realistic Responses, then, seems to display a none too 
“conservative” radicalism and adventurism (1996, p.67).  Ruan further states 
that “those who describe [neo-conservatism] as a ‘moderate’ or ‘third’ force are 
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mistaken.  It is more extremist than the ‘political’ or ‘economic radicalism’ to 
which it is opposed (1996, p.67).  “Extremism”, according to Ruan, is the 
emphasis neo-conservatives place on political stability over the economy.  Ruan 
(1996, p.63) states that the authors of Realistic Responses are in agreement 
with their neo-authoritarian predecessor with the notion that “democracy entails 
chaos”.  However, they disagree with the neo-authoritarians support for free 
enterprise which might give rise to aspirations for political participation, thus, 
leading to calls for democracy. “Radicalism”, though, as posited by Wang 
(another dissident), refers to any school opposed to neo-conservatism (1996, 
p.83).   For Ruan, the Realistic Responses call for “strict government” 
meant to “strengthen ideological control” (1996, p.50).  Yet Ruan, in his critique, 
does not differentiate between the competing “hard” or “soft” neo-conservativism 
in the lead-up to the Fourteenth Congress. 
 
In the Realistic Responses article, neo-conservatism does attack liberal 
intellectuals and their program for democratic reform, whilst making crucial 
concessions to liberal values and practices (Kelly, 1996, p.6).  Ruan (1996, 
p.63) states that:  “neo-conservatism [as presented in Realistic Responses] sets 
itself up as opposition to ‘radical Westernisation reform’ since it opposes 
‘indiscriminate adoption of the Western democratic political system and also the 
Western free enterprise system’”. 
 In his critique of Realistic Responses, Ruan states that the princelings 
involved in its authorship “lay the blame for the June 4 massacre on the 
‘democratic romanticism’ of the liberal democratic intellectuals and students” 
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(1996, p.63).  Ruan (1996) asserts that neo-authoritarians split into two groups 
after the Tiananmen Incident; those opposed to the repression, such as Zhao 
Ziyang and Wu Jianxing, and those of the “pro-killing faction”, namely the 
princelings.  It must be noted, though, that this is the opinion of a Chinese 
democrat dissident. 
  
As aforementioned, the authors of Realistic Responses attempted, but 
failed, to get elected at the Fourteenth Congress.  Their failure to get elected did 
not mean that “hard” neo-conservatism was abandoned, as some analysts such 
as Kelly (1996) suggest, but rather that it was sidelined.  Gu Xin and Kelly have 
concluded, due to the failure of the princelings being elected, that “the doctrine 
[of neo-conservatism] is likely to emerge, no doubt updated and altered, in 
China after Deng and other original revolutionaries [die]” (1994, p.230).  
Realistic Responses was the first and most articulate form of neo-
conservatism published after the Tiananmen Incident.  Yet it must be noted that 
Realistic Responses was published by “hard” neo-conservatives. 
 
JIANG ZEMIN’S “STRESSING POLITICS” 
 
China analysts, such as Lam (1999), assert that Jiang, along with Zhu 
Rongji (including their political associates, and members of Jiang’s “Shanghai 
Faction”) are neo-conservatives.  Initially, it was hard to categorise Jiang as 
either a reformer or a conservative.  Yet the ascension of the Jiang Zemin Era in 
1995, and his speech delivered at a meeting for the coordinators of the Fifth 
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Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Party Congress on 27 September 1995, 
revealed Jiang’s neo-conservative tendencies.  This speech also revealed 
Jiang’s desire to create his own “theory” armed at developing Deng’s thought 
and maintaining the legitimacy of the CCP in the post-Deng era (Hong, 1997, 
p.90). 
A basis of the speech was Jiang’s iteration of the “Twelve Guiding 
Principles”, which was a “general guideline for correctly handling the major 
relationships [that the CCP] should adhere to” (Jiang, 1995, p.29).  Jiang 
continued by stating that  
 
[Due to the] new contradictions and problems that have cropped 
up in the modernisation drive being undertaken under the 
conditions of a socialist market economy….the purpose [of the 
guidelines] is to, on the basis of summarising historical 
experiences, strive to master the objective law, to unify the 
understanding of the whole Party, to cater for people of all ethnic 
groups in the country, and to mobilise all positive factors to speed 
up the socialist modernisation drive. 
 
These “Twelve Guiding Principals” consist of: first, the relationship 
between reform, development and stability; second, relationship between speed 
and efficiency; third, relationships between economic construction and 
population, resources and environment; fourth, the relationship between the 
primary, secondary and tertiary industries; fifth, the relationship between the 
Eastern region and the Central and Western regions; sixth, the relationship 
between the market mechanism and macroeconomic regulation and control; 
seventh, relationship between the public ownership economy and other 
economic sectors; eighth, the relationship between the State, enterprise and the 
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individual in income distribution; ninth, the relationship between opening up 
wider the outside world and upholding self-reliance; tenth, the relationship 
between the central and local authorities; eleventh, the relationship between 
national defence building and economic development; twelfth, the relationship 
between material ad spiritual civilisation building (Jiang, 1995, pp.29-36). 
 
 As explored by Hong (1997), amongst other analysts, Jiang’s speech on 
“stressing politics”, entitled Leaders Must Stress Politics, exemplifies the 
precedence placed on political stability over far-reaching economic reforms. 
Whilst the first, fifth and tenth “guiding relationships” dealt predominantly with 
political stability, out of all of the twelve guiding relationships, the most important 
is the relationship between reform, development and stability12 (the first “guiding 
relationship”).  This is because the other eleven relationships are conditioned by 
this overall relationship.  In other world, if reform, development and stability were 
properly dealt with, it would lay a solid foundation and create favourable 
conditions for the other eleven relationships. In his speech Jiang (1995, p.29) 
states that 
 
Stability is the premise for development and reform, and 
development and reform require a stable political and social 
environment…Without a stable political and social environment, 
nothing can be done…[the CCP hopes to] bring about long term 




                                                          
12 The key tenets of the political thought of neo-authoritarianism also promotes the inter-
relatedness of political stability and economic marketisation.   
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Yet, it must be noted, that although the speech does not place 
importance on economic reform, the reality was that economic reform was again 
occurring under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, with the assistance of Zhu 
Rongji. 
  
The key ideals of this speech were reiterated by Jiang when he met 
high-level officials from the Editorial Board of Jiefangjun Ribao (People’s 
Liberation Army Daily) on 2 January 1996.  Jiang presented a revised version 
again when he participated in a meeting for CCP leaders of the NPC and the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPCC) on 3 March 1996.  
This speech was published on 1 July 1996 by Qiushi (Searching Truth) 
magazine, which is sponsored by the Central Committee.   
  
The speech was interpreted by most Chinese intellectuals and 
politicians differently.  First, some thought that “stressing politics” referred to the 
notion of stressing the core of the Jiang Zemin leadership, which was designed 
to maintain Jiang’s power and CCP authority. Second, it was seen as a 
reaffirmation of many local leaders’ political powers. Third, for others, the 
speech was to signal another anti-corruption campaign. Fourth, some 
considered it as an anti-reform call. Fifth, some considered it as a hardline 
stance against Taiwanese independence, Hong Kong democracy and American 
hegemonism. Sixth, it was deemed a duplication of two old ideas, such as CCP 
authority and anti-corruption, which were not created by Jiang, but by Zhao 
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Ziyang’s idea of neo-authoritarianism and Chen Yun’s theory of CCP 
construction (Hong, 1997, p.89). 
 
In fact, Jiang’s speech revealed his belief that there needed to be a 
balance between economics and politics, which are core tenets of the theory of 
neo-conservatism.  As Jiang (“On Stressing Politics”, Searching Truth, 1996, in 
Hong, 1997, p.90) stated: 
 
We must learn how to dialectically understand and deal with the 
relationship between reform, development and stability, between 
material civilisation and spiritual civilisation, between productive 
forces and productive relations, and between [an] economic base 
and superstructure. 
 
Jiang, as the core of the third generation leadership, also had to balance 
himself between the legacies of Mao and Deng.  Hong ( 1997, p.91). posits that: 
 
Politically, Jiang is confronting a dilemma in dealing with Mao’s 
and Deng’s ideas [at least in 1995].  Jiang does not have enough 
capacity [at the time of the speech] of overstepping Mao and 
Deng’s philosophy; and Jiang will lose his legitimacy if he just 
follows and copies what Mao and Deng advocated.  Meanwhile, if 
Jiang follows a policy of pro-Mao and anti-Deng it [would] damage 
Jiang’s credibility because Jiang’s current position [in 1995 was] 
completely based upon Deng’s appointment and trust.   By 
contrast, if he follows an anti-Mao pro-Deng [stance], he [would] 
lose significant support from conservative forces which [were] still 
valuable [to assist in ‘cementing’ his position as the ‘core leader’].  
Being balanced, Jiang’s power will be maximised through unifying 
those who support Mao and those who support Deng, in order to 
limit and even eliminate any possible attacks from both 
conservative and reformist factions. 
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Jiang managed to “politically” balance himself within the CCP; he had 
not been as “left” as Mao, nor as “right” as Deng.  Hong states that most 
Chinese people prefer accepting reliable, steady, balanced and sophisticated 
leadership rather than one that polarises society between two extremes (1997, 
p.91).  Jiang’s neo-conservative stance, balancing both economics and politics, 
appeared to assist in stabilising China from the extremes of politics experienced 
under Mao, and the extreme rightism experienced under Deng’s economic 
reform.  Indeed, those who suffered in Mao’s era now expect a market economy 
and democratic practices; and those who have not benefited as a result of the 
introduction of a market economy under the reformist Deng era, have begun to 
look for economic stability, purified government and social equality (Hong, 1997, 
p.91). 
 
Yet, the notion of “stressing politics” and its related policies are not new.  
Traditional societies, from agricultural societies to industrial economies, engage 
in “stressing politics”.  This is because “stressing politics” essentially refers to 
the stressing of non-economic fields, particularly the legal systems, 
institutionalisation, moral values, and the rule of economic competition.  The 
construction of a legal system and political institutions is completed first, in 
conjunction with the reformation of the economy, and political participation is 
seen as an end result of the latter.  This is consistent with the central tenets of 
neo-conservatism, and it is a model of economic development that has been 
adapted by other East Asian nations, such as South Korea and Japan (Hong, 
1997, p.91) 
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Jiang’s “Stressing Politics” was co-written, if not ghost written, by the 
neo-conservative academic Wang Huning.  Wang’s early ideas touched upon at 
least two issues that later became important to neo-conservatism.  The first 
issue was the political implication of decentralisation.  Wang was concerned that 
the strategy of economic decentralisation pursued under reform was giving 
localities an economic and political interest and a capacity to resist the centre.  
This implication of this, in Wang’s view, was not the emergence of a more 
pluralistic society but the impairment of effectual central rule.  The second issue 
raised was that a common value system was required.  Thus, while hinting that 
the communist ideology was in need of reform, Wang also suggested that the 
central government needed to develop, maintain, and even enforce a certain 
ideological structure.  In short, Wang called attention to the need for the central 
government to construct and enforce certain structures to uphold the political 
and ideological supremacy of the centre in an era of economic decentralisation 
and ideological lassitude (Feng, 1995, p.637).  These themes are similar to 
those presented in Jiang’s speech. 
It is also interesting to note that neo-conservative think tanks, such as 
Wang Huning’s involvement in the Central Committee’s Policy Research Office’s 
Political Group, were also incorporated in the Rural Policy Research of the 
Secretariat of the CCP and the Institute of Economic System Reform. 
 
After the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the Chinese intelligentsia were 
looking for a solution to assist them overcome their (perceived) economic and 
political difficulties as a means of re-legitimising the CCP.  With the intense 
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political indoctrination after 1989, the taizidang introduced their “hard” neo-
conservative article, “Realistic Responses”, in an attempt to influence policy-
making at the Fourteenth Congress of 1992.  Unsuccessful in obtaining election, 
the influence of the taizidang and supporters of “hard” neo-conservatism may 
have lessened but it has not been completely side-lined.  “Soft” neo-
conservatism, with its renewed emphasis upon the economy, as well as 
maintaining the hegemony of the CCP, successfully influenced the current 
leadership of the CCP, especially Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji and members of the 
“Shanghai Faction”. Indeed Jiang’s speech on “Stressing Politics” can be utilised 
as an “identification” of the beginning of the “Jiang Zemin Era”. 
The tenets of neo-conservatism, of building a market economy and 
maintaining a strong, stable government, are held by the majority within the 
CCP.  The emphasis placed on cultural nationalism within the theory of neo-
conservatism, is also used by the CCP as a legitimacy-building device.  The 
difference between proponents of “hard” and “soft” neo-conservatism is the 
emphasis they placed upon reforming the economy and the maintenance of a 
market economy.  Throughout the 1990s, economic and political policy has 
oscillated between both “hard” and “soft” advocates of neo-conservatism.  This 
differs from the period 1986-1989, as identified by Rolls (1998), when Deng’s 
policies manoeuvred between the conservative/elders and the reformers.  This 
period still found those in government who advocated the ideals of Marx, Lenin 
and Mao Zedong.  After the Tiananmen Incident, and the deaths of many first 
generation revolutionary leaders, the impact of MLM on policy-making was not 
as substantial as in the Maoist era (see Chapter Four).  With the CCP’s 
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movement away from absolute adherence to MLM, neo-conservatism has 
helped shape both economic and political policy in the 1990s.  As latter chapters 
argue, it is Jiang Zemin’s support for both “hard” or “soft” neo-conservatism, at 




THE LEGITIMISATION OF THE CCP 
 
A major focus for many China analysts since the Tiananmen Incident of 
1989 has been the “legitimacy” of the CCP in China.  Indeed, scholars, such as 
Yang (1996, p.201), have declared that the Tiananmen Incident “marked the 
most serious legitimacy crisis of the CCP in the PRC history” after the failure of 
the Cultural Revolution.  With official adherence to the Dengist “Four Cardinal 
Principles”, and the maintenance of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought 
(MLM), combined with China’s emphasis upon building a socialist-economy; 
many analysts have stated that China is ideologically void, and therefore the 
legitimacy of the CCP is vacuous.  It appears to some, like Barmè (1994, p.272), 
that the dynamic, yet explosive, cocktail of MLM and economic marketisation 
has meant “some authorities have become victims of their own ideological 
schizophrenia”.  Academics appear to be split between those who believe that 
the CCP is facing a crisis of delegitimisation and those who feel that the CCP is 
relegitimising itself. Those who insist that China is facing a legitimacy crisis 
centre their argument upon what they perceive to be an unrealistic adherence to 
MLM as China moves to modernise its economy.  For them, China’s “legitimacy” 
appears to be based on the theoretical implications of official ideology of MLM.   
A smaller number of China academics have focused on the 
relegitimisation, or self-legitimisation, of the CCP.  As Yang (1996, p.202) notes, 
“the literature has by and large neglected the dynamic development [of] the 
[religitmisation] process by the CCP”.  Yet, it must be noticed, Yang was 
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concerned with the “consequences” of this process.  Relegitimisation within the 
CCP is focused upon “performance legitimacy”:  the providing of economic 
benefits to the populace.  Although the official dogma is still MLM, the ideology 
is slowly “postponing” the “Marxist” and “Maoist” strains, and capitalising on 
creating a “Leninist-developmentalist” state within a neo-conservative 
framework. 
This chapter reviews the arguments of both “deligitimacy” and 
“religitimacy”. It argues that there is compelling evidence that the CCP is 
relegitimising itself.  The substance of this religitimacy is the adoption of the 
political theory of neo-conservatism.  Indeed, due to the nature of the leaders of 
the CCP “utilising” the key tenets of this theory (see Chapter Two) in shaping 
both economic and political policy, the identification of the renewed push by the 
CCP to religitimise itself as a developmentalist-Leninist state, incorporating 
elements of performance legitimacy, is important as neo-conservatism has 
assisted in this relegitimisation.  Furthermore, there appears to be a correlation 
between the adaptation of neo-conservatism by the CCP, the relegitimisation of 
the CCP, and the establishment of the “Jiang Zemin Era”. 
 
DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGIES 
 
 It is important to understand the concepts of “legitimacy”, “political 
legitimacy”, “delegitimacy”, “religitimacy” and “ideology” in order to fully 
comprehend and assess the arguments used by various China analysts. 
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Legitimacy, essentially, is defined as a political relationship between 
state and subjects (Barker, 1990, p.3).  Legitimacy, or political legitimacy, can be 
qualified as: 
The degree of justifiability of the claim of a particular regime or 
government in staying in power.  Legitimacy is a subjective 
concept that involves consciousness and awareness.  Legitimacy 
is more of a matter of belief in a mindset than a legal concept.  
Legitimacy concerns two parties:  the governing and the governed.  
Legitimacy results from the interaction between the government 
and the general public over the basis of governmental authorities 
and public obedience.  Legitimacy does not require total 
recognition of government legitimacy claims by the governed 
(Young, 1998, p.204). 
 
Political legitimacy is derived from other forms of legitimacy, and is one 
aspect of the justification of an entire social or economic order (Barker, 1990, 
p.21).  Legitimacy, to some, could be the state’s ability to maintain peace, order 
and stability, and to provide basic security, material needs and welfare.  
Legitimacy, therefore, depends on the performance and efficacy of the 
government (He, 1996, p.195). Political legitimacy, stated or implied, is the right 
to govern, to formulate policies, to attend to the general arrangements of a 
society, and to enforce its commands (Barker, 1990, pp.24-27). However, 
legitimacy should not be the independent cause of loyalty among a nation's 
citizens. 
Academics further their delineation of legitimacy to include "regime 
legitimacy", of which, China, and the CCP, should be included.  This is because 
the CCP's authority over China is as a "regime", as distinct from a "state" or 
"government" (Lawson, 1993, p.183).  Fishman (cited in Lawson, 1993, p.183) 
defines a regime as a more permanent form of political organisation than a 
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specific government.  In addition, a regime penetrates the apparatus of the state 
further than other forms of government, such as Western liberal democracy 
(Fishman, cited in Lawson, 1993, pp.185-187).  China's form of government, 
according to political scientists, is a regime due to the CCP being the sole 
source of all political power which possesses the exclusive rights to legitimise its 
form of government. 
  
 Delegitimation refers to the process whereby the "serious erosion in 
legitimacy weakens [the regime's] authority and may lead to its demise" (Yang, 
1996, p.204; see also, Schmitter, 1985, p.95).  For China, Ding (1994, p.21) 
asserts, the process of deligimitation is a process of constant comparison made 
by members of the concerned political community, such as the intellectuals or 
the informal opposition13.  These comparisons involve: one, the comparison of 
the power holders' words and promises with their deeds and actions; and, two, 
the comparison to other countries (what the Chinese term "horizontal 
comparison" - hengbi - which is in contrast with the officially sanctioned "vertical 
comparison" - shubi, comparing "old China" with "New China"). 
 
Self-legitimation, according to Kelly (1998, p.23), refers to states whose 
autonomy from the societies they govern is maintained through the production 
and consumption of self-images.  Religitimation is the renewal of legitimacy, 
differing from the regime's old claim to political legitimacy. 
                                                          
13 An ”informal opposition” in the case of China can refer to those members of the CCP who may 
be in differing political factions. 
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Ideology refers to a system of concepts and principles concerning 
human life in its entirety, including physical, social, intellectual and affective 
domains.  Zhang (1994, p.82) states that in China, "ideology" is often used 
interchangeably with the term "worldview"; which he sees as "a cognitive 
paradigm by which individuals make sense of their existence".  For Communist 
states, ideology plays a crucial role in the politics of state socialism.  Cheng 
suggests that in a Communist state, ideology or theoretical formulations confirm 
the legitimacy and shape the political climate and economic policies (1990, 
p.52).  Furthermore, the change of ideology in its Chinese context means that 
change in the practical ideology14 is a reflection on the dominant CCP leaders’ 
values and opinions. Such systems are “idiocratic”; they rely on an explicit and 
codified system of political ideas derived from Marxism-Leninism which guides 
the actions of the political elite in the hegemonic Communist party, and justifies 
the party’s monopoly on power and legitimises its proclaimed mission to build 
socialism.  For example, during the Dengist era, White (1995) notes that the 




                                                          
14 A practical ideology is given extreme importance because it guides central policy, which plays 
a much more innovative and aggressive role in development in China than in the West.  A 
“guide-line” is neither a specific policy nor the overarching Maoist-Leninist ideology but provides 
a framework for policies and a formula for applying Marxism Leninism.  A guideline defines a 
particular economic and political goal, provides the criteria for legitimising political-economic 
behaviour and sets the fundamental moral and ideological principles (Chen Weixing, 1994, pp. 
45-46). 
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DELIGITIMISATION:  THE DEMISE OF MARXIST-LENINIST-MAO ZEDONG 
THOUGHT 
 
Those academics who believe that China is facing a legitimacy crisis 
base this "deligimitisation process" on the "redundant" usage of ideology as a 
bastion of legitimacy. As an example, Zhang Baoshui, in his article "Marxism, 
Confucianism and Cultural Nationalism", has stated that:  "In the past the Party 
leadership derived its legitimacy from Marxism, but Marxism has turned out to 
be an equivocation, if not a total fallacy" (1994, p.93). 
Other academics, such as Shambaugh (1993, p.254), state that the 
leadership does not have a coherent vision for the future or a plan to solve its 
problems, reacting instead in an ad hoc fashion.  Feng (1995, p.2) argues that 
"China's political system remains an ideological one that requires a theoretical 
basis for all major policies to sustain the system's legitimacy. Young (1998, 
p.111) declares that despite the continued efforts at "Party-building", 
"rectification" and "improving style", "the Party is plagued by indiscipline and 
organisational weakness; it has lost any persuasive ideological position which 
can justify its claims to 'leadership'".  Furthermore, "members are regarded as, 
at least, self-serving and, beyond that, are enmeshed in pervasive corruption". 
For these academics, it appears that the sole criterion they use in the 
exploration of the CCP's legitimacy in China is its official adherence to MLMT.  
 
Under Mao, China took a dogmatic approach to the writings of Marx and 
Lenin, as applied by Mao to Chinese conditions.  In fact, the early legitimacy of 
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the CCP and the Communist Revolution rested, in a large part, on an explicit 
belief that China's future rested with Communism (Kluver, 1996, p.2).  In 
addition, the incorporation of “Mao Zedong Thought”, or Maoism, meant that 
China was in a “continuous revolution”, with the attempt at keeping socialist 
goals and values alive as meaningful guides to social and political action 
(Meisner, 1989, p.352).  
Feng (1995, p.200) notes that communist ideology is a self-enclosed 
system in that it claims an undisputed superiority over other ideologies.  The 
ruling power within this Communist system convinces society that Communism 
represents the best alternative to societal development.  Marxists believe that 
there are qualitative differences between belief in a social or economic system, 
and a belief in a governmental one (Barker, 1990, p.27). Chinese Marxism, then, 
is a very specific, historically conditioned, ideological system (Kelly, 1998, p.20).  
The fundamental principles of the CCP's ideology, according to Feng (1995, 
p.13), serve to:  determine the Party's final goal; legitimate the CCP's leading 
role in society; define the social and political order the CCP wants to maintain; 
and, provide a worldview framework to evaluate everything from policies to 
social behaviour. 
The legitimacy of the Party is largely based on its role in history as the 
apex of struggle against oppression (Kluver, 1996, p.38).  Since ideological 
justifications, then, serve as the primary basis for legitimate rule in Communist 
countries, all policy and personnel decisions need to be framed with an 
ideological explanation.  However, due to the necessity for ideology to be 
ultimate and unchanging, policy changes or theoretical turnabouts are either 
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ignored or downplayed (Kluver, 1996, pp.35-37).  Marxist nations define identity 
by the achievement of an ultimate goal, yet, in the case of China, the legitimacy 
of the CCP rests on a certain vision of China's past and future; a vision, Kluver 
believes, that has been largely dismantled by the process of Deng's economic 
reform (1996, p.2). 
   
Scalapino (1986, p.60) states that in China (as in Vietnam and North 
Korea) the effort to achieve and maintain legitimacy has taken two forms.  
Firstly, a high premium has been placed upon Marxist-Leninist ideology (that 
encompasses terminologies such as "the people", "democracy", "class enemies" 
and "nationalism").  From this ideology emanates a moral authority to rule.  
Secondly, citizens have been involved in public politics in specific ways:  
mobilisation for various campaigns; memberships in mass organisations and 
voting; and the participation in political study sessions.  This allowed the 
population to perceive that they were part of the political process.  Scalapino 
concludes that the available evidence indicates that public support for the CCP 
was the highest in the years between 1950 and 1956, when memories of the 
war preceding Communist victory were still fresh (though the low points were in 
1960-61 and immediately after the Cultural Revolution)(1985, p.75). 
 
It is commonly argued that China has faced two serious legitimacy 
crises since the PRC was founded by the CCP.  The first occurred in the 
aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao.  To salvage its 
legitimacy, the CCP shifted its emphasis from Marxist-Maoist ideology, that is, 
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economic socialism and Mao's charismatic appeal, to economic modernisation 
and political institutionalisation15.  This new basis for legitimacy, then, according 
to some academics, led to the CCP's second legitimacy crisis, which Yang 
(1996), amongst others, states was epitomised by the Tiananmen Incident. 
It is China's modernisation program, with its conflicting ideology to that 
of Marxism, and, more so, Maoism, which academics believe is leading to the 
CCP's deligimisation.  As Feng (1995, p.20) states, a Leninist state faces a two-
fold legitimacy crisis.  Firstly, not unlike developmental states, Leninist states 
can be challenged as non-credible if they fail to maintain sustained economic 
growth and raise peoples' living standards.  Secondly, a legitimacy crisis can 
occur if the Communist regime achieves economic success in ways that deviate 
from fundamental ideological principles and therefore undermines the orthodox 
foundation of that system. 
Feng goes on to argue that ideology remains relevant, not because the 
Party still needs to derive inspiration from it, as in the Maoist era, but because 
the Party has to present policy changes through the overlay of ideological 
rhetoric (1995, pp.2-3).  Therefore, the concept of deligitimacy extends from the 
Party's refusal to renounce its ideology, whereby ideology, then, continues to 
constrain the workings of new ideas and policy manoeuvres (Feng, 1995, pp.2-
3).  Therefore the Party's survival using unorthodox practical reforms (which are 
often blatantly capitalistic in nature) have to be carried out within the established 
ideology. 
                                                          
15 Political institutionalism could include the “re-inventing” of the NPC under Qiao Shi and the 
desire to establish in China the “rule of law”.  See Chapter Five for more details. 
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It is true that China appears to be entering a "phase of cynical rejection", 
as termed by Kelly (1998, p.58), as a mass phenomenon, which was first 
characterised in Eastern European nations several decades ago.  Young states 
that the manipulation of the orthodox ideology has reinforced this cynicism 
(1998, p.118). In China nowadays, political campaigns elicit limited support, 
perceived anti-social behaviour is constituted as a serious problem, and, 
importantly, efforts to revitalise the ideological base have run into difficulty 
(Scalapino, 1986, p.75).  "Vertical campaigns", reminding people how miserable 
their lives were before the creation of the PRC and how much progress has 
since been achieved have been intensified.  Furthermore, it appears that 
cynicism and indifference are especially widespread among the younger, better-
educated Chinese (Scalapino, 1986, p.69).  Barmè (1994, p.274) posits that the 
Maoist worldview that gave the Chinese population a sense of self-worth has 
been dismantled; what remains, he continues, "is a crude pre-World War I 
positivism, a faith in science, material wealth, capitalism and national strength". 
Young believes that though the new orthodoxy may be effective in 
countering "leftism" it offers little else, apart from easing the doubt of the Party's 
vanguard rationale (1998, p.119).  Both ideological erosion and economic reform 
have undermined the relevance of the CCP, according to Young (1998, p.123), 
as well as throwing into greater doubt cadres' commitment to the Party or 
acceptance of its prescribed norms and operating procedures.  Young views the 
Party as self-serving (1998, p.119), and that the Party authorities themselves 
have contributed to the erosion of Party ideology (1998, p.114), especially with 
widespread corruption amongst CCP officials.  Essentially, Young concludes 
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that "by reducing socialism to economic goals, the Party has effectively 
rendered irrelevant its unique claim to political leadership" (1998, p.118), 
especially in terms of the previously articulated orthodoxy. 
 
It has also been stated that China's retained allegiance to socialist 
principles on which it was founded, with its ultimate goal of achieving the perfect 
Communist state, ignores the global reality of the dissolution of the former 
Soviet-bloc and its recanting of Marxism-Leninism (Kluver, 1996, p.1).  This 
adds to the embarrassment of orthodox Marxist-Leninism's apparent stagnation 
and the decline of it as being the "theoretically superior socialist system" (Zhang, 
1994, p.82).   
Yet most China analysts fail to differentiate the purpose of ideology in 
the Mao and Deng eras.  Sun (1995, p.22) asserts that the one major legacy of 
the Mao era was “ideological absolutisation” (his definition).  He defines this to 
mean that official doctrine was claimed to be the total truth which grounded 
“correct behaviour and thinking”.  Therefore, there was no deviation in 
theoretical Mao Zedong Thought or Marxism-Leninism and reality. Indeed, Sun 
(1995, p.120) proposes that the ”rethinking of the socialist system first came to 
the Chinese political agenda [in an] effort to repudiate the policies and ideology 
of the Mao era”. 
It needs to be remembered that for China's ideology, like its Soviet 
equivalent's beforehand, the faith in the classic Marxist-Leninist ideology tends 
to die out with the revolutionary generation, whereby the avowal of such faith 
becomes more or less tactical.  Schmitter states that the ideological decay of the 
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orthodox dogma within the CCP involved in the transmission of political values 
across generations affects the legitimacy of regimes, whereby a secular process 
of decline and disillusionment abound "once the generation that organised it 
[passes] away" (1986, p.94). 
Furthermore, academics who believe in the CCP's deligimisation as a 
plausible motive for the demise of the CCPs authoritarianism need to be aware 
that is quite difficult to prove such claims either logically or empirically.  As with 
the advent of "democracy" in Russia and Eastern Europe, the regime's downfall 
could be much more closely linked with the desire by the populous for material 
goods.  In addition, as Scalapino (1998, p.37) notes, China currently enjoys 
more stability, with less coercion, than it has had in most periods in the past. 
 
More divisive than ideological decline, though, is the corruption that has 
taken hold in the CCP.  Corruption is so severe that it threatens the legitimacy of 
the CCP and it has burgeoned in the reform period because there is no clear 
line between what is permissible and what is illegal or illegitimate (Hong, 1997 , 
p.93).  Corruption serves to undermine the Party's claim to moral authority, and 
efforts to address it have included such things as the discipline inspection 
system and the public drives against economic crime.  As such, corruption taints 
the Party as a "decaying organisation" (as defined by Goldstein, cited in Young, 
1998, p.121).  It is clear that if the Party were able to tackle corruption seriously, 






Those academics insisting that China is facing a legitimacy crisis state 
that if the Cultural Revolution had devastated peoples' belief in Communism and 
MLM, economic reform damaged faith in traditional morals and values (Hong, 
1997, p.97).  The government itself has given up its ideological insistence on 
Communism, though it symbolically retains MLM as the officially ideology in 
China (Hong, 1997, p.98). 
Since 1978, China's economic reform process has demanded a 
revaluation of China's ideology.  The previous "mistakes" of the Cultural 
Revolution were assigned to Mao; and there was a shift to economic 
modernisation through the "Four Modernisations" as the criterion by which to 
judge the CCP's success (Watson, 1996, p.1).  Essentially, then, development 
or "performance legitimacy" has become the sole criterion for evaluating policies 
and political leaders (Tong, 1998, p.104).  Kane (1995) has simplistically 
explained the usage of “performance legitimacy” as a means of the CCP to “take 
a momentous leap in abandoning any claims to legitimacy based upon appeals 
of history or ideals, and that the CCP has come to base its legitimacy on the 
ability to make China and the Chinese people rich”. 
These policies are indeed moving away from basic Marxist principles 
and challenging doctrines, such as the definition of "socialism" long held sacred 
in Marxist circles.  More interestingly, they reject and contradict Mao Zedong 
Thought (a detailed examination is explored further in this chapter).  Yet, 
ideology is not inelastic; it does contain the potential for theoretical revision. 
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It should be remembered that Deng was the author of the "Four Cardinal 
Principles", with its inclusion of the maintenance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought, in order to appease the Maoist hard-liners, so that they in 
return would support Deng's vision of the "Four Modernisations".  Essentially, 
since then, Mao Zedong Thought has been rejected and Marxism has been 
sidelined.  Mao Zedong Thought is now known as a “scientific system”, that is, 
Mao’s Thought needs to be taken in the specific context in which it was 
formulated. As Kluver (1996, p.2) states, "many of the reforms are not only 
capitalist, but are directly contradictory to the policies of Mao on whom the entire 
Chinese political structure rested for decades".  Leninism, with its rigid structure 
of Party organisation and rule, remains.  Ultimately, China is a Leninist-
developmentalist state, or a "market-Leninist society" (as defined by Harding, 
1998, p.12).  Under these conditions, there are only two lines of effective appeal 
to the Chinese populace in this period of economic growth and political fluidity:  
nationalism and material gain (Scalapino, 1986, p.69; and Harding, 1998, p.12) 
– both of which are incorporated in the political thought of neo-conservatism. 
 
Thus, religitimation of the CCP is predominantly three-fold.  First, the 
CCP’s reassessment of socialism and ideology has been an important form of 
religitimisation, and, second, socialism has been used as a basis of nationalism.  
This relegitimisation provides a varied role for "socialism" in China.  It is an 
extension of the Party's positive equation of "socialism" with "Party dominance".  
Together, the reorientation of the ideology and the incorporation of “nationalism” 
into Chinese “socialism” lead to the third element:  the legitimacy of the CCP is 
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based on “performance legitimacy”.  That is, the CCP has to “guide” in the 
economic and technological modernisation of the country whilst inspiring 
nationalism in the populace. 
 
The Reassessment of Socialism  
 
For Zhang (1994, p.93), the CCP's reassessment of capitalism and the 
redesign of socialism are signs that the "Party is in a psychotic state, although 
its ideological coping mechanism is still trying to function [so as] to preserve its 
institutional existence".  Zhang states that "the myth of the Party's monopoly of 
truth has been shattered completely, even for some of the most loyal loyalists" 
(1994, p.93).  Zhang believes that the Party has an "inability to invoke Marxism 
for its rescue…talking about exploitation and poverty under capitalism only 
embarrasses the CCP…predictions of the death of capitalism sound self-
mocking" (1994, p.93). 
   
What the CCP has attempted to do, however, is to incorporate 
capitalistic economic disciplines and terminologies into its official economic 
ideology (Feng, 1995, p.4).  "Socialism" is now defined as the development of 
productive forces, rather than as a system to guarantee egalitarianism (Kluver, 
1996, p.110).  Naturally tensions inevitably arose with the merging of capitalist 
ideas in a system that relied upon socialism for its legitimacy (Feng, 1995, p.4; 
and Hughes, 1998, p.67).  Legitimacy in Chinese socialism, as defined by Dirlik 
(1989, p.365), is based on the premise that socialism must have a Chinese 
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colouring and meet the (economic and/or developmental) needs of the Chinese 
society. 
   
The continual reinterpretation of "socialism" is crucial to the Party's 
vanguard leadership claim (Young, 1998, p.115).  The new economic ideology 
did contribute to many policy dilemmas, and was a source of political conflict 
(Feng, 1995, p.4). Yet, as Kluver (1996, p.109) notes, it was Marxism that 
brought the revolution to China, and Marxist theory that has "assisted" with 
economic reforms, so there was no reason to consider any other ideological 
grounding, at least not publicly. 
  
The current ideology does appear similar to capitalism.  Intellectuals and 
policy elites created the new economic system by first flexibly interpreting 
Marxism and then systematically borrowing capitalist ideas (Feng, 1995, p.4).  
But it needs to be noted that Marxist ideology fails to provide solutions to 
China's problems of economic modernisation.  This is essentially due to the fact 
that Marxism, in its original meaning, is more a theory of social transformation 
based on prescribed material conditions, rather than a practical model of 
economic development (Feng, 1995, p.198). Indeed, Marxist-led revolutions, 
such as China’s, have been successful in economically underdeveloped 
countries.  This differs to Marx’s notion that a socialist revolution would occur in 
advanced capitalist countries.  As such, nations such as China lack the Marxist 
defined social and material prerequisites for socialism (Meisner, 1989, p.344).  
Marxism, as a theory, rests on the central proposition that socialism 
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presupposes capitalism.  As Meisner (1989, p.344) notes, “original Marxist 
theory...championed the historical necessity of capitalism”. 
  
Therefore, the incorporation of capitalist economic concepts into the 
official ideology generated certain profound policy and political predicaments for 
the CCP (Feng, 1995, p.4).  To avoid damaging the ideologically based 
legitimacy, Chinese policy makers attempted to interpret all reform policies as 
compatible with the official ideology.  China’s compromise with capitalism 
represents, as Dirlik (1989, p.370) states, “nothing but an innovation within 
socialism to carry socialism to a higher plane”.  Indeed, the utilisation of 
capitalism is designed to serve, not subvert, national autonomy and national 
self-image. 
As such, the Party's treatment of "socialism" has been associated with, 
amongst others, the slogans of "socialism with Chinese characteristics", 
"primary stages of socialism" (shehuizhuyide chuji jiedun), as well as Deng’s 
“criterion of truth”.  Yet it should be noted, as Sun (1995, p.10) has, that  
 
The drastic course of change in post-Mao China has often led to 
the neglect of the facts that there have been serious struggles [by 
the reformers and the conservatives in the CCP] over the nature 
and goals of reform and that a particular course of change has only 
occurred as an outcome of such struggles. 
 
  
Misra (1998) suggests that Deng’s “criterion of truth” played a crucial 
role in  establishing legitimising flexibility and the reorientation of ideology to the 
demands of economic construction.  Used to assist Deng and his followers 
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overthrow Mao’s designated heir Hua Guofeng in the late 1970s, the campaign 
on “practise is the sole criterion of truth” skilfully employed selective Maoist 
tenets to discredit other ones.  The campaign accomplished the reformist 
leadership’s goal of establishing a new ideological consensus and addressed 
the crisis of legitimacy brought about at the end of the Cultural Revolution 
(Misra, 1998, p.27).  Misra argues that the usage of the “criterion of truth” was 
the “first attempt to spell out a new post-Mao stance, which could justify a retreat 
from leftism and the reorientation of policy towards rapid and sustained 
economic and technical modernisation”.  Deng’s advocacy of “seeking truth from 
facts” legitimised (economic) practise over (Marxist-Maoist) theoretical validation 
(Misra, 1998, p.52); China’s opening to the outside revealed the realisation of 
the gap between reality and theory.  In addition, the easing of restrictions on 
intellectuals assisted in the development of any ideological discourse. 
The slogan of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was essentially a 
theoretical attempt to deviate from the Soviet centrally-planned command 
economy.  Under the patronage of the then General Secretary, Hu Yaobang, 
economists associated with the CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Science) 
Economic Research Institute, headed by Liu Guoguang, examined the socialist 
economic model of the Soviet Union and other socialist variants (such as the 
Yugoslav and Chinese models) from late 1983 to early 1984.  Sun Yan (1985, 
p.188) suggests that it was Su Shaoshi’s article “Develop Marxism in the Full 
Scale Reform and Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (1983), 
supported by such theorists as Yu Guangyuan and Fan Ruoyu, that assisted in 
the campaign.  The purpose of the campaign, then, was to allow the reformers 
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to launch a major ideological offensive questioning the “essential” nature of 
planning and, more importantly, the principle of state ownership.  This was done 
in order to decentralise economic planning and move towards economic 
marketisation.  It was in June 1984 that Deng Xiaoping gave a speech titled 
“Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” which was used as the 
“theoretical basis” for the reform from September of that same year. 
The thesis of the “primary stages of socialism” was used by Zhao 
Ziyang, the then General Secretary (after the fall of Hu Yaobang in 1987, due to 
the student demonstrations late in that same year), to counter his critics on both 
the left and right within the CCP (Misra, 1988, p.115).    Indeed, the theory of the 
“primary stages of socialism” was adopted at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 
October 1987.  The notion of “primary stages of socialism” was first raised in 
1979 by Su Shaoshi and Feng Lanrui at the Theory Conference, which was held 
under the auspices of Hu Yaobang to assist in ideological reorientation.  Their 
article, “The Question of the Stages of Social Development After the Seizure of 
Power by the Proletariat” (1979, Jingji Yanjiu, no. 5, pp. 14-19), attempted to 
locate China in a pre-socialist phase whilst retaining a Marxist perspective and 
remaining ideologically defensible (Misra, 1998, p.185).   
As Misra has noted, Su and Feng maintained that socialism in the 
Chinese context meant that socialism is transitional.  They divide the stage of 
transition from, one, capitalism to socialism by a (i) transition period, that is a 
seizure of power by the proletariat, and (ii) “underdeveloped socialism”, two, 
developed socialism, that is, the kind of socialist society envisioned by Marx and 
Lenin, to three, communism (Misra, 1998, p.93).  As China’s society was not 
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one envisioned by Marx or Lenin, China could not be called “completely 
socialist”.  However, Su and Feng deem, since China’s society was a product of 
a proletarian revolution and one where the means of production was brought 
under public control, China could be called socialist, albeit “underdeveloped”.  
They also thought that Maoist “egalitarianism” and its opposition to “distribution 
to work” was premature, and that due to the peasant-agricultural base of China 
in the Maoist era, China  was not sufficiently ready for socialist commune 
systems (Misra, 1998, pp.91-94).  When first presented in 1979, the 
conservatives were against any notion that the CCP had captured power before 
“socialist” conditions had been met (Misra, 1988, p.56).  The version of the 
thesis presented by Zhao Ziyang did not emphasise China’s “unsocialist” nature 
or the unfeasibility of socialism but highlighted China’s weak material base (Sun, 
1995, p.195). 
  
The reinterpretation of socialism throughout the 1980s was 
consolidated, for example, as the Party finally settled on the goal of building a 
"socialist market economy" and introduced the theoretical notion that China had 
entered its “second revolution” at the Fourteenth Party Congress in October 
1992 (Watson, 1996, p.2).   
To build a “socialist market economy”, "relations of production" should 
be adjusted, then, to meet the demands of growth.  Indeed, almost any 
economic practises could be regarded as "socialist" if they contributed to growth 
(Young, 1998, pp.115-116).  Furthermore, as long as the public sector is greater 
than the private sector, it was deemed, that that nation was socialist (Kluver, 
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1996, p.111).  Also, the "socialist market" doctrine asserts that capitalism can 
thrive under socialism, to the enrichment of both (Kluver, 1996, p.112). 
 
Analysts have been using the phrase "second revolution", at least since 
the mid-1980s, to explain China's modernisation program.  However, Chinese 
leaders were slow to use the phrase as it implied a drastic set of changes, 
something the reformers did not want to acknowledge.  It was in Jiang's speech 
at the Fourteenth Party Congress (1992) that the proclamation was made that 
Deng's economic reforms begun at the 1978 Plenum was a "second revolution".  
It was argued that just as historic progression established the inevitability of the 
first revolution, that is the founding of the CCP in 1949, historical progression 
demanded the second revolution, that of the modernisation of the economy 
(Kluver, 1996, p.106).  The usage of the terminology of "second revolution" to 
explain the importance of the economic modernisation is due to being a Leninist 
party, the CCP needs to uphold its revolutionary momentum in order to keep 
socialism vital and, thus, maintain its legitimacy (Feng, 1995, p.199). 
  
Kluver (1996, p.94) notes that after the 1987 Thirteenth Party Congress, 
the CCP was forced to continue its search for ways to justify both the 
continuance of the reforms and the legitimacy of the Party.  The concepts of 
"second revolution" and "primary stages of socialism", presented at the 
Fourteenth Party Congress (1992), meant that a new theoretical paradigm had 
been devised to release China from the orthodoxies of Marxism and Mao 
Zedong Thought.  The hegemony of the CCP, though, was not to be questioned;  
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the maintenance of political stability is used as a tool for the Party's legitimacy to 
rule.  
Indeed, in Jiang's speech there was no condemnation of Mao, and any 
mention of Mao was relegated to his revolutionary legacy without endorsing any 
of his policies.  By arguing that Mao had brought about the first revolution, the 
creation of the People's Republic of China, and, therefore, Deng the second, the 
"Four Modernisation's" policy, Jiang was able to exclude Mao's economic 
policies from impacting upon current policy.  In addition to this, though Deng was 
praised for initiating the reform program, the program was beholden to the Party.  
Therefore, it would appear, by de-emphasising individuals and emphasising the 
Party, Jiang's speech reinforced the legitimacy of the Party as the guiding force 
in society (Kluver, 1996, p.106). 
  
The current focus is not on building “socialism” per se, but on the 
construction of the necessary economic foundations (Meisner, 1989, p.356).  
With the emergence of the “primary stages of socialism”, the CCP has 
postponed the “real” (or “genuine”) socialist society to a very distant and 
unpredictable time in the future (Meisner, 1989, pp.355-356). 
According to Kluver (1996, p.59), the Party's recourse to MLM, although 
weakened by dialectical materialist line, allows "practise" to be the external 
criteria.  Although the unique role of the CCP is immune from ideological 
questioning, its position, or legitimacy, should be based on economic 
performance (Kluver, 1996; and, Young, 1998).  As such, it should be noted that 
the introduction of this new economic ideology has resulted in the renewed 
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legitimacy of the CCP (He, 1996, p.196). Socialism, then, has come to mean 
little more than economic growth (Young, 1998, pp.115-116). 
 
Feng (1995, p.15) identifies what he terms "instrumental principles" that 
have influence the fundamental principles contained in the official orthodoxy.  
These instrumental principles are "dogmatic", "pragmatic" or "divergent".  
Dogmatic principles are directly derived from, and serve to actualise, the 
orthodox ideology, for example Mao's communal systems.  Pragmatic principles 
are loosely grounded on ideology but are grounded on practical needs; 
therefore, they represent and serve to fill the gap between ideology and reality, 
for example communal systems being incorporated into capitalistic Town and 
Village Enterprises (TVE) under Deng.  Divergent principles actually come from 
another ideological source but are defined in terms of the existing ideology, for 
example, the capitalistic reinterpretation of "socialism". 
Therefore dogmatic principles reflect the pre-reform Maoist years of the 
CCP.  The pragmatic type has been used extensively during the reform years, 
especially in the Dengist era.  The divergent principles emerged in the late 
1980s.  This was when the reform was demanding bold policies beyond the 
existing ideological framework. 
 
Essentially Deng has generally been viewed as a pragmatist by China 
analysts.  Pye (in He, 1996) has identified four means employed by Deng to 
counter the changes in ideological orientation.  First, the maintenance of political 
stability was (and is still) used as a tool for the Party's legitimacy to rule.  
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Second, ideology was used to legitimate the Party, yet also to protect (or “stifle”) 
the discussion of politics that could lead to factional strife.  Third, Deng managed 
to keep order through fear, expedience, fatalism (lack of alternatives) and sheer 
discipline.  Fourth, the usage of pragmatism to legitimate the CCP (pp.194-195). 
It is ironic, though, that Deng's pragmatism contradicts his emphasis 
upon the "Four Cardinal Principles".  This is because ideological legitimisation 
implies the source of the legitimacy from the top, while Deng's pragmatism, 
which entails performance legitimisation, is based on material gains and is 
therefore open to popular scrutiny.  The dilemma that faced China, especially in 
the 1980s, was that it was caught within a set of contradictory imperatives:  if the 
CCP responded to ideological requirements, it undermined the rationality of the 
market economy; and if it responded to economic rationalism, it undermined the 
ideology.  Therefore, the leadership "swung" between the two; they vacillated 
between ideological and pragmatic rationale (He, 1996, pp.195-196). 
 
From pragmatism, divergent principles under capitalistic auspices arose.  
Yang (1996, p.202) states that the CCP modified and shifted its legitimacy mode 
to economic nationalism and traditional Chinese political conservatism to 
provide a crucial part of the answer to the stability of the current regime.  Yang’s 
assessment is similar to that of the political theory of neo-conservatism that 
currently pervades the current leadership’s ideology. 
The reforms have focused upon the forbidden realm of orthodoxy, 
“creating an exciting intellectual environment where a new ideology or ideologies 
may gradually coalesce while interacting with the old” (Zhang, 1994, p.82).  
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Goldman (1996, p.49) states that “the waning of overarching ideology and 
weakening Party controls allows room for intellectual exploration and individual 
creativity without reference to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, or any 
thought”.  But, it should be noted that there is a movement whereby high-ranking 
leaders blame subordinates for poor governmental performance and corruption, 
thereby shifting the focus of popular resentment from the system to incumbents 
(Ding, 1994, p.21). 
Ideological considerations have given way to practical concerns.  The 
barriers to marketisation are no longer ideological but social and structural 
(Tong, 1998, p.103).  Leadership ideas are influenced by intellectuals and policy 
elites.  “Ideas from above” perform a significant function of forming and 
redefining political discourse and ideology in which new policy proposals could 
emerge (Feng, 1995, p.3). 
While still relying on ideology for legitimacy, the CCP has no longer 
been sure that this ideology can generate "legitimacy as believed" (as defined 
by Feng, 1995, p.18), thus, the advent of "performance legitimacy”.  In addition, 
though some of the processes towards modernisation have caused the erosion 
of state authority (though the policies were intended to strengthen the party-
state) (Shambaugh, 1993, p.253), even if the ideological apparatus was actually 
dismantled the CCP would undoubtedly retain bureaucratic elements of a 
Leninist political culture (Kelly, 1998, p.37). 
 
Young (1998, p.114) states that the CCP’s new ideological definitions of 
"socialism" and other Marxist creeds have been a response to the declining 
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significance of the official ideology within the Party and Chinese politics. It needs 
to be noted, though, that the CCP's public ideology is not usually for just the 
public's consumption, nor does the CCP expect public adherence to the 
ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.  Relegitimisation, or self-
legitimation, though designed for public consumption, is more designed for the 
CCP's political hierarchy.  It reinforces the regime's self-confidence by 
presenting a "mirror" in which its virtues are enhanced and faults hidden. MLM 
crucially contains, as part of its own theory, the view that control of the 
ideological system in itself provides a token of legitimacy (Kelly, 1998, pp.57-
58). 
Essentially, ideology is used to identify power groups within the CCP, 
and is used as a resource in elite conflicts in China (Kelly, 1998, p.60).  For 
example, the speeches that arise from Party Congresses and other important 
meetings are important not so much as to persuade the nation, but to reveal the 
new political line and the compromise/consensus of top Party officials, thus 
providing clues of acceptable belief and behaviour, ultimately to create the 
political reality (Kluver, 1996, p.130). 
 
“Socialism” as a form of “Nationalism” 
  
"Socialism" has also been successfully used by the CCP due to its 
linkage with historical and nationalistic appeals, in the notion that "only socialism 
can save China…" (Young, 1998, p.116). Scalapino (1986, p.69) asserts that 
China is moving in the direction similar to that of the former Soviet Union, by 
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laying claim to the allegiance of the people.  This is done by abandoning class 
struggle in favour of a united front of the whole people and injecting nationalism 
into all important pronouncements and policies.  Nationalism, and 
internationalism, has always been a priority for Communist regimes.  Most 
communist regimes, like the CCP, came to power in the context of wars against 
external forces and were therefore connected with the struggle for 
independence (Scalapino, 1986, p.60).  Essentially, as Dirlik paraphrases, 
“Chinese socialism is nationalistic in orientation” (1989, p.365). 
Since 1989, there have been numerous indications that there is a 
growing disenchantment with the West, and a belief that the West, its values 
and systems, have not made much difference to post-Communist countries 
(Barmè, 1994, p.273).  Indeed, the CCP plays on the fear of chaos held by the 
Chinese.  The leaders point to the former Soviet Union, where the market, civil 
society and democratisation have not led to economic advancement, improved 
welfare and political freedoms for all but rather to the rise of economic Mafia, a 
drastic fall in living standards, collapse of welfare nets and the brooding 
shadows of a resurgent Russian nationalism (Saich, 1998, p.261).  In fact, the 
social and economic chaos that followed the Soviet Union's and Eastern 
Europe's revolution has led the Chinese to cherish their current stability (Liu, 
1993, p.244). 
 Scalapino states that with the ideological decay amongst the populace, 
nationalism - which has always been embedded in China's Communist 
movement - has been surging (1998, p.37).  However, Zhang (1994, p.82) 
asserts that the contention between the official cultural nationalism and the 
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cultural nationalism of the Chinese populace will intensify, to the disadvantage of 
the Party orthodoxy.  For Dirlik , (1989, p.369) 
 
Chinese socialism has been but a disguise for, or instrument of, 
the national quest for wealth and power to which socialism as an 
ideology in its own right has been largely irrelevant. 
 
The Advent of “Performance Legitimacy” 
 
As a Leninist-developmentalist state, China is pursuing economic reform 
whilst undertaking slow political change.  As Harding (1998, p.12) notes, the 
principle objective of the CCP is to promote economic modernisation, not Maoist 
"class struggle".  Apart from nationalism and economic rationalism, other 
important areas where ideology is still invoked are to defend the CCP leadership 
in politics and state ownership of major industry.  Zhang (1992. pp.92-92) 
surmises that China's leadership realised it was impossible to keep its people 
content without adapting to a market economy that not only promises 
deliverance of economic goods but also requires far-reaching social and political 
change.  For Zhang, China has had to initiate its own "peaceful evolution".  
 
It appears, then, that the Chinese government is utilising "performance 
legitimacy" as a basis for its legitimacy claims, based on China’s economic 
performance and nationalism.  Performance legitimacy has been utilised 
extensively in nations where the government has been maintained by either a 
one-party state or a one-party dominant state.  Huntington (1991, p.27) indicates 
that Western democratic states are less dependent on performance legitimacy 
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that authoritarian states.  This is because in the Western democratic systems, 
failure is blamed on the incumbents instead of the system, with the ouster and 
replacement of the incumbent to renew the system through the use of an 
opposition in government.  Singapore, amongst others, is an exemplar of the 
Asian region's one-party dominant states.  In such a political system, the 
Singaporean Peoples' Action Party (PAP) dominates the legislature and much of 
the political life.  Although the existence of other political parties is tolerated, 
they are weak and ineffectual.  In fact, the relative weakness of the opposition 
parties in Singapore is one of the reasons for the PAPs continual political 
domination (Lee, 1986, p.207). 
East Asian states rely heavily upon performance legitimacy, and thus, 
provide a good example of the function of "political legitimacy".  Johnson's 
(1987, Political Institutions and Economic Performance:  the Government 
Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, in Feng, 1995) 
analysis was that the East Asian states are "ultimately legitimised not by their 
ideological pretensions" but "by their results".  Furthermore, these nations do not 
have a strong ideological commitment to equality and social welfare; they simply 
define growth, productivity, and competitiveness as the foremost and even 
single-minded priority of the state.  In addition, unlike Communist nations, they 
do not have a goal culture, that is, a pronounced commitment to an explicit 
program of social transformation (Feng, 1995, pp.19-20).  Lee (1986, p.202) 
states that the political, social and economic life in Singapore has been 
influenced by the PAP’s political ideology of survival and the concept of 
achievement. 
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An examination of these Asian one-party dominant states reveals that 
"performance legitimacy" is not based on economic development alone.  The 
"performance legitimacy" of the nations has been enhanced by being 
accompanied by slow political institutionalisation, and with the emergence of the 
rule of law (Pei, 1995, p.66). Indeed, as shall be verified in later chapters, China 
has begun a process of political reform through political institutionalisation - 
although China has not yet begun the moves to democratisation as was 
achieved in Taiwan.  For the time being, “performance legitimacy” is based on 
China’s economic expansion, modernisation and nationalism. 
 
By the 1992 Fourteenth Congress, the CCP had attempted to 
religitimise itself16.  Although some China analysts deem that the CCP’s 
deviation from the Marxist-Maoist creed has effectively meant that the party will 
continue to face a legitimisation crisis, they ignore the substantial undertakings 
by the CCP to renew the ideology to allow for China to mount its transformation 
into a burgeoning giant.  The irrelevant notion of “socialism” fashioned under 
Mao’s “ideological absolutisation” has been discarded.  With the reinterpretation 
of Marxist texts, the CCP has used “practice” as the criterion in which to judge 
the sustainability of the party.  Theoretical re-evaluation has allowed the 
introduction of such slogans as “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and 
“primary stages of socialism” which befit China’s modernisation program.  In 
addition, the CCP has successfully intertwined the concept of socialism with that 
                                                          
16 This was achieved by the Congress affirming China’s “socialist market economy” and that the 
theory of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was to be its guiding principal.  See Chapter 
Five for more information. 
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of nationalism.  The Chinese Communist Party has effectively become a 
nationalist party (though this should not be confused with the Nationalist Party in 
Taiwan, the Kuomintang).   
With MLM reduced to a Leninism-developmentalist framework, 
incorporating the thesis of neo-conservatism, the CCP has looked towards 
“performance legitimacy” as the basis of its legitimacy.  Not unlike other nations 
in the Asian region, the advent of “performance legitimacy” assists the CCP in 
retaining leadership in politics and directing the economic modernisation 
necessary in that country. 
Politically, democratisation is '"officially" outside public discourse, 
although, at times, it had been a topic tolerated and somewhat encouraged by 
reformist leadership of Zhao Ziyang and his encouragement of the political 
theory of neo-authoritarianism in the late 1980s (Tong, 1998, p.103).  As part of 
the framework underlying he neo-conservative evolution of the “Jiang Zemin 
Era”, Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought will continue to lose ideological 
viability:  orthodoxy will be based on Leninism and developmentalist 
modernisation within a neo-conservative framework.  The system does need 
some semblance of democratic legitimacy, although it is unlikely that the current 
leadership will initiate an end to authoritarianism and introduce a democratic 
system (He, 1996, p.211).  Indeed, neither the existing authoritarian system nor 
Western liberal democracy seems practical in China’s near future. 
 
For Jiang Zemin, whilst the CCP endeavoured to create terminologies of 
“socialism” to meet economic challenges, neo-conservatism has enabled him to 
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not only strengthen and legitimise the CCP but to also legitimise his position as 
the “core” of the third generational leadership.  Socialism in China, under Jiang, 
incorporated those two central tenets of neo-conservatism: the movement 
towards a market economy, and the continuation of an “enlightened dictator”.  
Furthermore, socialism in China, as does neo-conservatism, uses “nationalism” 
in order to unify the populace.  Furthermore, as the following chapters shall 
reveal, neo-conservatism has provided Jiang with a platform to orchestrate a 




JUNE 1989 TO OCTOBER 1992 
 
Before 1992, Western academics rarely commented on the role of Jiang 
Zemin within the Chinese hierarchy.  Indeed, within the echelons of power in the 
CCP, Jiang did not commandeer significant political clout in comparison to the 
likes of Chen Yun or Li Peng.  Nor did Jiang consume as much attention in 
Western journals as did Deng Xiaoping, who was still clearly the “anointed 
helmsman” by the West.  In fact, during this time some Western analysts17 were 
already predicting the downfall of Jiang Zemin and assessing “rightful” 
replacements to the position of General Secretary.  It is true that Jiang did not 
evidence much control within the mechanisms of the CCP18, but this was 
ultimately due to the fact that he was Deng’s protégé and also because he 
originally had a minute power base as General Secretary19 during the time.  He 
did, however, clearly utilise the time to manipulate power relations in such a way 
in which he would not only retain, and legitimise, his position as General 
Secretary, but also to strengthen his position by being selected the Chair of the 
CMC and eventually being appointed the President of the People’s Republic of 
                                                          
17 Such comments are reiterated by Chang (2001) 
 
18 Furthermore, upon becoming Secretary General, Jiang was referred to as “Flowerpot” due to 
his “penchant for standing around and looking pleasantly idle” (Gilley, Bruce, 2000, “Jiang 
Zemin: The Great Autopilot”, International Herald Tribune, 27 September, in Pye, 2001, p.45). 
 
19 Indeed, Chang (2001, p.37) argues that immediately after the Tiananmen Incident that the 
position of General Secretary was not that of a “real” leader but more of a “clerk who had to 
please several elderly bosses”. 
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China.  It should be noted that Jiang was successful in achieving the latter 
during a period in which the conservatives controlled not only the political and 
economic realms, but one when Deng’s economic authority waned (as did that 
of the reformers) in the CCP. 
In order to thoroughly examine Jiang’s ability to oscillate between the 
conservative and reformer factions during this period, it is important to 
understand the political environment in which he had to operate.  Therefore, this 
chapter discusses his elevation to the position of General Secretary, examines 
the political climate of the period and traces the rise of the princelings.  It also 
discusses the political implications of Deng’s “Southern Sojourn” during the 
Chinese New Year of 1992, which culminated in a “changing of the guard” at the 
Fourteenth Party Congress in October of that same year.  Finally, this chapter 
reviews the course of action undertaken by Jiang during this period that enabled 
him to strengthen and legitimise his position as the “core of the third 
generational leadership” in the CCP. 
 
THE “ELEVATION” OF JIANG ZEMIN 
 
Due to dissatisfaction with Zhao Ziyang’s handling of the students in the 
lead-up to the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, Deng Xiaoping and other elder 
conservatives were determined to replace Zhao as the General Secretary of the 
CCP, even before 4 June 1989.  Indeed, the lead-up to the Tiananmen Incident 
witnessed a conflict between Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang, which reflected the 
conflict between the reformer and conservative policy perspectives (Teiwes, 
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2001, p.72)20.  Furthermore, orthodox Maoists within the CCP were unhappy 
with Zhao’s, and therefore Deng’s, advocacy of economic reform and believed 
that if they were to get rid of Zhao that they would also reduce the influence of 
the reformers within the CCP.  Indeed, Deng learned that there was an anti-
Zhao group that consisted of Yang Shangkun, Bo Yibo, Peng Zhen, Chen Yun 
and Li Xiannian. 
Indeed, the elders and contending political power cliques that were 
responsible for the suppression during the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, would also 
hold political power after the Incident, including those who wanted to take 
advantage of their political clout by rolling back Deng’s reforms.  After the 
Tiananmen Incident, the elders consisted of Chen Yun, Yang Shangkun, Wang 
Zhen, Bo Yibo, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen and Song Renqiong.  Lam (1995, 
p..333-334) states that the latter, with the inclusion of Deng Xiaoping, were 
collectively referred to as the “Gang of Elders”, the “White Eye-browed Cabal”, 
or the “Eight Immortals”.  The cliques, many of whom were beholden to the 
elders included: the “Soviet Faction”, led by Li Peng and other graduates of the 
Eastern European bloc universities; the “Beijing Faction”, represented by the 
State Council planners and ideologues in the capital such as the then Beijing 
Secretary LI Ximing and the Beijing Mayor, Chen Xitong21; and the “Gansu 
Faction”, a group of conservative Party functionaries under Organisational Chief, 
Song Ping. 
                                                          
20 Unlike during the Maoist era, as the “loser” of the internal CCP conflict, Zhao Ziyang was 
shown remarkable leniency. 
 
21 Chen Xitong was expelled from the Politburo and as Beijing Mayor on 28 September 1995 for 
corruption.  His demise meant that Jiang had more chance of securing his position as the core. 
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However, in order for the Chinese populace, and the Western world, to 
accept a new General Secretary, he (due to the fact that males are the usual 
recipients of such political positions within China) could not be “tainted with the 
blood of Tiananmen”, unlike Li Peng (Lam, 1995, p.334).  Another consideration, 
for Deng at least, was that the new General Secretary must have some 
economic reform credentials22. 
Jiang Zemin, in the short term, fulfilled these requirements.  Hailing from 
his political power base of Shanghai, as the Mayor of Shanghai, he was one of 
the Shanghai-related cadres.  As such, these Shanghai cadres were not 
“tainted” and, equally important, they were practitioners of Deng’s open-door 
policy.  They were also less “Westernised” and independent-minded than their 
counterparts from Guangdong, Fujian or Hainan.  In addition, the Shanghai 
cadres were considered more amenable to central control than the regional 
“warlords” from the southeast of China, including many affiliates of Zhao Ziyang, 
whose power base was in Guangdong (Lam, 1995, p.334).   
For, Deng, his original expectation of Jiang was merely to hold the 
Party, nation and army together and to continue with economic reform23.  
Indeed, with Deng’s retirement as head of the CMC in November 1989, it is 
                                                          
22 Hu Shaoming believed that Deng choose Jiang because he had to choose someone as 
General Secretary before Chen Yun or Li Xiannian recommended their own subordinates (FBIS, 
1989, August 2, p.13) 
 
23 In a scathing attack on Jiang’s appointment, one China commentator believed that there were 
four reasons to why Deng chose Jiang as General Secretary. First, that Jiang was a “yes-man”, 
who was “obsequious” to the higher authorities.  Second, when Deng went to Shanghai, Jiang 
deferred to him; third, when Deng asked Jiang, in his capacity as Mayor of Shanghai, to 
contribute more funds to the central government he hastily agreed.  Fourth, Jiang quelled the 
1986-1987 student demonstrations in Shanghai without much difficulty.  It should be noted the 
author of this article was a staunch “democrat” and not in favour of Jiang’s appointment (FBIS, 
1989, July 3, p.23). 
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evident that his retirement marked the emergence of a shift in power from the 
“generation that had fought and won the revolution to the first post-revolutionary 
generation” (Fewsmith,2001, p.53).  Chang (2001, p.39) adds that Deng’s 
resignation from the post of Chairman of the CMC not only revealed his self-
rebuke at the failure to forestall the Tiananmen Incident, but also, and more 
importantly, to signal to the other leaders to leave the political stage for the third 
generational leadership and Jiang. 
Although Jiang had a power base in his position as Mayor of Shanghai 
and his positions at the Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics, as well as 
at the First Automobile Plant in Changchun, he clearly had less of a power base 
than any previous successor since Hua Guofeng.  He had less status than not 
only Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, but also his Standing Politburo colleagues Li 
Peng and Qiao Shi.  Teiwes (2000, p.73) argues that, paradoxically, Jiang’s 
notional weakness actually bolstered his position. 
 
It was to be just five days before June 4 that Deng asked the two 
political brokers, Li Peng and Yao Yilin, to throw their support behind Jiang, 
whom Deng had already identified as the new General Secretary (Fewsmith 
1997, and Wu Anchia, 1994).  Their support was necessary due to the fact that 
Jiang was more junior in party ranking than either Li or Yao, and that Jiang’s 
”meteoric” rise might provoke opposition.  Deng told Li and Yao that on choosing 







The people see reality, if we put up a front so that people feel that 
it is an ossified leadership, a conservative leadership, or if the 
people believe that it is a mediocre leadership that cannot reflect 
the future of China, then there will be constant trouble and there 
will never be a peaceful day (Fewsmith, 1997, p.474). 
 
 
In order to assist Jiang, Zeng Qinghong, Jiang’s Chief of Staff whilst 
Mayor of Shanghai, moved with Jiang to Beijing in 1989.  Zeng was promoted 
from Vice-Chair of the General Office of the CCP to Chairman, and eventually 
an alternate Politburo member.  Zeng Qinghong was to become Jiang’s 




The post-Tiananmen political climate brought about renewed political 
conservatism which enveloped all aspects of Chinese life: political, cultural and 
social.  As Fewsmith (2001) explains, after the Tiananmen Incident, the 
dominant objective within the CCP was the need for stability and unity.  With 
Tiananmen as a clear warning of what could eventuate if differences were not 
contained, the lesson put to the leaders was simply that “we all hang together or 
we hang separately” (Fewsmith, 2001, p.72). 
The strength of the conservatives within the Party in the winter of 1989-
1990 was indicated not only be the directness of the challenges to Deng’s 
ideological authority, but also a major effort to restore at least a significant 
measure of State planning to the economy (Fewsmith, 1997, p.480).  For the 
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conservatives, they had two main aims: one, to lay past blames on Zhao Ziyang; 
and two, to manipulate both the economic and political spheres for their own, 
and, as they perceived, the CCP’s, political preservation. 
 
For the CCP, the case against Zhao Ziyang was to become an 
ideological “football”.  The Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central 
Committee (23-24 July 1989) was convened after a three-day enlarged Politburo 
meeting, but this Plenum failed to conclude a case against Zhao Ziyang24.  This 
alone reflected the depth of division within the Party.  At the Fifth Plenary 
Session of the Thirteenth Party Congress in November 198925, however, the 
Plenum laid out a systematic, albeit implicit, critique of Zhao Ziyang’s 
management of the economy.  Furthermore, during the campaign against 
bourgeois liberalisation, it was impossible to separate criticisms of Zhao from 
issues of ideology and Party line. 
 
In addition, whilst in the early months after the Tiananmen Incident most 
economic commentaries published in the Peoples’ Daily and the Guangming 
Daily were written by unknown reporters or economists, after the Party’s Fifth 
Plenum, these newspapers again intensified serious economic and pro-
conservative editorials.  For example, a number of well-known economists, 
including Ma Hong, Zhang Zhouyuan, LI Chengrui and Wan Jiye, all argued in 
                                                          
24 At the 1989 National Day speech, Jiang was reported to have said that Zhao Ziyang had 
“committed the serious mistake of supporting the turmoil [of the Tiananmen Incident] and 
splitting the Party” (FBIS, 1989, October 2, pp.17-21). 
 
25 It was at this Plenary Session that Jiang was appointed the Chairman of the CMC. 
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measured economic terms the case for the Fifth Plenum calling for continued 
economic retrenchment (Fewsmith, 1997, p.481). 
The retrenchment of the reformist economy began under the slogan of 
“controlling the economic environment and consolidating the economic order” 
(Liu, 1994, p.342), which was held in conjunction with the renewed political 
direction of the she xiao education campaign (which is detailed below).  By 
September, even Jiang called for a renewed emphasis upon ideological 
education and Party building, stating that: 
 
China will resolutely carry out reforms of both economic and 
political structures, but these reforms [will] help enhance and 
improve the Party leadership (FBIS, 1989, September 22, p.7). 
 
 
Liu states that this campaign policy “succeeded only too well”, as it 
caused thousands of factories to go bankrupt and pushed more than thirty 
million people our of work (1994, p.342).  Interestingly, Li Peng26 and the 
conservatives could not provide nor implement a successful economic program 
within this period.  As Fewsmith (2001, p.53) states, “after years of carping 
about the various failings of reform, conservatives at last had a relatively free 
hand to implement their preferred policies”.  In fact the continued economic 
vitality of the township and village enterprise (TVE) systems underscored the 
success of market-orientated reform rather than the so-called double guarantee 
system (which restored greater control and planning over two hundred major 
industries) (Fewsmith, 2001).  Therefore, with the Tiananmen protests still fresh 
                                                          
26 At this time Li Peng was concurrently the Premier as well as being the minister of the State 
Commission for Restructuring Economy of the State Council. 
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in the minds of the leaders of the CCP, the Party began to gradually de-
emphasise the economic austerity and continue economic reform. 
 
In the Chinese political realm, after the Tiananmen Incident, China 
embarked on the socialist ideology education campaign (she xiao) in the rural 
areas.  This campaign represented an attempt by the CCP to link the double 
track development of “socialist material civilisation” and “socialist spiritual 
civilisation”.  Indeed, the reformers within the Party were forced to join the 
conservatives to present a bipartisan approach accepting the campaign27, 
whereby she xiao was first announced in a joint circular issued by the CCP 
Central Committee and the State Council in December 1990. Essentially, the 
goals and tenets of this campaign were: one, to make the peasants believe in 
the “truth” (for example, that socialism is superior to capitalism); two, to make 
the peasants adhere to a correct political orientation; three, to strengthen Party 
building and the CCP leadership in the countryside; and, four, consolidate 
capitalism and combat the threat of “peaceful evolution”. 
 
It would appear that, by the summer of 1990, there had been a 
relaxation of the hard-core conservative ideology, as Li Ruihuan, whom Deng 
had put in charge of ideology, called for a campaign against pornography28 
(Fewsmith, 1997, p.477).  Yet, due to the influence of the father-son combination 
of Chen Yun and his son, Chen Yuan, who was the Deputy Governor of the 
                                                          
27 See also Chen Weixing (1993, pp.70-73). 
 
28 Campaigns against pornography had begun earlier in late 1989. 
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Peoples’ Bank of China, Li Ruihuan was only a formal figurehead of the ideology 
leading group.  Conservatives had dominated the top levels of the Propaganda 
and Organisation Departments, as well as those responsible for economic policy 
making, since the Tiananmen Incident.  Indeed, after the Tiananmen Incident, 
the Peoples’ Daily, the Guangming Daily, Xinwen Chuban Bao (News and 
Publication) all tried to actively promote the “struggle against peaceful evolution” 
in an attempt to restore Mao’s ideas and to discredit Deng’s reform policy (Zhao 
Suisheng, 1993, p.744). Deng Liqun, who had returned to power in the 
academic and cultural spheres, with conservatives attempted to revitalise Mao 
worship, foment class struggle, and to reindoctrinate Marxism-Leninism 
(Goldman, 2000, p.115). 
 
Fewsmith, (2001, p.37) argues that the reason the she xiao campaign 
did not last was that the bureaucratic interests and departments reasserted 
themselves.  Indeed, the campaign reveals the nature of Chinese politics 
whereby informal politics (that is, the elders “retired” to the CAC) can sometimes 
overrule the formalised political base within the CCP.  In addition, Fewsmith 
notes, this campaign and its predecessor, the campaign against bourgeois 
liberalisation in 1987, could be manipulated by the formal realm due to the 
ideological component incorporated into the campaigns. 
 
In order to pacify international opinion and the demands of the Chinese 
intellectuals after the Tiananmen Incident, the CCP appeared to be bringing 
about the political adjustment as notably evidenced in the elevation of Jiang 
 102
Zemin to the position of General Secretary.  After 1989, all senior members of 
the CCP were careful to point out that political reform in China needed to take 
place in the context of stability and the “political reform [would] have Chinese 
characteristics” (Lam, 1995, p.243). Lam clarifies this by revealing several 
quotes by high officials within China.  For example, the then President, Yang 
Shangkun, was quoted as saying: 
 
The political system of a country should be determined by actual 
conditions in that country and not copies from other 
countries…China resolutely opposes the bourgeois-liberal concept 
of attempting to copy the Western system, and to change China’s 
existing system (China News Service, May 9, 1991). 
 
Deng continually repeated the need for stability (coining the phrase 
“stability overrides everything”, wending yadao yiqie, which was first used in his 
31 October 1989 talk with Richard Nixon). In addition, Li Ruihuan remarked that 
“the construction of Chinese democratic politics must be based upon the 
premise of unity and stability” (NCNA, 1993, May 21; in Lam, 1995).  Jiang 
Zemin also stated that “[we] cannot transplant to China the parliamentary 
democratic system, the multi-party system, and other political systems of the 
West” (CNS, 1990, June 12; and Ming Pao, 1992, March 23, in Lam 1995).  
Reflecting Jiang’s political adroitness (to be detailed below), Jiang has on 
several other occasions stressed that political reform consisted of no more than 
the “perfection of the socialist democracy”.  Jiang had also hinted that the 
Western ideals of democracy and freedom were not compatible with China’s 
“national conditions” (CNS, 1990, June 27; in Lam, 1995).  In an address in July 
1991, Jiang made it very clear that only a very limited degree of the old “let a 
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hundred flowers bloom” would ever be revived in the cultural arena: “We will 
never allow bourgeois liberal things to poison the people or society, or counter 
socialism” (Jiang, in the Peoples’ Daily, July 2, 1991; in Lam, 1995).  Indeed, 
due to the political climate of the time, Jiang echoed the hard-conservative 
stance of the elders and Li Peng.  As will be detailed further in this chapter, the 
period directly after the Tiananmen Incident was a period in which Jiang 
attempted to form alliances with Li Peng and to placate the elders in order to 
maintain his position as General Secretary. 
 
This period also witnessed the collapse of a succession of Communist 
parties and the collapse of the Soviet Union.  As a result, the CCP’s siege 
mentality intensified, resulting in a further tightening of Party controls over the 
PLA and the state security organs.  The leadership reconfirmed its conviction 
that it had responded appropriately to the Tiananmen Incident.  In addition, the 
leadership concluded that the Eastern European and Soviet authorities had 
erred in embarking on the path of political reform and in losing control of their 
armed forces.  On the other hand, neo-conservatism states that political reform 
needs to be undertaken after the opening up of the economy. 
Tian Jiyun, a member of the Politburo and a Vice-Premier of the State, 
said that: 
The root cause of the Soviet collapse was the people’s 
dissatisfaction with the Soviet-styled socialism, which proved to be 
inferior to capitalism in creating social productivity (although 
mistakes of past Soviet leaders should not be overlooked) (Wu 




Shambaugh (1992, p.258) also supports the view that it was the 
collapse of the Soviet Union that convinced Deng to undertake his nan xun (also 
known as Deng’s “Southern Sojourn”, which is detailed later). Furthermore, by 
the spring of 1991, Deng simply lacked the political clout to fully reinstate his 
vision of reform.  Fewsmith (1997, pp.491-492) states that there could be 
various reasons for this.  First, Deng failed to win over (or intimidate) his 
opponents, and also failed to win the support of the “silent majority” of Party 
elders who seemed “neutral” in the period.  Second, it could be assumed that 
Deng, faced with opposition, chose to bide his time until a more opportune 
moment.  Third, the swift victory of the United States in the Gulf War may very 
well have renewed fears in Beijing that the world was becoming increasingly 
unipolar, and that the US would apply new pressures on China.  Indeed, this 
period would see increased pressure from the “princelings”, the sons of the CCP 
elders, to become part of the CCP hierarchy.  
 
THE RISE OF THE PRINCELINGS29 
 
It appeared that from late 1990, a top priority of the leadership was to 
ensure that positions of influence in the Party, government and the army 
remained in the hands of cadres who were “totally trusted by the CCP”. The aim 
of the “princelings” was to seize as much power as possible at the 1992 
Fourteenth Party Congress.  Therefore they targeted their attacks at Deng 
                                                          
29 Li (2001) provides an interesting clarification of current members of the taizidang in his book 
China’s Leaders. 
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Xiaoping, and his nominated core, Jiang Zemin, especially in their article 
Realistic Responses30.   Ruan (1992, p.30) suggests that the “theory” within 
Realistic  Responses was aimed at negating the guideline of reform and opening 
adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Congress. Headed 
by Chen Yuan, Chen Yun’s son, the social foundation for the “princelings” was, 
according to Ruan (1992, p. 31):  
Merely comprised of those political and economic upstarts 
obsessed with the lust for power and money among children of 
senior officials, and a small number of “young thinkers” who regard 
themselves as [being] “more intelligent” than ordinary people. 
 
The “princelings” were supported by not only Chen Yun, but also by 
Wang Zhen and Deng Liqun, as well as their own protégés such as He Jingzhi 
and Wang Renzhi. 
As of 1991, the contenders for succession were all members of the CCP 
Politburo Standing Committee.  This group was comprised of Jiang Zemin, 
Prime Minister Li Peng, law and security expert Qiao Shi, Propaganda Chief Li 
Ruihuan, Party Organisational Chief Song Ping, and Yao Yilin (although he was 
in poor health). Other influential candidates included: Yang Baibing, Secretary 
General of the CMC, Zhu Rongji, former Mayor of Shanghai and recently 
appointed Deputy Minister of the State Council, Ye Xuanping, the son of Ye 
Jiangying, a former leader of Guangdong Province, and Zou Jianying, Chairman 
of the State Planning Commission.  At this time, the elders, such as Hu Qioamu, 
Deng Liqun and Zhao Ziyang, could not be discounted, although the patronage 
                                                          
 
30 See Chapter Two for more information about the article Realistic Responses. 
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provided by the elders was also of assistance.  Therefore, Deng supported 
Jiang, Li Ruihuan and Zhu Rongji; Chen Yun tended to support Li Peng, and to 
a lesser degree Yao Yilin and Song Ping, who were both in their seventies; 
Yang Shangkun supported both Li Peng and his half-brother Yang Baibing 
(Bachman, 1991, p.252). 
In order to ensure a position of influence, one would need to possess 
military support, “image” and political skill.   With emphasis on “stability and 
unity”, the leadership was keen to avoid unchecked power struggles that would 
weaken its rule and disturb the current succession order.  An overt power 
struggle could have possibly split the Party, brought about another “Tiananmen”, 
and threatened Party rule (Bachmann, 1991, p.253). 
 
THE 1992 “SOUTHERN SOJOURN” (Nan Xun) 
 
It is here that Deng’s “Southern Sojourn” (nan xun) assumes added 
significance so far as these power struggles at the centre are concerned. 
Essentially, the aim of Deng’s “Southern Sojourn” was to end the prolonged 
policy and ideological debates that had constrained his efforts to revitalise the 
reform of the economy.  Due to the nature of the period from 1989 to Deng’s 
sojourn during the Chinese New Year of 1992, and the movement towards 
“orthodox leftism”, Deng’s tour was the most dramatic political event to occur 
between the Tiananmen Incident and the 1992 Fourteenth Party Congress.  
Whilst the tour may have been “the most dramatic political incident” during this 
time, the sojourn can also be deemed “an act of frustration” by Deng 
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(Shambaugh, 1992, p.257) in order to attempt to reverse the direction in which 
the orthodox conservatives were leading the country.  It is apparent that Deng’s 
pre-emptive attack was against “leftism”; a reference to holding onto orthodox 
Marxist ideology.  Indeed, during his sojourn, it is reported that Deng: 
 
Blamed [the] leftists for talking too much about “countering 
peaceful evolution” and not enough about reform and the open 
door policy (Lam, 1992, January, p.25). 
 
This attack by Deng, Zhao (1993, p.746) posits, was an implicit attack 
on Chen Yun and the orthodox ideologues.  Shambaugh concurs with Zhao’s 
assessment by stating that “’leftism’ was Deng’s code for his obstructionist 
opponents in Beijing” (1992, p.258).  As a result, the “southern sojourn” allowed 
the moderate reformers to regain the political initiative, which Baum (1996, 
p.154) eulogises as the creation of a “new mood of buoyant optimism, 
reminiscent of the pre-Tiananmen period”.  However, it must be noted that whilst 
Deng’s sojourn did reignite economic reform with a vengeance, it also 
unleashed heightened power struggle.  This power struggle was to be largely 
resolved at the Fourteenth Party Congress that was held in October the same 
year. 
 
As mentioned previously, after the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, Deng 
Xiaoping had at first agreed to allow orthodox conservatives such as Chen Yun, 
Yao Yilin, Song Ping and Li Peng, teamed up with a series of other hardliner and 
military conservatives, to control the economic, cultural, social media and 
military policies.  During this time, Deng remained out of public view, but it needs 
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to be noted that he was unwilling to shed all the vestiges of formal authority and 
rule solely through informal means.  Deng had given up his last major position, 
as head of the CMC, in November 1989.  Yet, the Thirteenth Party Congress 
passed a secret resolution that allowed for the referral of all major decisions to 
Deng as the “helmsman of the Party”, even though the role of “helmsman” was 
not a formal position.  Furthermore, although Deng’s opponents may have 
reduced Deng’s capacity to exercise authority, they did not directly challenge 
Deng’s position as the “core” of the Party (Fewsmith, 1997, p.498). 
However, by late 1990, Deng concluded that conservatives had gone 
“too far” and that it was time for a re-appraisal of the policies, and a redirection 
towards further economic reform.  His first attempt to reign in the conservatives 
was during the 1991 Chinese New Year when he used the Shanghai newspaper 
Liberation Daily to call for bold reform.  Yet Deng was unable to get the national 
media to renew the economic reform campaign.  This inaction by the national 
media to renew economic reform revealed that Deng’s self-imposed “retirement” 
after the Tiananmen Incident brought about two realities.  First, Deng had 
indeed lost control of the propaganda apparatus to Chen Yun.  Second, as 
evidenced by the first, he had lost control of the Politburo itself to the orthodox 
conservatives. 
 
In an attempt to salvage his pre-Tiananmen reforms, Deng decided, as 
Mao had often done in the past when faced with political opposition to his own 
policies, to take his case directly to the populace by visiting an economic model, 
predominantly the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) of Shenzhen, in January 1992.  
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Essentially, Deng, like Mao before him, apparently concluded that if he could not 
work through normal bureaucratic channels, he would need to circumvent them.  
Essentially, then, the central leadership had been bypassed as Deng went to the 
“masses” to advocate the deepening of reform. As Fewsmith notes (1997, 
p.503), 
 
During 1991, Deng had complained that many of the CCP leaders 
were “merely going through the motions” of supporting reform and 
that they were in danger of losing their jobs.  It is also interesting to 
note that Deng specifically signalled his support for Zhu Rongji, 
whom Deng had sponsored to become a Vice-Premier in March 
1991.  Deng, remarked on Zhu as “quite capable in economics” , 
revealing his desire to once again kick-start economic reform.   
 
Deng’s sojourn, and its delayed coverage by the national media, 
reinforced not only his lack of control over the national propaganda organs, but 
also, and more importantly, the opposition Deng faced in Beijing from Chen Yun 
and his allies in his attempt to further economic reform.  Zhao Suisheng (1993) 
delineates the non-media coverage, and the Deng-Chen Yun conflict into three 
policy and ideological issues: one, disputing the Party’s central objectives, with 
Deng promoting market-orientated reforms and economic opening to the outside 
and Chen favouring a more orthodox planned-economy approach emphasising 
Marxist ideology; two, their conflicting views on capitalism; and, three, their 
different perspectives on the roles of the SEZs.  Zhao Suisheng (1993, p.743) 
concludes that: 
 
[With the collapse of the USSR], Deng argued that the CCP 
needed to learn from the experience of the Soviet Communist 
Party (CSPU) which ha become divorced from the people, had run 
counter to the interests of the state, and had failed in its attempt to 
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promote economic development.  For Chen, the principle lesson 
for China was that the CPSU had failed to grasp class struggle.  
Thus Deng insisted on economic reform while Chen stressed the 
need to fight “peaceful evolution”[heping yanbian]. 
 
 
Indeed, just weeks before Deng’s sojourn, Chen Yun presented a paper 
discussing “Six Points of View and Opinions” at the Eight Plenary Session of the 
CAC, which was convened on the last day of the Eight Plenary Session of the 
Thirteen Party Congress.  Essentially, Chen’s six points stated that the Party 
was straying from Marxism and engulfing reform through “overzealousness”. 
Zhao Suisheng (1993) furthers his argument by stating that both Deng 
and Chen had clear allies during this period.  Zhao (1993, p.743) states that 
Deng’s allies included Yang Shangkun, Yang Baibing, Liu Huaqing, Qiao Shi, Li 
Ruihuan, Zhu Rongji and Tian Jun.  Chen’s allies included Li Peng, Yao Yilin, 
Song Ping, and those in charge of the major ideological organisations which 
included the CCP Central Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Culture, and 
major Beijing newspapers. 
Fewsmith (2001) states that the reason as to why the Chen Yun-Deng 
Xiaoping conflict did not fracture the Party was due to Chen Yun’s belief in not 
expressing political differences.  Therefore, whilst Chen would comment on 
reform measures he did not agree with, he did not openly criticize Deng, nor did 
he openly challenge Deng for the “core” position.  On the other hand, Deng 
tolerated Chen’s criticism and the inference by the State Planning Commission 
in the implementation of reforms.  Overall, Fewsmith, (2001, p.54) concurs that 
there may have been a “mutual recognition” between the two that the Party 
could not survive another struggle to “win all” like that which occurred in 1978. 
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Whilst the Hong Kong media organisations were quick to cover Deng’s 
trip, which began on January 19, 1992, in Shenzhen, by publishing timely 
reports31, it took nearly two months before Deng’s sojourn was reported in 
China.  At first, a few regional newspapers in Shenzhen, Guangdong and 
Shanghai had begun reporting the event and publishing photographs by early 
March.  It was not to be until March 31, that the People’s Daily would publish a 
long detailed account of Deng’s activities in an article titled, “East will bring 
Spring all Around: On the spot report on Comrade Deng Xiaoping in Shenzhen” 
(Fewsmith, 1997, pp.500-501).  However, Shambaugh (1992, p.257) states that 
it was not until 28 April, 1992, that Deng’s sojourn was reported in the national 
print media, the People’s Daily.  Yet, it should be noted that Fewsmith (1997, 
p.499) states that on 22 February, the People’s Daily published an authoritative 
article that called for strengthening reform.  The tour was also televised in an 
unscheduled documentary developed by the China Central Television station on 
31 March (Zhao Suisheng, 1993, p.741).  Before the People’s Daily reported 
Deng’s sojourn, and indicating a new power alignment, the 4 April editorial of the 
People’s Daily called for faster economic liberalisation but omitted the usual 
reference to it being a “leftist deviation”.  Furthermore, on 8 April, in a small story 
on its back page, the People’s Daily openly backed the recent call, by Deng, for 
faster reform.  This was to be the first time since the 1989 Tiananmen Incident 
that the paper made a public stance on Deng’s instructions. 
                                                          
31 It was rumoured, by officials in the SEZ of Zhuhai, that the Hong Kong press “bought” illegally 
taken photos of Deng in the economic zone. 
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 However, it is interesting to note, as Liu (1994, p.242) has done in his 
assessment of Den’s sojourn speeches, that Deng “pandered” to provincial and 
local government officials in a bid to gain support for furthering economic 
reforms.  Another interesting focus of Deng’s speeches was his contention that 
without the previous ten years of reform, the CCP would not have survived the 
upheaval caused by the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 (Fewsmith, 1997, p.497). 
 
Although Deng’s sojourn was not reported in substantial detail in the 
Chinese national media32, this does not mean that Deng’s opponents were not 
discussing the implications of Deng’s trip and his recorded speeches.  Within the 
highest echelons of power within the CCP, it would appear that Deng’s trip 
garnered both support and opposition.  Indeed, both Qiao Shi and Yang 
Shangkun separately accompanied Deng on his sojourn, as Deng had to be 
accompanied by at least one member of the Politburo.  Jiang Zemin also visited 
Deng in Shanghai on 5 February 1992, 
In fact, upon Jiang’s return to Beijing, a special Politburo meeting was 
convened on 8 February33 in order to consider the trip. At this special Politburo 
meeting, Deng’s emphasis on adhering to the one centre (in other words, for 
Chen Yun to stop destabilising the Party), accelerating reform and opening up, 
and counter attacking Chen Yun’s dogmatic theory was aired. It was decided to 
relay the content of Deng’s talk orally to cadres at and above the ministerial, 
                                                          
32 The Chinese media still discussed the importance of a Marxist planned economy.  For 
example, the Dangdai Sichao (Modern Ideological Trends), a theoretical journal of the 
Propaganda Department, published an article entitled “Erroneously Targeting a Political Trend 
Will Capsize the Boat”, which favoured the struggle against rightism. 
 
33 Fewsmith (1997) dates this first meeting on 12 February 1992. 
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provincial and army ranks.  Fewsmith does add that he believed this Politburo 
meeting took place under “obvious pressure from Deng” (1997, p.499).  It was 
not until 2 March that Deng’s speeches were officially disseminated within the 
Party in the form of the “Central Document No. 2”, which was a reworked 
version of Deng’s statement during his trip to Guangdong, for study by all Party 
and military cadres.  The document represented Deng’s assessment of China’s 
current condition and implications for China’s future.  The document not only 
offered a vigorous defence to economic reform undertaken in the 1980s, but 
also called for further borrowing and learning from “capitalism”. Reinforcing 
Deng’s desire for economic reform only, the document did not call for any 
political reform or political liberalisation, rather the document reaffirmed Deng’s 
belief in continuing the “dictatorship” of the CCP, one of the Four Cardinal 
Principles of CCP in China.  In addition, Deng indirectly criticised a number of 
conservatives (such as Chen Yun) in his speeches34. When his speeches were 
circulated later, and then included in his Selected Works, these remarks were 
deleted (Fewsmith, 1997, p.498). As Miles (1996, p.99) states: “to name names 
in this way meant serious business in a country where veiled attacks are the 
norm”.  Also, due to Chen Yun’s influence over the propaganda apparatus, this 
document was limited in circulation. 
At an enlarged meeting of the Politburo, 10-12 March, several members 
demanded that the body endorse Deng’s economic thought, including Yang 
                                                          
 
34 Miles (1996, p.99) identifies these conservative elders as: Deng Liqun; Hu Qiaomu (member of 
the CAC); Wang Renzhi (head of the Propaganda department); He Jingzhi (acting Minister of 
Culture); and, Gao Di (editor of the People’s Daily). 
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Baibing, the Vice-Chair of the CMC.  As an implicit rebuke of the conservative 
assertion that maintaining ideological purity and combating subversive elements 
was the most important priority within China, the Politburo agreed that economic 
development remained China’s highest priority. 
During this Politburo meeting, Jiang offered a self-criticism for his laxity 
in promoting reform. For Jiang, with his overt reliance on the conservative elders 
for support, and the Jiang/Li axis, his slowness in promoting Deng’s push for 
further reform was to be his first major challenge.  Jiang was left with little choice 
but to distribute Deng’s speeches.  Fewsmith (2001, p.71) states that in 
response to Deng’s criticism of Jiang during his nan xun, Yang Shangkun and 
Qiao Shi apparently joined forces in an effort to oust Jiang.  Teiwes (2000, p.74) 
states that regardless of Deng’s criticism of Jiang’s reluctance to push economic 
reforms, Deng never relinquished his support of Jiang as the “core”. 
Afterwards, Jiang had no difficulty in following Deng’s call to push 
economic reform further.  As, Zheng (1997, p.36) states, “by following closely to 
Deng’s reformist line, Jiang secured his position as the legitimate heir and 
defeated challengers [such as the Yang brothers]”. After this time, and realising 
that there was a movement away from staunch conservatism, various members 
of the Chinese government and military officials a the central and regional levels 
began to endorse Deng’s remarks and the accelerated reforms that he 
advocated. For example, Yang Baibing, the Vice-Chairman of the CMC, 
declared that the PLA would “escort and protect” (baojiahuhang) the reform, and 
the army’s mouthpiece, the Liberation Army Daily, repeatedly ran articles in 
support of the reform (Fewsmith, 1997, p.501). 
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However, Chen Yun and his protégés who opposed the shift towards 
economic reform were still attempting, throughout the spring of 1992, to 
manipulate public opinion and generally undermine Deng’s counterattacks 
against “leftism”.  At the annual meeting of the NPC in March, Li Peng’s annual 
report, as the then Prime Minister, failed to mention the threat from the “left” and 
the need to “emancipate productive forces”, themes utilised by Deng during his 
sojourn35.  Rather, he concentrated on continuing the socio-political environment 
created by Chen Yun by placing emphasis upon “opposing bourgeois 
liberalisation”, attacking hostile forces”, “resisting imperialist peaceful evolution”, 
and so forth (Shambaugh, 1992, p.258).  However, the NPC delegates refused 
to accept the Prime Minister’s report, instead forcing Li through five 
unprecedented redrafting sessions, and over one hundred and fifty 
amendments, before finally adopting a different document that was more 
compatible with Deng’s view. 
 
After his tour, Deng again criticised critical leftist ideology and proposed 
the introduction of capitalist elements for further economic reform and opening 




                                                          
35  However, in the 8 April People’s Daily, an extract of Li’s work report was published which did 
include “references to attacking the left”.   This evidenced a strong change in the People’s Daily 




[Firstly] while it is necessary to be alert against rightist tendencies, 
more attention should be paid to guarding against leftist one; [and, 
secondly] emphasis on a planned economy or on a market 
economy is not the essential distinction between socialism and 
capitalism (Wu An-chia, 1993, June 2). 
 
THE FOURTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS (October 1992) 
 
Thus, one goal of Deng’s “southern sojourn” was to place a renewed 
emphasis on economic reform.  It also meant the disintegration of the role of 
Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought within the ideology.  Another goal was to 
begin fashioning a new political leadership, with Jiang Zemin as the “core”, that 
would continue those economic reforms that would be announced at the 
Fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992. 
At the Congress, Jiang hailed Deng as the “chief architect” of China’s 
reforms and modernisation who had displayed enormous political courage” in 
the framing the political theorem of “building socialism” (Miles, 1996, p.117).  
Ideological restructuring has always been given the highest priority at the Party 
Congresses, especially during period of power succession.  During the 
Fourteenth Congress, following Deng’s call for a “second liberation of thought”, 
Jiang established the theory of the “socialist market economy” as the core CCP 
ideology. 
 
It should be noted that before the commencement of the Fourteenth 
Party Congress Deng succeeded in completing the majority of his power 
succession arrangements from the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Plenary Sessions of 
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the CCP’s Thirteenth Central Committee through to the Fourteenth National 
Congress (Wu Anchia, 1993, June, pp.3-4).  Indeed, the major success for Deng 
occurred in the spring of 1991 when he was able to elevate Zhu Rongji to the 
position of Vice-Premier during the annual session of the NPC (Fewsmith, 1997, 
p.489).  It needs to be noted, though, that Zhu’s succession to Vice-Premiership 
was balanced by the simultaneous selection of the conservative Zou Jiahu to the 
Vice-Premiership as well.  Another interesting elevation to the Politburo at the 
Fourteenth Congress was Wu Bangguo, a protégé of Jiang Zemin, who would, 
by 1997, influence the day-to-day mechanisms of the economy. 
 
The majority of the factional strife and manoeuvring took place largely 
behind the scenes in the first half of 1992, after Deng’s nan xun, which 
culminated in the unveiling of the new leadership at the Fourteenth Congress 
and the Eight NPC in March 1993.  Indeed, the Spring of 1992 would reveal that 
Deng had enough authority to force nominal compliance with hi wishes, but he 
did not have enough authority to subdue opposition altogether.  Ultimately, Deng 
wished to create a leadership base that would ensure the stability in China after 
his death. 
It should be noted that the majority of the changes at the Fourteenth 
Congress was a concise effort undertaken by Deng and his allies to consolidate, 
and further legitimise, Jiang’s position as the leader of the Party.  The changes 
can be simply paraphrased as a six-pronged attack, which is detailed below. 
First, Zhao Ziyang’s closest followers were expelled from the central 
leadership.  Hu Qili, Yong Rudai and Rui Xingwei lost seats on the Politburo and 
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the Secretariat and Yan Mingfu failed to be elected to the Central Committee 
(due to the Ninth Plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee which closed the 
case against the Zhao Ziyang, and confirmed its original verdict that he had 
“supported the turmoil and split the Party” during 1989).  Zhao’s deputy, Bao 
Tong, however, was imprisoned without charge for three years, was tried and 
then convicted for “counter-revolutionary incitement” and for leaking state 
secrets.  The dismissal of Zhao Ziyang’s associates would reduce Zhao’s 
influence within the CCP and also increase Jiang’s legitimacy as the “core”. 
Second, Jiang’s position was bolstered by the ouster of such veteran 
leaders as Wan Li, Yang Shangkun, Song Ping, Yao Yilin and Qin Jiwei.  This, 
in turn, led to the third of the six-pronged attack: the CAC was scrapped.  
Although the CAC was established in 1982, Deng was explicit in stating that the 
CAC was a “transitional body”, which would last no longer than a decade.  
Chinese sources said that at a Politburo meeting in late 1991 the CAC would 
continue to function until the Fifteenth Congress of 1997.  Modifications of the 
CAC were suggested, for example, that there would be no new inductees, and 
that it might be downgraded to a less powerful advisory committee that would be 
headed by Yang Shangkun.  The scrapping of the CAC can be seen to be a way 
to further reduce the elders’ influence and facilitate a transfer of power from the 
“second” to the “third-generational leadership”, especially the influence of Chen 
Yun, who headed the organisation.  It needs to be noted, though, that although 
the CAC may have been officially disbanded, the elders had many followers 
and/or protégés, and still wielded political influence.  This is why the new 
leadership remained obliged to consult them when making major decisions (Wu 
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Anchia, 1993, June, pp.5-7).  As an example of the latter, in an attempt to 
obviously pacify and win over the elders, Jiang received senior Party members 
and cadres in Beijing on 11 January 1992 and asked them to offer opinions and 
suggestions (Wu Anchia, 1993, June, p.8). 
The fourth reason was that a number of influential conservatives were 
ousted from the Central Committee, including Gao Di, the hardline former editor 
of the People’s Daily, Weng Renzhi, director of the Central Committee’s 
Propaganda Department, and He Jingzhi, the acting Minister of Culture.  
However, unlike the political purges under Mao, the purge of leftists was 
minimal. 
Fifth, two senior military officers, Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen, were 
installed in the Politburo Standing Committee and the CMC, respectively, in 
order to give added protection to Jiang, thus providing a “imperial/military escort” 
for further reforms (Wu Anchia, 1993, p.70).  This was to assist Jiang in his dual 
role as General Secretary and his Chairmanship of the CMC.  The Fourteenth 
Party Congress resulted in the removal of General Yang Shangkun, and his half-
brother Yang Baibing, from their influential positions in the CMC.  Until the falling 
out between Deng and the Yang’s in late 1992, the Yangs were instrumental in 
providing “imperial/military escort” for Deng’s reforms (Lam, 1995, p.251).  For 
Jiang’s survival, it would become clear that the support from the military was 
necessary for Deng to implement his reforms and it would also be necessary for 
Jiang to garner support form the army in order to become the “core” of the Party 
in reality as well as in name (Fewsmith, 1997, p.501).  The removal of Yang 
Baibing as Vice-Chairman of the CMC reduced Yang Shangkun’s authority 
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within the CCP.  As Yang Baibing, who lacked any military professional 
experience, was placed in the position due to flagrant nepotism by Yang 
Shangkun, his removal was not seen as a challenge to Jiang’s position as 
General Secretary.  Rather, the removal of Yang Baibing was due to his 
promotion of his own loyalists, and this undercut Jiang’s authority as the 
Chairman of the CMC.  As Fewsmith (2001, p.73) states, Yang “attempted to 
freeze Jiang out of military affairs on the grounds [that] he was a novice”.  It has 
been reported36 that Jiang had previously appealed to Deng that he could not 
function in his position as Chairman of the CMC under those circumstances37. 
Sixth, none of the “princelings”, the authors of Realistic Responses, 
were elected to the Politburo Standing Committee, thus reducing their influence 
gained in the period from 1989 to late 1992.   
As a result of changes at the Fourteenth Congress, it should be noted, 
nearly half of the Central Committee members and more than half of the 
Politburo were replaced (as in the Party Secretariat, Discipline Inspection 
Committee and the CMC).  Interestingly enough, Qiao Shi was removed from 
the post as Secretary of the Party’s Discipline Inspection Commission and 
removed from the Central Committee Secretariat at the Fourteenth Congress.  
However, at the time he was still a member of the Politburo Standing Committee 
and President of the Central Party School (Wu Anchi, 1993, p.72).  In addition, 
                                                          
36 See Fewsmith (2001, p.73). 
 
37 During this time, the armed forces experienced its most extensive purges since 1949.  The 
movement within the CMC since has been to recruit professional military personnel who have 
usually received their education at the National Defence University in Beijing and/or key 




Qiao’s appointment as the head of the NPC upgraded the standing of this 
“rubber-stamping” legislative body as it had never previously been headed by a 
member of the Politburo Standing Committee38.  Qiao’s appointment would also 
reveal Deng’s abandonment of his long term strategy of separating the 
government and the Party.  However, in the future, Qiao Shi’s role in the NPC 
would conflict with Jiang’s desire to control all governmental organs.   
 
Following the Congress, it would appear that the political tide returned to 
Deng’s favour.  From the 1989 Tiananmen Incident until October 1992, the 
Propaganda Department, the People’s Daily, the Central Party School, the Party 
History Research Office, and the journal Contemporary Thoughts, were the key 
organisations in the ideological/political conflicts that were bastions of the 
conservatives (Shambaugh, 1992, p.259).  By June 1992, Qiao Shi and Li 
Ruihun had gained control of these organs from the conservatives and were 
proceeding to root-out Deng’s opponents.  Contemporary Thoughts, headed by 
Marxist ideologue Deng Liqun, was closed for a period of time for openly 
challenging Deng’s sojourn speeches. Gao Di, the director of the People’s Daily, 
came under intense criticism by Lui Ruihuan for obstructing the reporting of 
Deng’s trip.  Gao Di was also accused of amending key articles to be published. 
Indeed, the Party School’s study group for senior cadres moved from studying 
“anti-peaceful evolution” to Deng’s thought (Shambaugh, 1992, p.259). Yet by 
September 1992, the Propaganda Vice-Chair, Wang Renzhi, amongst others, 
                                                          
38 In addition, Li Ruihuan became the Chairman of the CPPCC, casting of the CPPCC’s image of 
being a “political vase”. 
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had organised an “anti-peaceful evolution” study group at the Central Party 
School which warned that peaceful evolution could be boosted by “pragmatism” 
in the leadership.  The conservatives within this group denounced Li Ruihuan as 
“a person who wants to be Gorbechev” and called Qiao Shi a “fence sitter” 
(Fewsmith, 1997, p.494). 
 
The Fourteenth Congress was also an attempt to codify Deng’s ideas 
into an official doctrine: “Deng Xiaoping’s Theory of Building Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics”.  Baum states that the heaping of praise upon Deng’s 
theory of building socialism assisted in its elevation to canonical status (1998, 
p141).  Previously, on 12 May, 1992, the Politburo passed the “Changfa (1992) 
No. 4 Document” demanding that the reform process proceed at a faster rate 
(Wu Anchia, 1993, June, p.12). 
 
Intellectuals, acknowledging the more open political atmosphere, also 
raised their voices in protest against leftism.  A collection of essays called 
Historical Trends by such famous intellectuals as Wang Meng, the former 
Minister of Culture, and Sun Changjiang, former editor of the Science and 
Technology Daily, criticised leftism.  However, due to the conservative-controlled 




JIANG ZEMIN 1989-1992 
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Rather than pursue economic reform, Jiang tended to lean towards the 
conservative side shortly after he became General Secretary.  Indeed, it would  
appear initially that Jiang gave, as Lam states (1995, p.336), “more time 
jockeying for position and ‘vote buying’ than tending to affairs of the state”. 
However, the period from 1989 to early 1992 reveals Jiang’s fluidity in the 
Chinese political context and his ability to gauge political winds.  It also reveals 
that Jiang was not naïve about the tenuous nature of his position, that is, without 
support from power holders from all political spectrums within the CCP, both 
reformers and conservatives alike, his tenure as General Secretary would 
indeed by brief.  Therefore, whilst Liu (1994, p.242) states that “the fact that 
even Jiang went over to the hardliners side [after the Tiananmen Incident] 
reflects the hardliners’ arrogance and Deng’s weakness at the time”, this 
statement also reveals Jiang’s knowledge of the political necessity to curry 
favour with the conservatives, as well as Deng’s allies.  It also reveals that 
Jiang’s position as the “core of the third generational leadership”, during this 
time, was not yet consolidated.  
 
In fact, until 1995 the majority of Western academics rarely mentioned 
the position of Jiang Zemin, and even posited that Jiang Zemin achieved very 
little in his tenure as General Secretary from 1989 through to the Fourteenth 
Party Congress of 1992.  Furthermore, several academics, in this same period, 
were predicting Jiang’s downfall.  However, these academics failed to note that, 
unlike his predecessors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang (who were replaced due 
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to the student demonstrations in late 1986 – early 1987, and mid-1989, 
respectively), Jiang had commandeered strategic posts to consolidate each of 
the four types of power bases in the Chinese political system: credentialist; 
personal; institutional; and regional (Garvey, 1997, p.28)39. 
Initially, it was believed by academics that Jiang would not survive 
politically as Deng would not live long enough to secure Jiang’s position.  
Fortunately for Jiang, Deng’s longevity allowed him to solidify power bases, 
expanding from the power bases that he had already established before his 
appointment to Beijing.  These included the First Automobile Plant (in 
Changchun), the Ministries of Machine-Building and Electronics (MOMB), and 
Mayor of Shanghai.  From these bases he used his position as General 
Secretary to install loyalists; thus beginning what academics would declare to be 
the emergence of the Shanghaibang (the Shanghai Faction). 
 
Due to Jiang’s lack of ties/allies in the first years after his promotion as 
the General Secretary, he moved “cautiously and refrained from rushing to any 
conclusion or precipitous actions” (Chang, 2001, p.41).  Jiang successfully, and 
skilfully, developed ties with the elders and advanced an alliance with the then 
powerful Li Peng40.  Indeed, due to Li Peng being the “adopted” son of Zhou 
Enlai, Li had close ties with the revolutionary elders. 
                                                          
39 See Shambaugh, 1993, for a detailed discussion on these types of power bases. 
 
40 Interestingly, it took Li Peng more than three months after Jiang was appointed General 
Secretary to “profess his loyalty” to Jiang as the “core” of the third generational leadership.  
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Jiang’s efforts to establish his “legitimacy” to rule involved first 
developing ties with the revolutionary generation (or “second generational 
leadership”), keeping good relations with the elders who were still alive and 
creating the impression that he was a worthy inheritor of their achievements41.  
With the assistance of Wang Daohan, who was Jiang’s patron at the MOMBE, a 
previous Mayor of Shanghai, and also an associate of Deng’s, Jiang had earlier 
established ties with the conservatives Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, Ye Jianying, 
Wei Rongzhen and Chen Yun (Lam 1999). 
One of first major speeches given by Jiang was at the fortieth 
anniversary of the founding of the CPC.  Interestingly, Deng was absent at this 
forum. However many of the conservative elders were present, including Song 
Ping, Bo Yibo and Song Renqiong.  Speaking last after these revolutionary 
elders42, Jiang reinforced his movement towards aligning himself with these 
elders by stating that he extended his “highest respects and cordial regards to 
the proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation”.  During this speech he 
also reinforced the leadership role of the Party core (FBIS, 1989, July, p.12). 
It is interesting to note that in late June 1989, the then Vice-Chairman of 
the CAC, Song Renqiong said: “The existing young leadership with Jiang Zemin 
as its core is doing a very good job; we old comrades are very supportive of their 
work” (Lam, 1995, p.249).  Implicit in this remark was that if the third 
                                                          
41 Even before being appointed General Secretary, Jiang wisely encouraged Party elders to 
come to Shanghai to inspect work, or to rest, whilst Mayor of Shanghai. 
 
42 The speakers at this forum included Wang Houshou, Chen Pixian, Wu Kiuquan, Hu Qiaomu, 
Huang Huoqing, Lu Dingyi, Gen Biao, Wang Shoudao and those previously mentioned above. 
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generational leadership, or indeed if Jiang, did not measure up, the elders were 
ready to withdraw their blessings. 
 
In another clearly calculated move, and reflecting Jiang’s ties with the 
conservative elders, Jiang then formed an “alliance” with the then powerful Li 
Peng, in what is termed the “Jiang/Li Axis”, which further cemented his position 
as General Secretary.  It is undeniable that Li Peng, during this period, assumed 
paramount economic and political power.  Without the assistance, or the 
“utilisation”, of Li Peng, Jiang would have had no support from the conservatives 
in his role as General Secretary43.  Indeed, it could be surmised that the Jiang/Li 
axis fell apart with the deaths of several conservative elders within this period.  
With the passing of CPPCC Deputy Secretary Wang Renzhong in March 1992, 
former President and CPPCC Chair Li Xiannian44 in June 1992 and former Mao 
secretary Hu Qiaomu in September 1992, Jiang may not have felt so compelled 
to continue with his reliance upon Li Peng and the conservatives for support.  
With the axing of the CAC at the Fourteenth Congress, together with the deaths 
of several of the elders, the informal role of politics in China was weakened. 
 
Jiang also stressed the importance of Party building during this period.  
After his appointment as General Secretary, China’s propaganda organs began 
to distribute articles purporting to have been written by Jiang whilst he was the 
                                                          
43 For Jiang, being allied with Li was safer than being a recipient of Li’s opposition to further 
reform. 
 
44 Li Xiannian was Jiang’s closest political supporter at the time. 
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Mayor of Shanghai, detailing the need to “build a stronger party” (FBIS, 1989, 
July 24, p.28).  From 1989, Jiang realised that speaking about the needs to 
“rectify the Party” or ”Party building” not only endeared him to the conservative 
elders45, but also gave him the appearance of being a “strong” and credible 
“core leader”.   
 
Jiang’s concurrent position as Chairman of the CMC allowed him to 
influence the military apparatus46, whilst his other powerful position as President 
allowed him to influence the running of the government apparatus.  The 
positions of General Secretary and Chairman of the CMC bestowed Jiang with 
the opportunity for power, control of the political agenda, and patronage. 
Therefore, Jiang became head of the Party, the government and the army, 
which was contrary to the principle of separating the Party leadership and 
government administrations put forth at the 1987 Thirteenth Party Congress. As 
a result, Jiang could endeavour to build a power base considerably independent 
of Deng47. 
 
                                                          
45 Indeed, many of his speeches took place in the company of the elders.  His 29 December 
1989 speech on Party building had Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Yao Yilin, Song Ping, Li Ruihuan, as well 
as members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.  Deng was noticeably absent. 
 
46 In his capacity as Chairman of the CMC, between 22 – 25 December, he inspected military 
bases in the key Fuzhou Military region.  At the famous Minxi Revolutionary Base Area, Jiang 
told Red Army veterans and officers that they should live up to the “revolutionary ideals” of the 
“Great Helmsman” Mao Zedong by “promoting army ideological work” (Lam, 1990, p.1).  In the 
previous year, he had made “pilgrimages” to “revolutionary meccas”, including Yan’an, 
JInggangshan and Minxi. 
 
47 Many Sinologists, such as Garvey (1997, p.2) support the view that Jiang could then begin to 
use his formalised positions in order to build a power base independent to that of Deng. 
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When Jiang was first notified of his move to Beijing a month prior to the 
Tiananmen Incident, he lost no time in trying to transfer favoured Shanghai 
aides to the capital.  Indeed, as previously mentioned in Chapter Three, Wang 
Huning, the possible “ghost writer” of Jiang’s 1995 speech “Stressing Politics” 
was moved to Beijing.  It was announced on 4 August 1989, that Zeng 
Qinghong, previously a Deputy Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party 
Committee in charge of ideological work, was to be appointed the Deputy 
Director of the General Office of the Central Committee.  Quite clearly, Jiang 
was intentionally moving loyal staff from Shanghai to key positions in Beijing. By 
1990, Jiang attempted to augment his power base by requesting that a few 
dozen of his former associates were posted to the Party and the State Council 
headquarters.   
 
However, Jiang had serious flaws that might have precluded him initially 
from becoming a true helmsman, in the spirit of Mao and Deng.  He had dubious 
credentials as a reformer (Lam, 1995, p.339), especially in his position as Mayor 
of Shanghai.  However, he was able to win over the elders with his 
uncompromising stand against “liberalisation”.  Initially, Jiang was “lukewarm” in 
carrying forward reformists’ ideas, particularly during the anti-leftist campaign 
which had been raised by Deng during his sojourn.  At his speech to the Central 
Party School on 9 June 1992, Jiang repeated the orthodox viewpoint that 
“leftism” was a matter of cognisance whilst “rightism” was a matter of political 
statement (Lam, 1995).  According to Jiang, leftism manifested itself in taking an 
orthodox, bookish” approach to certain Maoist tenets, and sticking to 
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“unscientific and warped” interpretations of Marxism.  Rightism, on the other 
hand, meant the negation of the Four Cardinal Principles.  Yet, by 14 June 1992, 
Jiang ceased making any reference to “anti-leftism” (Lam, 1995, p.340). 
 
Deng, though, did continue to champion Jiang’s cause throughout the 
period48. Whilst continually championing his role as the “core” of the Party in his 
role as General Secretary of the CCP, he also elevated Jiang to the 
Chairmanship of the CMC, and the Presidency. 
Jiang further extended his influence within the government kou, a 
bastion of Li Peng, in 1992, with the appointment of Wang Mengkui as head of 
the Research Office under the State Council.  This weakened Li’s influence as 
Wang Mengkui replaced Li’s ally, Yuan Mu (Garvey, 1997, pp.18-19). Indeed, 
Jiang moved loyalists to positions of influence just a month after becoming 
General Secretary, therefore establishing his own patron-client relationships. 
 
Jiang, in the early stages, did not concern himself with the economy 
because he had learnt from his predecessor, Zhao Ziyang, that if he failed in the 
economic realm that is could cost him his position.  Jiang let Li Peng, and later 
Zhu Rongji, run the economy, simply because if anything went wrong Li or Zhu 
would be the scapegoats – although Lam asserts another reason: that Jiang 
                                                          
48 The championing of Jiang as the “core” by Deng was required for several reasons.  As a 
successor hand-picked by Deng, Deng had to “save face” and support Jiang, otherwise it could 
have been deemed that Deng had chosen the wrong person to be the General Secretary of the 
CCP.  Deng’s previous successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, had been stripped of their 
positions as General Secretary.  Furthermore, Jiang did represent a “new” orientation of the 
CCP and he did possess more economic reform credentials than Li Peng. 
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was not interested because he knew nothing about the economy49.  Indeed, 
Jiang showed little interest in the economy until the Fifteenth Congress, 
preferring to consolidate his power and extend his influence in other 
governmental and Party positions.  However, during the time he did encourage 
the continuing of Deng’s open door policy. 
 
During the years from 1989 to 1992, many Sinologists referred to Jiang 
as a “transitional figure” or a “Hua Guofeng-like figure”, in other words, “basically 
an incompetent leader whose power depended exclusively on the words of 
Deng” (Li, 2001, p.29).  These Sinologists failed to identify that Jiang actually 
represented the powerful political force of the technocrats. 
Also during this time, the most catalytic episode was Deng’s nan xun.  
This is because in Jiang’s attempt in currying favour with the elders and Li Peng, 
and Jiang’s strengthening of his position as General Secretary, and as Chair of 
the CMC, he positioned himself as a conservative and not a reformer.  With the 
manoeuvrings that occurred at the Fourteenth Congress, and due to the 
assistance of Deng, Jiang was able to lessen the influence of the princelings, 
slowly distance himself from the elders and begin the deployment of associates 
and affiliates who would hold key positions in government and Party 
organisations.  Jiang would be able to embark on the establishment of the Jiang 
Zemin era.  As the following chapter shows, it was during this time that Jiang 
                                                          
49 Lam (1999, p.78) also supports the view that Jiang’s knowledge of the Chinese economy was 
limited. 
 131
fully utilised the political theory of neo-conservatism in order to provide a 





ESTABLISHING THE “JIANG ZEMIN ERA”: 
LEGITIMISATION AND CONSOLIDATION 
 
In order to establish himself as the real core of the CCP hierarchy, Jiang 
had to take the initiative in building new institutions and rules by which the Party 
and the government could be effectively governed50.  As stated in Chapter 
Three, for Jiang legitimacy did not rest on emphasising the ideology of MLM, 
rather legitimacy was based upon “performance legitimacy”; that is, the 
providing of economic benefits to the populace.  Indeed, Jiang could not rely on 
any “contributions to the revolution” as a basis of his legitimacy51.  Furthermore, 
Jiang had to utilise differing Party and governmental positions52 (that is, General 
Secretary, Chairman of the CMC, and the Presidency) as forms of legitimacy.  
Additionally, as discussed in Chapter Two, towards the end of 1994 Jiang began 
to assert a political platform for legitimacy based on his tenet of “stressing 
politics”, a simplification of the political thought of neo-conservatism. 
From the onset of Jiang’s tenure as General Secretary, there was a 
consistent notion that he would not survive in that position.  Indeed, it would 
appear that existing leaders with more secure positions were expected to object 
                                                          
50  A view subsequently supported by Zheng, 1997, p.36. 
 
51 As part of the third-generational leadership, Jiang had no claims to any pre-1949 revolutionary 
activities, unlike members of the second-generational leadership that included Deng Xiaoping. 
 
52 Indeed, until the end of 1992, Jiang held no posts in the government work kou (department), 
which was under the control of Li Peng. 
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to his accession53, that Deng would not live long enough to secure Jiang’s 
position, or that Jiang’s limited abilities would limit his tenure at the top.  
Interestingly enough, it would be Deng’s longevity that would enable Jiang to 
secure his legitimacy.  In fact, with Deng’s passing in 1997, after the 1992 
Fourteenth Congress and before the 1997 Fifteenth Congress, Jiang was able to 
consolidate power by ensuring that his allies and protégés were promoted to key 
governmental and Party positions. 
Furthermore, Jiang’s ability to bolster his legitimacy during the period 
from the Fourteenth Congress until his 1995 “Stressing Politics” speech, would 
allow him to orchestrate the 1997 Fifteenth Congress.  The particular Congress 
would eventually test whether or not Jiang could initiate new institutions and 
rules to govern, thus creating a new era associated with his name and 
leadership, and, more importantly, independent of Deng, albeit, with Deng’s 
blessing.  In contrast to the Fourteenth Congress, Jiang had to first establish 
himself as the core leader independent of Deng, yet with Deng still “on-side”.  
From the point of view of the Party, Jiang’s second task went beyond simply 
consolidating a centred leadership to deal with the emerging fourth generation 
leadership:  Jiang also had to convince the Chinese people that he could meet 
China’s domestic and international challenges (Zheng, 1997, pp.37-38). 
 
The period from the Fourteenth Congress would reveal, as Bachman 
(2000, p.57) notes, that Jiang “continued to show that he is perhaps the luckiest 
                                                          
53Those who were deemed to object to his accession are Li Peng and Qiao Shi, both of who 
shall be discussed further in this chapter. 
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politician in recent Chinese history”.  The key concept that Bachman identified 
was defining Jiang as a “politician”.  While Jiang displayed neither the helmsman 
capacity of Mao, nor the charisma and pragmatism of Deng, he possessed 
attributes that enabled him to promote allies, members of the Shanghai Faction 
and created an axis of coalitions54 in order to promote the economy and, at 
times, ideology. Furthermore, Jiang the “politician” was able to produce 
statesman-like policies that displayed his leadership abilities, his goals and his 
legitimacy, as exemplified by his creed of “Stressing Politics”, which was first 
outlined at the 1994 Fourth Plenum. 
 
During this period, Jiang needed to be able to position himself into the 
centre of the political system, and to make the system revolve around him.  The 
1992 Fourteenth Congress presented Jiang with an opportunity that would assist 
in the confirmation of his legitimacy.  This Congress saw the increased elevation 
of central technocrats, Party apparatchiks, military professionals and provincial 
administrators, especially those who would support Jiang’s agenda.  So 
successful was Jiang throughout this period that he was able to build a stable 
position of power for himself (for example, being elected President in 1992) and 
positions of power for his supporters, many of them heading key organisations, 
both Party and governmental. 
Indeed, the period after 1994 witnessed more stability, with less 
coercion, than had been the case in the majority of the previous periods.  
                                                          
54 Jiang created a coalition first with Li Peng and then with Zhu Rongji, which shall be further 
detailed in this chapter. 
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Usually after Chinese political transitions, such as the 1992 Fourteenth 
Congress, a “period of great fluidity with unexpected issues or political coalitions 
burst upon the political scene” (Fewsmith, 1995, p.636). 
For Chinese intellectuals, as Goldman states (1996, p.49), the Deng and 
Jiang regimes resemble the authoritarian Guomindang period, with its weak 
Leninist-Party State and watered down ideology. This period tended to leave 
intellectuals alone as long as they did not challenge the Guomindang.  As the 
CCP leader, Jiang may have wanted to impose tighter controls on intellectual 
life, but he neither had the capacity nor the will to do so. 
 
This chapter, then, explores the tactics/strategies employed by Jiang in 
order to legitimise and consolidate his position in the Chinese hierarchy and thus 
place himself as the “core of the third generational leadership”.  In order to 
legitimise his position, Jiang managed to successfully accomplish many things.  
First, after the Fourteenth Congress, he was able to move away from the 
Jiang/Li axis, which was created in order to preserve Jiang’s position as General 
Secretary, and instead form a coalitional axis with Zhu Rongji, who was also 
from Shanghai55.  Second, although Jiang began to create  a network of allies 
and protégés before the Fourteenth Congress, it was after this Congress that he 
was able to expand his control over various governmental and Party 
organisations through his “Shanghai Faction” connections, and the building of 
new ties with emerging leaders. Third, Jiang had to balance the burgeoning 
                                                          
55 Although Zhu Rongji also had connections with Shanghai, and is closely affiliated with Jiang, 
most Chinese analysts deem that Zhu has created his own “faction” of allies and protégés which 
is commonly referred to as the “Zhu Rongji clique”. 
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power of Qiao Shi, who was appointed the Chairman of the NPC at the 
Fourteenth Congress.  Fourth, in order to appease the populace, Jiang had to 
be seen as taking a stand against corruption, which was rampant within the 
CCP.  Fifth, towards the end of the period under study, Jiang began to 
consolidate his legitimacy by providing a “platform” by which he could lead the 
CCP into the twenty-first century.  This “platform”, neo-conservative in nature, 
was outlined in his “Stressing Politics” speech. 
 
DENG, IDEOLOGY, “SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS” AND 
JIANG 
 
The CCP central document, “The Main Points of Propaganda Work in 
1993”, stressed Dengist Thought and called for the latest volume of Deng’s work 
to be published within the year.  Also on the ideological agenda were “study 
programmes”,  a “simple reader” for grassroots-level Party members, two 
national meetings on propaganda, two national theoretical conferences based 
on the summary of Deng’s theory contained in Jiang’s report to the Fourteenth 
Congress, and seminars for provincial department level cadres and propaganda 
department heads. 
 
Following the resurgence of Deng’s popularity, both amongst the 
populace at large and within the CCP, after his “nan xun” in early 1992 and 
culminating at the Fourteenth Congress in October 1992, there was an 
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explosion of a “Deng cult” the following year56.  Lam (1994) states that the 
“Deng cult” reached a highpoint due to two publications that year, namely, Deng 
Rong’s My Father Deng Xiaoping57, published in September 1993, and, more 
importantly, the third volume of Deng’s Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping.  The 
latter seemed to confirm that Deng Thought had replaced Mao Zedong Thought.  
Yet no leader dared to openly admit any deviation from Mao Zedong Thought, 
which still remained a theoretical basis of the CCP’s legitimacy.  This does not 
mean to say that the leaders of the CCP have not been selective when it comes 
to inheriting” Mao’s doctrines, as both Deng and Jiang have done.  Mao’s theory 
of class struggle, the usage of political movements to promote economic 
development and Mao’s xenophobia largely became discarded.  What was 
preserved were nationalism, self-reliance and “seeking truth from facts” theory.  
Mao’s theories, now “narrowed down”, were increasingly applied in a pragmatic 
way, and in particular came to be used as a rallying point for safeguarding 
national sovereignty and dignity (Wu Anchia, 1994, p.39).  The leadership, under 
Jiang, had attempted to link Deng’s theories with Mao’s thought.  However, the 
bankruptcy law and stock markets, for example, could be seen to be negations 
of Mao’s ultra-leftism.  What Deng shared with Mao was the ideals and goals of 
socialism; a conviction of the need to maintain state sovereignty and to keep the 
military under Party control, and a belief in grooming successors.  It is 
interesting to note that whilst the Party stressed Deng’s theory of “Building 
                                                          
56 This year also marked the increased pronouncements of Deng’s pending death.  By May 
1993, there were reports that Deng Xiaoping was suffering from Parkinson’s disease. 
 
57 With Deng Xiaoping suffering from Parkinson’s disease, his daughter, Deng Rong, who 
worked in the Army General Political Department, became his “eyes and ears”, especially in the 
Army. 
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Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, the Four Cardinal Principles, which had 
played a prominent role after Tiananmen, were played down, yet not 
abandoned.  In addition, Deng was convinced that the CCP would stay in power 
if the Party could continue to upgrade peoples’ living standards.  This attempt at 
performance legitimacy could only continue if the economy continued to expand, 
and opportunities for people to xiahai (dive into the sea of business) through 
“sustained, high speed and healthy development” (Lam, 1994, p.2.4).  Indeed, in 
order to emphasise his philosophy of reform, Deng placed the nan xun talks as 
the last chapter in his Works.  Reinforcing Deng’s philosophical legacy, Jiang 
called Deng’s teachings “a scientific theory that integrated socialism with 
patriotism”, and a “great ideological driving force” that bound the nation together 
(Lam, 1994).  In addition, propaganda, cultural and media organisations churned 
out a series of patriotic campaigns aimed at solidifying the ningju (centripetal) 
powers of the leadership.  The main theme for this stepped-up indoctrination 
was laid down by Jiang in a mid-year conference on political work for workers: 
 
The more that we develop the socialist market economy, the more 
we should, on a comprehensive basis, strengthen and improve 
ideological and political work for the entire Party and society 
(Jiang, in Lam, 1994). 
 
Deng’s concept of reform, “the theory of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics”, has since been incorporated into China’s ideology.  Capitalist 
elements in the reform program have been given legitimacy in the Party’s 
constitution under the heading of “Socialist Market Economy”- a formula devised 
by Jiang in his report to the Fourteenth Congress.  The formula consists of three 
chief elements.  First, concerning planning, as a market economy is not always 
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capitalist and socialism can have markets.  Both planning and market forces are 
considered useful ways of regulating the economy.  Second, a variety of 
ownership types would be allowed to exist as long as the main body of the 
economy was under socialist public ownership.  The third important element of 
the socialist market economy formula was that it enabled China to make use of 
capital, technology and administrative expertise from capitalist countries as so to 
further develop socialism (Wu Anchia, 1993, pp.68-69). 
The CCP adopted the “Decision on Some Issues Concerning the 
Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure” during Third Plenary 
Session of the Fourteenth Congress (11-13 November 1993).  The “Decision” 
reiterated that the theory of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” was to be 
the guiding principle, and “the emancipating of people’s minds” and “seeking 
truth from facts” were to be central in the guiding ideology (Wu Anchia, 1994, 
pp.1-2).  This came into effect after eight revisions.  In order to establish Deng’s 
theory as the guiding principle for all reforms, the key ideas and policies 
advanced by Deng since 1978 were written into the revised constitution adopted 
at the March 1993 session of the Eight NPC, although Deng was not referred to 
directly.  Then, at the 1993 Third Plenary of the Fourteenth Congress, Deng’s 
theory of “emancipating people’s minds” was reaffirmed as the guiding principle 
for reform and opening up (Wu Anchia, 1994, p.38).  The constitutional revision 
at the Fourteenth Congress did reiterate the commitment of building a 




Lam (1995) states that Deng’s game plan after the Fourteenth Congress 
was seven-fold.  One, Deng “propped-up” the moderate technocrats, including 
the Shanghai Faction, as they could be counted upon to pursue cautious market 
reform while putting a “freeze” on political liberalisation.  Two, Deng assisted 
Jiang in promoting a younger generation of politicians and cadres who were 
“expert” and “red”. Three, Deng, with Jiang, sidelined the leftists and Maoists 
within the CCP.  Four, the tools of the proletariat dictatorship, such as the police 
and the army apparatus were reinforced.  Five, Deng carefully reserved a role 
for radical modernisers who had worked under the patronage of both Hu 
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang.  Six, a balance of power between the central and 
provincial authorities was to be maintained.  Seven, Deng sought to ensure that 
a power struggle would not emerge after his death. 
Whilst the Congress saw the removal of several conservatives and the 
elevation of a relatively large number of young technocrats, Deng’s overriding 
concern was to maintain stability through the balancing of the various factions.  
Indeed, due to the support the reformers had from the army, regional leaders as 
well as the intelligentsia, entrepreneurs and international opinion, Deng probably 
could have “wiped out” the leftists (Lam, 1995, p.326). 
For the leftists, the influence, although limited, of Deng Liqun and his 
allies was confined to the ideological and propaganda establishments or units, 
such as the Party’s Propaganda Department, the Policy Research Office of the 
Central Committee, the People’s Daily and other journals.  The protégés and 
allies of Zhao Ziyang were relegated to second line positions.  For example, 
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whilst Tian Jiyun retained his Politburo membership, he was transferred to the 
NPC as Qiao Shi’s deputy (Lam, 1998, p.25). 
The Congress revealed, however, the Party’s abandonment of the ideal 
of the separation of the Party and government58.  Thus a major step was taken 
towards the pre-Liberation concept of the fusion of Party and government, now 
called “cross leadership”, a reference to the fact that Politburo members and 
other top cadres could concurrently take up positions in the Party, government, 
legislature and the CPCC (Lam, 1995, p.247). In an internal speech shortly 
before the13-31 March 1993 NPC session, Deng explained why he had given up 
his cherished goal of the separation of Party and government.  Deng said that 
he had instead opted for “cross leadership” because of the “lessons of the 
European bloc”. Indeed, according to an astute analysis of the Communist 
world, a major reason for the fall of the USSR was due to the Party being 
“divorced” from the government, the army and other sectors, including the 
economy.  As Lam (1998, p.34) observes, the “ultimate expression of the 
yiyuanhua [Unitarian] nature of the leadership was the many hats bestowed onto 
Jiang”. 
 
A full meeting of the Central Committee was convened to prepare for the 
post-Deng era. At that meeting a twenty-point document on Party building was 
issued that focused on the need to rejuvenate the Party organisation with Jiang 
as the “core”.  None of this made Jiang’s position impregnable, but it did make it 
                                                          
58 The 1987 Thirteenth Congress raised the slogan of separating the Party from the government 
(dangzheng fenkai).  This would have meant that Party committees within each government 
agency would have to be abolished (Oksenberg, 2001, p.32).  
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very difficult for him to be challenged in the short term. His long-term future, 
however, was to be determined by his success in establishing prosperity and 
stability within the nation and in building a substantial power base of his own. 
 
Jiang came to understand why some degree of political reform was 
imperative for the Party:  political reform was needed for competition, power 
succession and political participation. Yet, without a national election system, 
and a free press it is hard for people to convey their demands and complaints to 
the leadership.  In contrast to Zhao Ziyang’s time, Jiang and the other leaders 
did not talk about political reform ideologically, focusing instead on “implicit 
political reform”59, meaning that changes needed to be introduced into China’s 
political practises rather than to its political discourse.  While elections continued 
to become an increasingly important method of selecting the party elite, Jiang 
had no intention of expanding Chinese democracy in terms of the relationship 
between the state and society60.  Nevertheless, he did call for consolidating 
grass-roots democracy. Furthermore, he also proposed the “rule of law”. Here 
the “rule of law” means that the law must be applicable to every individual in a 
given society, “the rulers must follow the laws just the same as the ruled do, and 
the rulers behaviour should be predictable” (Zheng, 1997, p.55). Political reform 
was to focus upon the perfection of the system of People’s Congresses, the 
system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation under the leadership 
                                                          
59 “Implicit political reform” is a terminology which was defined by Zheng (1997, p.54). 
 
60 Nor did Jiang erode the Four Cardinal Principles. 
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of the CCP, as well as the legal system, and the reform of administrative, 
organisational, personnel and labour systems (Wu Anchia, 1993, p.10). 
By early 1993, the degree of support for Jiang was unclear, although he 
had been working to strengthen his ties with the military, inspecting military 
regions and promoting associates from his time as Mayor of Shanghai.  These 
people included Yu Yongbo, Director of the PLA General Political Department; 
Wang Chengbin, commander of Beijing Military Region; Shi Yuxiao, Political 
Commissioner of Guangzhou Logistics Department; and Ba Zhongyan, 
commander of the People’s Armed Police Headquarters.  In an effort to win the 
support of veteran cadres, Jiang organised various activities to commemorate 
Peng Dehuai, and, with the assistance of Deng, purged Yang Shangkun and 
Yang Baibing and emphasised that the PLA had a duty to safeguard the social 
system (Wu Anchia, 1994, pp. 7-8). 
 
JIANG AS THE “CORE OF THE THIRD GENERATIONAL LEADERSHIP” 
 
At the Fourteenth Congress, the CCP was to be under the collective 
leadership of the seven Politburo members.  In order of seniority (and ages as of 
1993) these were: Jiang (66), General Secretary, President and Chair of the 
CMC; Li Peng (64), in charge of the State Council; Qiao Shi (68), Chair of the 
NPC and in charge of public security, procuratorial, legal and intelligence work; 
Li Ruihuan (58), Chair of the CPPCC; Zhu Rongji (64), assisting Li Peng; Liu 
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Huaqing (76), responsible for military work; and Hu Jintao (49)61, supervisor of 
the Party’s organisational work, especially the promotion of younger cadres62. 
Deng decreed that the vote of the seven Politburo members carried 
equal weight, and that policy decisions were to be passed by a majority.  This 
consensus-based “core” revealed his concerns about a post-Deng leadership 
arrangement.  Jiang took his place in conceptual terms as the successor to Mao 
and Deng (Teiwes, 2000, p.74), that is, as the “core” of the CCP.  On the one 
hand, Deng was convinced that investing Jiang with helmsman-like prerequisites 
would best guarantee stability.  On the other hand, Deng was aware of Jiang’s 
limitations at this time (Lam, 1998, p.25).  Lam states that the Politburo Standing 
Committee was less democratic than ever as it incorporated even less “non-
mainstream” elements into the decision making process.  Indeed, even though 
equal voting rights had been formalised in the Politburo, in actual terms of power 
the members were unequal, depending on age and experience and depth and 
breadth of their career backgrounds, amongst other factors (Dittmer, 2001, 
p.59).   
Furthermore, Scalapino (1998) stressed that collective leadership runs 
against the traditional grain of CCP political culture. This is because up until the 
formation of the collective leadership there had always been one “supreme 
                                                          
61 As the current successor to Jiang, before his appointment to the Politburo in 1992, Hu Jintao 
has an unremarkable career as Party Secretary of Guizhou and Tibet, respectively. 
 
62The remainder of the Politburo consisted of: Tian Jiyun (63); Li Tieying (56); Ding Guan’gen 
(63); Li Lanqing (60); Yang Baibing (72); Wu Bangguo (50); Zou Jiahua (66); Chen Xitong (62); 
Jiang Chunyun (62); Qian Qichen (64); Wei Jinxing (61); Xie Fie (60); and, Tan Shaowen (63).  
Those who stepped down from the Politburo in March 1993 at the First Session of the Eight NPC 
were Yang Shangkun (85); Wan Li (76); Qin Jiwei (78); Wu Xueqian (71); Li Siming (65); and, 
Yang Rudai (65).  
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power” that held the commanding authority.  The designation of “core leader” 
that was bestowed upon Jiang reflected Deng’s and other elders’ beliefs that the 
ambiguity of the consensus leadership was a destabilising factor, whereby 
assigning Jiang as the “core” would symbolically align him more closely with the 
leadership and, more importantly, facilitate Jiang’s amassing of additional 
constitutional/institutional powers. Jiang’s “core status” would, as a result, 
become his precious political asset (Teiwes, 2001, pp.74-76).  Indeed, in 1993, 
units in the propaganda, culture and media realms churned out a series of 
patriotic campaigns aimed at solidifying the ninju (centripetal) powers of the 
leadership.  Furthermore, the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth Congress (25-28 
September 1994) passed a stern resolution on the “construction” of the Party by 
strengthening democratic centralism.  Brosseau (1995, p.1) conceded that this 
declaration was made due to the prospects of Deng’s sudden death and 
warranted a gesture confirming that the contingency measures were complete 
and that the process of generational succession was being institutionalised by a 
set of contrived procedures. 
There was also a shake-up of the Central Committee Secretariat, with 
Hu Jintao, Ding Guan’gen, Wei Jianxing, Wen Jiabo and Ren Jianxin being 
elevated to key positions within the CCP.  The “top morality squad”, the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), was taken over by the Secretariat, 
which was responsible for running the Party apparatus and issuing major 
documents. Hu Jintao replaced Qiao Shi as the head of the Secretariat, which 
runs the Party apparatus and issues major documents. Indeed, with Hu’s 
elevation in 1992, he was deemed, by China analysts, to be the front-runner in 
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the “fourth generation leadership”63 (even before being appointed General 
Secretary in 2002). 
 
Excluding Jiang, until 1995, fifteen of the nineteen members of the 
Politburo, all seven of the Secretariat, and twenty of the thirty Provincial First 
Party Secretaries had been appointed since 1989. In addition, Jiang began to 
appoint people from the Shanghai region, thus contributing to the rise of the 
Shanghai Faction, and the continuation of Jiang’s consolidation of power 
through the appointment of allies and protégés to key Party and organisational 
positions.  Indeed, of the fourteen new appointees to the Politburo since 1990, 
Zhu Rongji, Wu Bangguo and Huang Ju were Jiang’s immediate successors as 
Mayor of Shanghai. Wu Bangguo and Jiang Chunyun were also elected to the 
Party Secretariat.  After the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth Congress, seven 
Politburo members, one-third of the total, were either born in or had connections 
with Shanghai: Jiang, Zhu Rongji, Wu Bangguo, Huang Chu, Qiao Shi, Qian 
Qichen and Zuo Jiahua64. It would appear that Jiang wanted Zou Jiahua to 
“groom” Wu Bangguo to succeed him as vice-Premier in charge of industry.  
Indeed, Wu’s rise would also be seen as a means of checking Zhu’s power in 
the economic field. Other members of the Shanghai Faction included Li Lanqing 
                                                          
63 The Fourteenth Congress, in order to institutionalise the succession procedures, an 
agreement was reached that there was to be a reduction on term limits, that is, no more than two 
terms or ten years in office (Oksendberg, 2001, p.30). 
 




and Ding Guan’gen (natives of the neighbouring Jiangsu Province who 
undertook studies in Shanghai).   
Indeed, Jiang also continued to recruit former associates of the MOMB, 
where he had served for more than ten years.  Among the top officials with 
MOMB credentials  were the Party Secretary of Fujian, Jia Qinglin, Director of 
the State Administration of Exchange Control, Zhou Xiaochun, and Vice-General 
Secretary of the Shenzhen Party, Huang Liman.   
It could be said that the rise of the Shanghai Faction, and those 
associated with MOMB, reflected the relatively narrow power base of Jiang.  
 
After the Fourteenth Congress, Jiang surrounded himself with a Party 
Leadership65 whose members were better educated, younger, more reform-
orientated and more pragmatic than their predecessors.  Indeed, seven of the 
fourteen new appointees to the Politburo were engineering graduates, like Jiang.  
Thus, with the elevation of so many Shanghai Faction protégés, Jiang obtained 
the advantageous position of having these protégés playing off/against each 
other.  This, in turn, would create the potential for intense competition in the 




                                                          
65 In Jiang Zemin Counsellors (see Li 2001, p.29), it has been stated that Jiang’s four closet 
political friends/allies are: Wang Daohan, former Mayor of Shanghai; Zeng Qinghong, Chair of 
the Organisational Department; Chen Zhili; and Liu Ji. 
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SHIFTING ALLIANCES: THE JIANG / ZHU RONGJI AXIS 
 
The one of the most salient features of this period (from 1992 until 1995) 
was the replacement of the Jiang-Li axis with the Jiang-Zhu Rongji axis.  During 
this period, Jiang was at the centre of a system that was defined by Bachman 
(200, p.57) as “an inner triumvirate of leaders”; consisting of Jiang, Li Peng and 
Zhu Rongji.  Indeed, although there had been tensions amongst the three, Jiang 
successfully utilised axis “arrangements” in periods as required.  For example, 
from 1989 until 1992, the Jiang/Li axis helped Jiang retain power, and curry 
favour with the conservative elders66, whilst the Jiang/Zhu axis, formulated 
during the austerity plan of 1992, helped push reform once again into the 
mainstream arena.  The three managed to work together, together forming the 
nucleus of the leadership, regardless of the other members within the Politburo 
Standing Committee.  All three appointed protégés to positions in their key Party 
and bureaucratic “domains”, although Jiang attempted to limit Li’s involvement in 
the Party and government after 1992.  However, Jiang held key advantages that 
made it unlikely that Li Peng or Zhu Rongji would ever been able to topple him.  
These “advantages” are discussed below. 
The worst case scenario for Jiang would have been if Li and Zhu had 
worked together to oppose him.  Bachman’s (2000, p.59) assessment was that 
“neither Li nor Zhu trusted the other enough to work in concert against Jiang”, 
and that “neither could live as co-leader with the other”. To avoid this, Jiang 
                                                          
66 Indeed, on many occasions Chen Yun highlighted Jiang and Li Peng’s relationship, and spoke 
highly of it.  For Chen, this relationship was favourable to his faction’s conservative line.  
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“dumped” difficult assignments on both Li and Zhu.  For example, Zhu Rongji 
was placed in charge of the economy whereby if anything went wrong, Zhu 
would suffer the consequences.  On the other hand, when the economy 
improved, Jiang could “claim” the glory.  Furthermore, as with Jiang’s usage of 
coalitions with both Li and Zhu, he could have easily played them off against 
each to further limit a united front against him (Bachman, 2000, p.59). 
Pye (2001), however, too easily dismisses the considerable power both 
Li and Zhu did wield.  Pye states that by performing their tasks/portfolios well, 
neither of them needed to worry about their personal (or political) security, unlike 
during the earlier Mao and Deng eras whereby covertly building or strengthening 
factional power bases was imperative for political security.  However, during this 
period, they both further consolidated their own power bases through the 
recruitment of allies and protégés.  Yet it must be conceded that their power 
bases could not rival that of Jiang’s, largely due to the success of Jiang’s tactics 
to limit their influence. 
 
About the same time as the March 1993 NPC, the Central Committee 
Leading Group of Finance and Economics (LGFE) was revived with Jiang as its 
head and Li Peng and Zhu Rongji as vice-heads (although Li Peng was replaced 
by Wu Bangguo in 1994).  Indeed, Miles (2000) indicates that for Zhu to also be 
appointed deputy head of the LGFE meant that both he and Li Peng were on 
“equal footing”.  Although the LGFE was practically dissolved after 4 June 1989, 
and therefore did not meet regularly, it remained the Party’s highest authority on 
economic policy-making.  Jiang expanded the establishment of the LGFE to 
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include research, coordination, supervision and executive functions.  Jiang 
strengthened his hold on this organisation by appointing his own allies to key 
positions: Wen Jiabo was made General Secretary of the organisation, and 
Zeng Peiyan its Vice-Secretary. In addition, Huang Qifan was put in charge of 
the industrial enterprises subgroup of the LGFE, a previously unheard of post 
(Garvey, 1997, p.18). 
It is important to note that there are numerous Leading Groups67: the 
Leading Group on Finance and Economics, the Leading Group on Ideology and 
Propaganda, the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs and the Leading Group of 
Taiwan Affairs.  These entities make the final decisions on major issues.  Due to 
these groups’ extremely secretive operations, the Leading Groups were not 
accountable to senior cadres, the NPC or the public (Lam, 1998, p.34). Indeed, 
neither the Chinese Constitution nor the Communist Party Constitution has 
made provisions for the establishment of these Leading Groups.  Their activities 
were never reported in the Chinese media either.  Interestingly, by 1992, Jiang 
headed the Leading Group on Taiwan Affairs (the CCP’s topmost policy-making 
body on Taiwan) and the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs (LGFA), as well as 
the LGFE.  As Chair of the LGFA, Jiang has reserved for himself the power to 
make China’s major foreign policy decisions68, eclipsing the influence of both Li 
Peng and Zhu Rongji (Chang, 2001, p.40). Furthermore, as head of State, Jiang 
                                                          
67 In Chinese, Leading Groups are referred to as lingdao xiaozu. 
 
68 It should be noted that the position of Secretary General allowed Jiang the right to have the 
final say in Foreign Affairs (Bachman, 2001, p.98.  
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was able to use the Presidency to attend summits and State visits to enhance 
his visibility, his prestige, and his legitimacy in China. 
Whilst it may be assumed that other leaders may have advocated key 
policies, without Jiang in the key positions of power, and willing to act as the key 
consensus-builder in scenarios that required political consensus, those policies 
would not have been pushed. 
 
In addition, with the physical and political “illness”69 of Li Peng that 
occurred throughout 1993, Jiang also took on responsibilities concerning foreign 
affairs (most notably, the “Taiwan issue”). In addition, Zhu Rongji became 
responsible for performing Li’s duties as Premier, although in an “unofficial” 
capacity70. Indeed, 1993 saw the inexorable decline of the conservative and 
Maoist planners, led by Li Peng and the retired vice-Premier Yao Yilin, both of 
whom were replaced by Zhu Rongji.  It must be noted, though, that this power 
shift took place gradually, and Zhu’s influence did not supersede Jiang’s.  In 
addition, Wang Mengkui was appointed Head of the Research Office under the 
State Council, which weakened Li Peng further, as Wang replaced a key Li ally, 
Yuan Mu (Garvey, 1997, pp.18-19).  However, with the demise of the CAC, the 
                                                          
69 Hong Kong newspapers reported that Li Peng had been criticised by Party elders, including 
Song Renqiong and Bo Yibo, before his April 24 mild heart attack.  The South China Morning 
Post stated that the elders had written an “anti-Li petition” that criticised Li for being “now left, 
now right” and for failing to “cure and restructure the economy”, which means, failing to limit the 
rapid growth (FBIS, 1993, May 25, p.10).  Political analysts believed that Li Peng contracted a 
“physiological” illness because of the political problems. 
 
70 As the seriousness of Li Peng’s illness was not made public, Zhu could not use the title of 
“acting premier”.  Officially Li Peng was suffering from a “bad cold”.  After Li Peng’s second heart 
attack in mid June 1993, it was announced that Zhu Rongji would temporarily oversee the State 
Council (which included being in charge of the economy, industry, agriculture, monetary affairs, 
finance and taxation).  Li Peng would be limited to receiving foreign dignitaries.  
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conservative elders formed semi-official groupings to influence policy.  For 
example, a “five man group of elders” made up of Chen Yun, Yao Yilin, Yang 
Shangkun, Bo Yibo and Wan Li, was reported to have been set up in mid 1993 
to “provide economic advice” to Zhu Rongji.   
 
Li Peng and his pro-Soviet71 clique did, however, retain formidable 
positions within the CCP.  Until late June 1993, it was Li who had the dominant 
say in finance and banking.  Indeed, key leaders within this area, including the 
Finance Minister Liu Zhongli and the then People’s Bank of China head, Li 
Guixian, were deemed to be allies of Li Peng.  However, Li still remained 
unpopular with elements of the Party and much of the Chinese populace, due to 
not only his involvement in the Tiananmen Incident, but also his lack of 
understanding of market-oriented reform and his movement towards State 
planning in 1990.  Indeed, Jiang could have easily “reassessed” Tiananmen, 
blaming the incident on “a manipulative Li”, amongst others (Bachman, 2000, 
p.59), especially if Li tried to dominate the “core” too much. 
 
It was to be the onset of the austerity program, Zhu’s “unofficial” 
capacity as acting-Premier (and thus having control over the State Council) and 
Zhu’s assumption in July 1993 of the Governorship of the People’s Bank of 
                                                          
71 The terminology “pro-Soviet” refers to the conservative preferences of a government controlled 
economy, similar to that employed by the Soviet Union. 
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China that marked a shift in the tug of war between Li and Zhu to Zhu’s favour72.  
The placing of the moderate Zhu in the position as Governor of the People’s 
Bank of China broke the tradition of central planners, from Chen Yun and Li 
Xiannian to Yao Yilin and Li Peng, having a dominant presence over the 
financial portfolio (Lam, 1995, p.331).  In addition, the “Zhu-clique” expanded 
with Zhu’s appointment of two close colleagues from Shanghai as the bank’s 
Vice-Governors, Dai Xianlong and Zhu Xiaohua.  By the end of 1993, it was 
evident that Zhu had collated a think tank not unlike those previously assembled 
by Zhao Ziyang.  Furthermore, Zhu placed key allies in the Ministry of the 
Economic and Trade Commission (Wang Zhongyu) and the State Planning 
Ministry (Chen Jinhua). 
 
The Jiang-Zhu Rongji axis worked out particularly well for Jiang.  Even 
though Deng played the key role in Zhu’s elevation to positions such as Vice-
Premier, Jiang recognised his talents and employed them effectively (Bachman, 
2001, p.97).  While Zhu frequently took the flak for pushing through the 
unpopular retrenchment (austerity) programme of late 1993-1994, Jiang took the 
credit for the reforms introduced73.  Indeed, the Third Plenary Session of the 
Fourteenth Congress (11-14 November 1993) took up the task of translating the 
Fourteenth Congress’ goals of “building a socialist market economy” into a 
concrete program of reform.  In June 1993, Zhu Rongji’s sixteen point-plan, 
                                                          
72 Lam (1993, p.9) states that Li Peng’s allies still controlled up to a third of the State Council 
ministries and departments, and these allies were in a position whereby they could sabotage 
Zhu’s economic policies. 
 
73 Zhu Rongji took a high political risk in maintaining the economy as he would have been held 
responsible if he failed to restore fiscal order. 
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where Jiang presided over a “Central Financial and Banking Work Conference”, 
in order to slow economic growth and restore financial order was soon to be 
reported as having achieved “initial results”(Fewsmith, 1994, p.26).  This was in 
order to “cool down” the problems of inflation and the runaway money supply, 
whereby economic concern was usually driven by socio-economic 
considerations to keep reform and development going at full speed (Lam, 1994, 
p.2.5). 
 
By 1994, the Jiang-Zhu axis had nearly collapsed.  With the reforms Zhu 
had introduced at the 1993 Thirteenth Plenum having slowed the economy, 
Jiang began to parcel out bits of Zhu’s portfolio.  Wu Bangguo was named Vice-
Chair of the LGFE, replacing Li Peng, and thus would share the leadership with 
Zhu Rongji under the supervision of Jiang.  More importantly, Wu Bangguo, who 
was also appointed to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, was placed in 
charge of reforming the SOEs, which was designated as the focus of economic 
reform in 1995.  Furthermore, at the March 1995 NPC, Wu Bangguo was made 
Deputy Prime Minister.  Jiang Chunyun was given the task of overseeing 
agriculture, another task which Zhu Rongji had been previously responsible for 
(Fewsmith, 1997, p.519).  In addition, apparently in return for his support, Jiang 
helped Hu Jintao gain the additional title of Principal of the Central Party School 
in mid-1993, which therefore displaced Qiao Shi. 
 
Indeed, Jiang’s position as General Secretary allowed him to have 
extensive control over key Central Committee offices and the Leading Groups.  
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Jiang could put people, that is, his associates and protégés if need be, in charge 
of the General Office, the Organisation Department and other key bodies. 
 
By late 1993, it was clear that Jiang had co-opted into his inner circle 
two new members of the Politburo.  Ding Guangen and Hu Jintao.  This was 
despite the fact that until 1992, neither Ding nor Hu were linked to Jiang from a 
factional prospective.  Originally a reformist in orientation, Ding became the 
Chair of the Propaganda Department, where upon he slapped a “straight jacket” 
on the media and cultural fields (Lam, 1995, p.335).  Liu Ji and Zeng Qinghong 
were both elevated in 1993 due to their affiliation with the Shanghai faction.  Liu 
Ji74 was elected to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and Zeng 
Qinghong was appointed the head of the Party General office. 
 
Working closely with Jiang’s Shanghai Faction was the Zhu Rongji 
Faction, which was also made up of ideologically conservative technocrats.  
There was a certain degree of overlap with the Shanghai Faction because many 
of Zhu’s protégés had come from Shanghai (for example, Dai Xianlong, the 
Governor of the People’s Bank of China; Zhu Xiaohu, former Director of the 
State Administration of Exchange Control; Li Jiange, Vice-Chair of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission; and, Lou Jiwei, Vice-Governor of Guizhou). 
The Shangdong group was also closely linked to the Shanghai Faction.  
Since the early 1980s, the Party Organisation Department was in the hands of 
                                                          
74 Liu Ji was the Vice-Chair of the Shanghai Department of Propaganda before his elevation to 
CASS.  He was instrumental in the shaping of Jiang Zemin’s draft documents, including the 
Political Report of the Fourteenth Party Congress. 
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the Shangdong group members, which might account for the fact that a 
relatively large number of faction affiliates were posted to senior positions from 
the regions.  This faction’s influence was particularly strong in the PLA (for 
example, through senior Generals Zhang Wannian, Chi Haotian, Wang Ruilin, 
Zhang Lianzhong and LI Lizhu)(Lam, 1998, p.37). 
In addition, at this time, Wu Bangguo was rumoured to be soon 
appointed the Director of the Organisation Department, the largest department 
under the control of the Central Committee.  Having a member of the Shanghai 
Faction there would have increased Jiang’s political clout (Wu Anchia, 1994, 
October, p.132).  Indeed, by 1994, Hu Jintao was overseeing all Party Affairs, 
Wu Bangguo, within the Organisation Department, was overseeing propaganda, 
Yu Jianxing was supervising government administration, Wen Jibo was 
overseeing agriculture, Ren Jianxin was in charge of security, and Jiang 
Chunyun was overseeing the Party’s overseas relations (Wu Anchia, 1994, 
October, p.133). 
 
QIAO SHI AND THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS (NPC) 
 
The strengthening of the legislature and the authority of the law in 
general was the only meaningful thing Beijing had done in terms of political 
reform in 1993.  Under Qiao Shi, the NPC committed itself to promoting the “rule 
of law”75.  Since assuming the NPC Chairmanship in 1993, Qiao had turned the 
legislative body into a formidable institution overseeing the Party and the 
                                                          
75 Laws (falu) and regulations (guiding). 
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government. In addition, he made much of the fact that the market economy was 
in many ways an economic system based on law.  The exposure of corruption in 
1993 also provided legislators at all levels to urge the perfection of laws, 
especially laws concerning the economy and trade, and the supervision of civil 
servants.  Qiao thus boosted the law drafting apparatus and power of the NPC.  
In spite of its long-standing status as the “organ of the highest power”, the NPC 
had never been a law-drafting team, and most of the bills had been drafted by 
Party administration departments for routine rubber-stamping by the NPC.  Both 
the NPC and the CPPCC, under the leadership of Li Ruihuan, became more 
active in “supervising the government” (Lam, 1994, pp.2.16-2.17). 
As Fewsmith (1994) states, the most important institutional outcomes of 
the institutionalisation of the NPC were the State Planning Commission and the 
establishment of a new State Economic and Trade Commission.  Fewsmith 
surmises that Qiao Shi had been quite active in making the NPC Standing 
Commission his “bully pulpit”, promising to speed up the formation of laws by 
which to govern the country. 
Qiao’s appointment as Chair of the NPC Standing Committee enhanced 
the status and visibility of the NPC, due to him being a Politburo Standing 
Committee member who had successively occupied various posts in Beijing.  
However, Qiao’s appointment did not cause basic changes in the functions of 
the NPC or its Standing Committee.  These functions are determined by the 
CCP’s perception and theoretical explanation of a Parliament under socialism 
and its operational arrangement for the system of People’s Congresses based 
on these perceptions which had not been adjusted since the economic reform of 
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1978.  The most important function of the People’s Congresses was the need to 
support the legitimacy of the CCP.   
Democracy, within these Congresses, is practised through the election 
of deputies. Indeed, when Qiao became Chairman of the NPC, he declared that 
“democracy must be institutionalised and codified into laws so that the system 
and its laws [would] not vary with a change in leadership, not with a change [in 
individual leader’s] viewpoint and attention”(Fewsmith, 1995, p.257; and 
Fewsmith, 1997, p.522).  This was to be a viewpoint that Qiao reiterated many 
times.  Indeed, Qiao represented the “liberal” persuasion in the Party, calling 
more explicitly and continuously than any other Party leader for institutionalising 
the rule of law (Fewsmith, 2001, p.73). 
Thus, the leader who seemed to have the greatest likelihood of 
challenging Jiang’s position as the “core” was Qiao Shi.  Quite simply, Qiao had 
the potential to restrain, if not challenge, Jiang’s “core”” status.  As Fewsmith 
(2001, p.73) argues: 
 
Qiao’s public statements certainly did champion the rule of law, but 
it had be come increasingly apparent that, whatever might be his 
feelings about law per se, [Qiao] was using the issue to distinguish 
himself publicly from Jiang, who continued to emphasise 




It has been stated that Jiang’s perceived contempt of Qiao Shi was due 
to the fact that Qiao was his superior in the Shanghai Student underground.  
Therefore, being higher ranked in the Party echelon, Qiao Shi was a real 
contender for Jiang’s position. 
 159
 
Whilst Qiao Shi was removed from his positions as Chair of the powerful 
Central Political and Legal Commission, and as Head of the Party School when 
he took over as the Chairman of the NPC in 1993, he continued to have much 
influence in the security apparatus in which he had built his career. 
 
NEO-CONSERVATISM IN THE CCP 
 
The Fourteenth Congress revealed a movement towards the 
conservative technocrats, nominally the Shanghai Faction, who adopted a hard 
ideological line while remaining committed to the open door policy.  Unlike the 
Zhaoists, who could be described as free marketeers, the neo-conservatives 
believed in the coexistence of market forces and fairly rigid State planning 
controls. 
Lam (1998) argues that on the Politburo Standing Committee, Jiang, Li 
Peng and Zhu Rongji could all be deemed neo-conservatives, although they 
differed in their personal interpretation of “neo-conservatism”.  Those whom 
could not be deemed to be neo-conservative consisted of the two heads of the 
moderate liberal cabal, Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan.  The political affiliation of the 
remainder, Hu Jintao and Liu Huaqing, at this point in time, was intriguing.  Hu 
Jintao, whose patrons included the conservative Song Ping and the ultra-liberal 
Hu Yaobang, adopted a neutralist stance.  Liu generally spoke for the army, and 
insofar as Jiang could exercise influence on the General from his position as 
 160
CMC Chairman, Liu could be considered closer to the neo-conservatives than to 
any other faction. 
 
By early 1994, the contours of the mainstream faction, which was built 
along a Jiang/Zhu Axis, had become clear.  The mainstream clique consisted of 
moderates, middle of the roadsters - that is, cadres who were neither “leftists” 
(remnant Maoists) nor “rightists” (that is, bourgeois liberals).  This clique was 
dominated by modernisation-minded technocrats not given to all-out 
Westernisation, and who were relatively liberal in economic matters but 
conservative in the ideological realm.  In terms of factional affiliation, these 
moderate leaders, as well as their protégés, were neither followers of 
conservative patriarchs Chen Yun and Deng Liqun, nor protégés of the ousted 
General Secretary Zhao Ziyang.  In addition, while they favoured market reforms 
in general, they also heeded the imperative of increasing the powers of the Party 
centre.  Also, while they were convinced that the Stalinist command economy 
should be dismantled, and that most economic activities should be guided by the 
market, they also believed in the preservation of indirect macro-economic 
control by the State (Lam, 1995, p.332). 
 
After the Fourteenth Congress, Jiang began to make an effort to 
formulate his own way of governing the country.  While Deng consistently 
insisted on decentralisation, Jiang had placed higher emphasis on 
recentralisation.  In Jiang’s view, there was no contradiction between “letting 
Deng’s flag fly” and developing a “non-Deng theory” (Zheng, 1997, p.43).  
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Indeed, the strategy of decentralisation had a negative impact on the State’s 
capacity76 to harness the activities of the provinces.  With the economic changes 
in the CCP’s ideology, the leftists remained afraid that a shrinking State sector 
would change the socialist nature of the CCP.  For the “new leftists”, the rise of 
the middle class meant the possibility of the CCP regime becoming ultra-rightist, 
as economic growth/reform had resulted in a strong bureaucratic bourgeoisie77.  
Furthermore, whilst privatisation at this stage was still small, the slow reforms of 
the SOEs resulted in a strong bureaucratic State sector, including collectives, 
which has been slowly linked to the “loss of State properties”.  Yet the 
guangshangs (literally: official businessmen) have been a major force behind 
China’s rapid growth, with the CCP becoming increasingly dependent upon 
them.  “New leftists” were nostalgic, appealing to Maoism and calling for their 
own version of economic and political democracy.  For them, economic 
democracy means that the government needs an egalitarian-orientated 
distribution policy, and political democracy should be achieved through the 
institutionalising of communist ideology (Zheng, 1997, pp.41-43). 
The Fourteenth Congress did not discuss opportunities for greater 
political reform, therefore the pressure for political reform was decreased.  
Social and political forces were geared more towards the “new leftists” 
interpretation of “political democracy”. 
                                                          
76 This is because improvements in the economy leads to regional power, especially in the 
southern and coastal areas, as the more developing economies where situated in the coastal 
regions, such as Guangdong, Fujian and Shanghai.   This lead to income disparities amongst 
regions, whereby the central government could not effectively coordinate local activities. 
 
77 On the other hand, the rise of the middle class could be viewed as a major threat to CCP 
dominance, as previously the Party had relied on a large worker and peasant class. 
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The need for unity was a major theme at the Fourteenth Congress, and 
at the following year’s NPC session.  The Party centre tried to achieve “unity” by 
intensifying ideological indoctrination.  Indeed, in the years following the 
Fourteenth Congress, the dictum in ideological and propaganda sessions was 
“patriotism, socialism and collectivism”. 
 
On the fifth anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident events, the 
complete transcripts of a speech by Zhao Ziyang in which he gave his own 
defence at a Politburo meeting five years previously, suddenly surfaced in Xin 
Bao, a highly respected Chinese language newspaper in Hong Kong.  This was 
an important signal for Jiang as the document must have been leaked by a 
faction within the CCP that was sympathetic to Zhao.  The timing of the release 
of the transcripts, on the anniversary of Tiananmen, was to provide Zhao with 
the greatest possible advantage in the any forthcoming struggle for power. 
 
1994: THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE JIANG ZEMIN ERA 
 
Thus, by 1994, there were several factors affecting the unity amongst 
the leadership.  These included: the political attitude of Yang Baibing’s followers, 
the relationship that Jiang had established with Liu Huaching and Zhang Zhen, 
the relationship between Jiang and Zhu Rongji, Qiao Shi’s relationship with Zhu 
Rongji, the relationship between Jiang and Li Peng and Li Peng and Zhu Rongji.   
Fewsmith (2001) is probably the only published Sinologist who had 
declared that “Jiang became his own man in 1994-1995”, and this was notably 
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due to the reduced influence of Deng Xiaoping and his reluctance (or 
incapability, due to sickness) to intervene in Chinese politics.  Indeed, Jiang’s 
“Stressing Politics” revealed his ability to begin shaping his own “era”, without 
the necessity of Deng’s patronage. 
The conservative forces, however, were still influential.  The first 
important group of conservatives consisted of certain Party cadres, such as Li 
Aiming, Vice-Chair of the NPC, Wang Banqian, Vice-Chair of the NPC, Li 
Guixian, State Councillor, Yang Rudai, Vice-Chair of the CPPCC, and a number 
of retired veterans, including Deng Liqun and Yao Yilin.  This group wrote a joint 
letter to the Politburo and the State Council complaining that “mistakes” 
committed by the Party centre and individual leaders had resulted in an 
overheated economy, financial disorder, and the rise of local strongholds.  The 
second group of conservatives consisted of cadres at central and local levels 
who had a vested interest in the old system and therefore feared the reforms.  
The third group was composed of the employees of the SOEs who feared for 
their jobs (Wu Anchia, 1994, p.10). 
 
Before the Fifteenth Congress, the CCP initiated a so-called “third 
liberation of thought”, which entailed “letting Deng’s flag fly” and reaffirming the 
theory of “primary stages of socialism”.  This theory was proposed earlier by 
Zhao Ziyang, in order to defend his reform policies and rationalise various 




Propaganda and the Media 
 
After Jiang became Secretary General, the Secretariat’s duties were 
expanded to include Party organisation, propaganda, ideology and discipline.  
Indeed, Jiang promoted his Shanghai allies to the main propaganda apparatus.  
Gong Xinhan and Zhou Ruijin were made Deputy Head of the Propaganda 
Department and Deputy Chief of the People’s Daily, respectively.  Xu 
Guangchun was promoted to editor-in-chief of the Guangming Daily.  This gave 
Jiang some control of the popular mediums of the time. 
 
By 1994, two thousand newspapers were being printed, and new 
journals were a focal point for the “intellectual factions”.  The most common term 
used to describe this phenomenon in Chinese was la shantou (literally: to 
occupy a mountaintop).  The term denoted the fortress mentality of groups that 
occupied a certain intellectual/political position.  The groups used the print 
media to propagate their view, launching various offensives against members of 
competing factions.  A number of new journals that appeared in Beijing, such as 
The East (Dongfang), Excellence (Jingpin), and Chinese Culture (Zhongguo 
Wenhua) were semi-independent.  In some cases these journals were funded by 
wealthy individuals or groups from the south.  Most provided honorary editorial 
positions for officials, or State leaders, as a form of political insurance (Barme, 
1994, p.271). 
In 1994, Xiao Gongqin, the author of the theory of neo-authoritarianism, 
issued warnings against the dangers of weak central government control, 
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pointing out that local mafias, corrupt police, and economic cartels would soon 
have the country in a stranglehold that would leave the central government 
increasingly incapable of imposing its will.  Like most other factions, Xiao wrote 
for one of the newer publications, namely Strategy and Management (Zhanlue 
Yu Guali), a Beijing-based magazine.  It should be noted, though, that Strategy 
and Management could be considered a bastion of neo-conservative supporters 
(Kelly, 1998, p.69).  Strategy and Management’s image was to be one of 
“enlightened nationalism which sought to promote a rational view of China’s 
national interest, and in the process headed off the temptation for rabid 
chauvinism” (Kelly, 1998, p.72).  The book, Looking at China through a Third 
Eye (Dianzhi Yangjing Kan Zhongguo), published in 1994, was also 
representative of the neo-conservative view (Goldman, 2000, p117).  Although 
the book was marked for “internal circulation”, meaning that it should not be sold 
to foreigners and ordinary members of the public, pirated editions were 
available.  Miles (1996, p.277) states that his Chinese sources revealed that 
Jiang spoke highly of the book to Party colleagues. 
 
THE 1994 FOURTH PLENUM AND “STRESSING POLITICS” 
 
By late 1994, the Jiang’s central task was to maintain political stability78. 
This was achieved mainly by two goals: boosting the “Marxist purity” of the 
Party, particularly that of the leadership corps at the Central and regional levels; 
                                                          
78 As late as August 1994, Deng was reported to have met with the Politburo and four key 
veterans, Bo Yibo, Wan Li, Qin Jiwei and Li Dengsheng, to reiterate his endorsement of Jiang 
and stress the need for the PLA to support Jiang. 
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and strengthening the police-state apparatus, which included the army and 
various kinds of law enforcement units (Lam, 1998, p.27). 
In the fall of 1994, as Deng’s health further declined, Jiang dropped 
economic issues from the agenda of the forthcoming Fourth Plenum in order to 
concentrate on Party-building issues.  The severity of organisational problems 
demonstrated at the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth Congress in September 
(25 – 28) 1994 dealt specifically with Party building.  It referred to the corrosion 
of the CCP due to corruption and the decadent lifestyle of the leaders, and inner 
circle democracy of the Standing Politburo members; and to member rights of 
participation in Party affairs. 
The problems concerning democratic centralism became apparent when 
“some places and departments” were not executing central decisions 
energetically enough and/or orders were ignored.  Furthermore, it was deemed 
by Jiang that discipline within the Party needed to be tightened. 
As a result, the “Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP 
concerning some major issues of strengthening Party building” was adopted by 
the Plenum in October.  This “Decision” stressed strengthening “democratic 
centralism”, essentially referring to the “subordination of lower levels to higher 
levels, the part to the whole, and everything to the Party centre” (Fewsmith, 
1997, pp. 518-519).  What Fewsmith (2001) surmised as “Jiang’s political 
strategy to try and carve out a ‘middle course’ that encompassed a fairly wide 
spectrum of opinion within the Party but nevertheless isolated both the 
ideological hardliners and bourgeois liberals”, was essentially Jiang’s adoption 
of the political thought of neo-conservatism. 
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The Fourth Plenum proved to be an important victory for Jiang.  The 
People’s Daily noted that “the second generation central leading collective has 
been successfully relieved by the third generation central leading collective” 
(Fewsmith, 1997, p.519).  Not only did the “Decision” reaffirm Jiang’s position as 
the “core”, it also promoted to Huang Ju (Mayor of Shanghai) to the Politburo, 
and Wu Banggou and Jiang Chunyun to the Party Secretariat.  The promotions 
served not only to shore-up Jiang’s personal support at the centre, but to also 
diminish the authority of Zhu Rongji, who could be seen by Jiang as a potential 
rival. 
 
Following the Fourth Plenum, and continuing his “Stressing Politics” 
theme, Jiang was continually defining his legitimacy and his usage of neo-
conservatism.  In a series of internal speeches, Jiang distinguished Marxism 
from anti-Marxism in seven areas.  These areas included: socialist democracy 
versus Western democracy, developing a diverse economy with predominant 
public sector  versus privatisation, and studying what is advanced in the West 
versus fawning the West.  Fewsmith (2001, p.136) states that: 
 
[These] distinctions would reveal that Jiang was searching for a 
formula that would permit him to move pragmatically beyond the 
ideological structures of the Old Left without leaving him open to 
the charge of being ‘lax’ on ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ that had 





After the Plenum, one theme taken up in the official press was that the 
establishment of a “socialist market economy” could endanger Party discipline, 
by encouraging “apathy” and “anarchism” and thus lead to the undermining of 
the supremacy of the Party centre. The claim was that a “socialist market 
economy” would in fact increase the need for democratic centralism.  This was 
explained in terms of the need for coordination and integration of national policy, 
and the role of the central authority in representing the highest interests of the 
whole Party and people (Young, 1998, p.122). 
 
In 1995, even as Jiang tried to reinforce his personal strength through 
the strategic promotion of protégés, to rein in centrifugal tendencies by re-
emphasising democratic centralism, to rein in factionalism, and to steer a course 
of “stability and unity” by curbing inflation and slowing down the pace of 
economic reform, he also made a dramatic bid to win public support by finally 
embarking on a campaign against corruption and by preventing worker peasant 
unrest from undermining the status quo.  Jiang also wanted to prevent 
bourgeoisie liberal elements within and outside the Party from throwing out the 
socialist system (Fewsmith, 1997, p.520; and Lam, 1998, p.27). 
By 1995, the State had so far been unable to find a mechanism to 
centralise authority without undermining reform.  Jiang needed to define a 
coherent policy line that was identifiable as the programme of his leadership – a 
programme that was distinguishable from both its predecessors and its 
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competitors – that would legitimise Jiang’s leadership79.  Fewsmith (1997) 
observed that a leader without a policy line was unlikely to be able to rally 
support either from within the Party or from the society at large in order to 
legitimate their own position. 
In addition, by this time, neo-conservatism was not a coherent socio-
economic political program.  In fact, as political debates evolved, neo-
conservatism could further evolve and split into different strains, not unlike its 
political predecessor, neo-authoritarianism.  Yet, neo-conservatism was gaining 
support due to the ideological vacuum occurring resulting from the changing 
needs of the populace, the irrelevance of the Marxist-Mao Zedong tenets within 
MLM, the growth of nationalism, the economic malaise of the SOEs, and the 
conception that the government should stand up for the common person 
(Fewsmith, 1997, p.645). 
Furthermore, another important issue facing Jiang and his leadership 
was to establish the fourth and the fifth generational leadership.  At previous 
Party Congresses, the old guard were powerful enough to choose their own 
successors.  Without the old guard, the Politburo Standing Committee had to 
play the role of guardians in selecting the next generation of leaders80. 
Progress had been made in building consensus about China’s economic 
reform, and even though reformist leaders’ economic policies had come under 
                                                          
79 Chang (2001) deems Jiang’s January 1995 speech on China’s relations with Taiwan, Jiang’s 
“Eight-Point Policy” towards Taiwan, as a powerful indication of Jiang’s security of command. 
 
80 At this stage, deciding on the fourth and fifth generational leadership was important, especially 
due to the limitation of two terms in office.  Therefore when Qiao Shi announced his impending 
“retirement” at the Fifteenth Congress, it allowed Jiang to set up a procedure for old leaders to 
“exit” gracefully from their positions of power when they became old. 
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attack by leftists, major “economic theories” had always been offered.  Political 
reforms had been more about power redistribution among major leaders and 
different Party and/or State organisations.  While economic reforms had often 
resulted in win-win situations, political reform could be described as a zero-sum 
game, as resistance to any kind of political reform could be strong from those 
who stood to lose much.  In China, political reform has necessarily meant the 
democratisation of the Party (although not “true” democracy).  In a Leninist 
state, where everything is politicalised by the Party State, political reform is 
impossible without initiative from the highest echelons of power. 
 
In the fall of 1995, Jiang made another move to establish himself as the 
undisputed leader of China.  On 27 September 1995, he delivered a speech 
entitled “Leaders Must Stress Politics” (or “Stressing Politics”) (“Jiang Zhengzhi”, 
Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 1996) at a meeting for the coordinators of the Fifth 
Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Congress81. This speech outlined twelve 
critical relationships that the Party and government must deal with in the coming 
years.  Overall, it was a speech that called for development and marketisation, 
as well as for stability and enhancing State capabilities.  As Fewsmith (1997) 
concludes, the speech was obviously intended to present Jiang as a thoughtful 
leader, cognizant of the difficulties facing China and reasonable in his approach 
                                                          
81 A year before, on 29 September 1994, Jiang presented a speech at the Fourth Plenary 
Session. In this speech, Jiang spoke of the need to “elevate” Party building, and that all things 
were built upon the necessity of strengthening the organisational construction, such as 
perfecting the democratic centralism, strengthening and improving the Party’s grass-roots 
organisations and training capable leaders for the future. 
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to these problems.  It was, in short, an agenda-setting speech, intended to lay 
the formation for Jiang’s leadership and the “Jiang Zemin Era”. 
Jiang reiterated his viewpoint when he met high-level officials from the 
Editorial Board of Jiefangjun Ribao (People’s Liberation Army Daily) on 2 
January 1996.  Jiang presented a revised version of his speech when he 
participated at a meeting for CCP leaders of the NPC and the CPPCC on 3 
March 1996.  This speech was published on 1 July 1996 by Qiu Shi (Searching 
Truth) magazine, a publication sponsored by the Central Committee. 
This speech allowed Jiang, who at this stage was eager to create his 
own theory, to construct a theory that was, on the one hand, aimed at 
developing Deng’s thought and, on the other hand, still maintained Jiang’s 
legitimacy to rule post-Deng China.  Indeed, Hong Zhaohui (1997, p.90) has 
accurately delineated the key points of the speech and how these were utilised 
by differing core audiences.  First, many people in Beijing believed that 
“stressing politics” meant stressing the core of Jiang’s leadership of the CCP, 
which was basically designed to maintain Jiang’s power and the CCP’s 
authority.  Second, some ordinary people read this political message as a signal 
of an anti-corruption campaign.  Third, the speech was seen to be an anti-reform 
call.  Fourth, the local leaders who were losing political control might be able to 
maintain their political power.  Fifth, groups involved with Hong Kong, Taiwan 
and international affairs believed that Jiang’s speech demonstrated a new 
change of international policy, moving towards a hardline stance against 
Taiwan’s independence , Hong Kong democracy and American hegemonism.  
Sixth, most Chinese intellectuals and politicians interpreted it as a duplication of 
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the older ideas, such as CCP authority and anti-corruption, which were not 
created by Jiang, but by Zhao Ziyang’s idea of neo-authoritarianism and Chen 
Yun’s theory of CCP construction. 
Before this speech, many China analysts, like Hong, had identified Mao 
as a conservative of the left, Deng as a moderate in the middle and Jiang as a 
liberal on the right.  In fact, Hong (1997) assumed that “Jiang would promote 
political democracy to make up for the deficiencies of Deng’s reforms which 
focused on the economic field only”. Jiang’s speech, however, moved him from 
the right (Mao-Deng-Jiang) to the middle (Mao-Jiang-Deng).  This “middle” 
position indicated that Jiang’s ideas would be designed to balance and equalise 
Mao’s leftist and Deng’s rightist excessiveness. 
Jiang’s speech presented an ideology, and what was significant about 
this ideology was that it was closely linked with leadership.  As Fewsmith (2001, 
p.88) correctly states: “it is impossible to think of Mao Zedong without Mao 
Zedong Thought, or Deng Xiaoping without ‘reform and opening up’ (now known 
as ‘Deng Xiaoping Theory’)”. Jiang, therefore, inevitably had to put his stamp on 
the ideology, to define a ‘line’ that was both personal and organisational.  
“Stressing Politics” was to be Jiang’s neo-conservative “stamp”. 
 
Deng had raised the slogan “guard against the right, but primarily 
against the left”, in his 1992 Southern Sojourn, but this creed had been largely 
ignored in the official media following the Fourteenth Congress.  Jiang’s 
“Stressing Politics” revived it and allowed Jiang to be identified with Deng’s 
reforms.  Jiang “touted” Deng’s reputation and legacy, whereby hinting that he 
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himself would push that legacy forward. Furthermore, Jiang built links with Mao 
and Deng in most of his speeches.  Indeed, Jiang needed to define a coherent 
line that was identifiable as the program of his leadership – one that was 
distinguishable from both his predecessors and his competitors; and a program 
that would legitimise the new rulers, with himself as the “core”.   
“Stressing Politics” was not a new idea for Jiang, as he had previously 
spoken about the need to reinforce the power of the centre, thus maintaining the 
stability of the CCP in order to promote economic development. In his speech to 
Party members (June 25 1993), Jiang (1993, June 28) stated that: 
 
[The Party leadership and Party building represent the 
fundamental assurance for the success of economic construction, 
reform and opening up.  The deeper the policy of reform and 
opening and the greater the economy develops, the more we 
should enhance Party leadership and promote Party building. 
 
Following the Fourteenth Congress, Jiang continually reiterated the neo-
conservative tenets of a “strong government” working to develop the market 
economy, where the “Party’s leadership and construction constitute the 
fundamental guarantee for the success of economic construction, economic 
reforms and opening up in China” and that “without the strong leadership of the 
CCP, there would be no liberalisation and development [of the economy]” 
(Jiang, 1993, p.18). 
Reflecting neo-conservatism, “Stressing Politics” did not commit to the 
ideology of MLM, but it did remain committed to the Leninist notion of State 
ownership of the core means of production, and the maintenance of centralism.  
The CCP would remain the “vanguard of the proletariat”, and the Party would 
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continue to “defend” the interests of the working classes.  Indeed, previously 
Jiang had spoken about the “ideological confusion [that had] shaken Party 
member’s faith [as] Deng’s theory had been set against the theory of Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought” (FBIS, 1993, May 3, p.18), yet neo-
conservatism was able to merge attributes of both these theories. 
 
From 1989 until Jiang’s enunciation of the creed of “Stressing Politics”, 
the leaders of the CCP did not seriously undertake a redefinition of the role of 
the Party in a market economy.  Indeed, for a leader who was often criticised for 
being bland, cautious and technocratic82, Jiang was beginning to reveal a 
boldness previously visible only in his deft manoeuvres against political 
enemies.  Furthermore, the classification of the “Jiang Era” as being “dull” was 
due to the fact that it was continually being contrasted to the constant drama 
associated with both the Mao and Deng eras (Pye, 2001, p.45). 
 
However, even as Jiang was “stressing politics” and his role as the 
“core” in the Party leadership, Qiao Shi chose to stress political reform and the 
“rule of law”.  Qiao stepped up the pace of legislation and incorporated greater 
expertise in its formulation.  Qiao Shi also gave greater weight to provincial 
initiatives and to the speed of economic reform than either Jiang or Li Peng 
(Fewsmith, 1997, p.522).  On the other hand, leftists, such as Deng Liqun, in a 
                                                          
82 Pye (2001) alludes to Jiang, the private man, as being probably the most sophisticated of all of 
the Chinese leaders with his ability to speak Russian and workable English, German and 
Romanian. 
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series of unofficial ten thousand word letters, attempted to interpret Jiang’s 
“politics” in a leftist-conservative strain (Kelly, 1998, p.65). 
 
In any case, the Jiang camp began to engineer a personality cult that 
was almost as elaborate as that of Mao or Lin Bao.  Jiang’s public relations 
operatives began in 1993 to leak or circulate sayings of Deng’s that were 
supportive of Jiang (Lam, 1998, p.35).  Indeed, by 1995, the Propaganda 
Department was completely under Jiang’s control.  From 1994 onwards, the 
Jiang image-building exercises almost overshadowed those of Deng.  Jiang was 
portrayed as a “genius who spun words of wisdom on the economy, foreign 
affairs, Party building and army construction” (Lam, 1998, p.36). 
 
Furthermore, Jiang was interested in increasing the power of the 
Secretariat, as its loyalty was more important than that of the Politburo.  Indeed, 
Zeng Qinghong, Director of the General Office, oversaw a dramatic increase in 
the organisation’s responsibilities, as it became a key institution in the research 
and formulation of policies, including important economic policies. Jiang thus 
gained further control over research by establishing a “central social and political 
work research team” to provide information of central decisions (Garvey, 1997, 
p.15). 
The appointment in mid-1995 of the Shanghai political scientist Wang 
Huning83 to the Central Committee Policy Research Office political group, can 
                                                          
83 Wang Huning was also the “ghost writer”, or contributor, of Jiang’s future “Three Emphases” 
and “Three Representative” campaigns that dominated in 2000. 
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be taken as a return to favour of the neo-conservative trend. Wang belonged to 
a “policy faction” of neo-conservatives that was said to include Xiao Gongqin, 
the architect of the political theory of neo-authoritarianism, and the political 
thought of neo-conservatism.  Indeed, the number of think tanks and research 
institutes had expanded in number under Jiang. 
 
By 1995, Jiang had created all four types of power bases within the 
Chinese political system: credentialist; personal; institutional; and, regional.  
Jiang had made considerable efforts to establish himself as a legitimate ruler.  
He had promoted allies into key positions of power; created institutional power 
bases in the Secretariat, Propaganda Department, Organisation Department, 
General Office, the CMC, the LGFE, Electronics Ministry; and devoted 
resources to Shanghai. 
 
In sum, the incorporation of the political thought of neo-conservatism in 
the emergence of the Jiang Zemin Era can be clearly seen in his speech, 
“Stressing Politics”.  This public discourse of neo-conservatism by Jiang, 
although hidden within his “Stressing Politics” speech, reveals the CCP’s 
acknowledgement of that political thought.  This is because Jiang’s speech 
would have had to have been endorsed by the Politburo Standing Committee 
before it was announced. 
Therefore, the assumption can be made that many other CCP leaders 
adhered, or aspired, to the political thought of neo-conservatism.  Lam (1999) 
had already identified both Li Peng and Zhu Rongji as neo-conservatives.  
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Indeed, Jiang has, through his promotions and political manoeuvrings, endorsed 
the expansion of the influence of the Shanghai Faction.  The members of this 
clique are not only Jiang’s allies and protégés, but they also are neo-
conservative in nature. 
Throughout this period, Jiang consolidated his position successfully 
contending with perceived “threats” to his position from people such as Qiao Shi 
and Chen Xitong.   
Ultimately, then, Jiang, through his speech, “Stressing Politics”, revealed 
his neo-conservative credentials and had, by the end of 1995, embarked on the 





The research focus of this study has been  to evaluate the leadership of 
Jiang Zemin as the “core leader” of the “third generational leadership” of the 
PRC during his “formulative stage”, from 1989 to 1995 (that is, before the 
consolidation of the “Jiang Zemin Era”).  Therefore an examination of Jiang’s 
ability to sustain and legitimise his position as the “core” and his usage of key 
elements of the political thought of “neo-conservatism” in order to develop his 
own “theory”, as a condition that would lend substance to the creation of his own 
“era”, is central to this research. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989, 
Sinologists embarked on examinations of post-Tiananmen China, however they 
were initially concerned about the apparent lack of legitimacy of leaders such as 
Deng Xiaoping and Jiang within the CCP (see for examples Kelly, 1998, Young 
1998 and Yang 1996) and/or the demise of Jiang Zemin in his role as General 
Secretary of the CCP (see Bachmann, 1991)84.  Although Sinologists, such as 
Lam (1999) and Fewsmith (1998), have sought to reveal how Jiang successfully 
legitimised and consolidated his position as the “core” from 1989 to 1995 they 
have not been able to delineate Jiang’s success in orchestrating his own “era”.  
Herein lies the value of this particular study. 
                                                          
84 Even Fewsmith initially hypothesised the “eventual fall of Jiang Zemin” and suggested others 
would replace him. 
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This research has shown that Jiang’s success in consolidating and 
legitimising his leadership was due to his ability to incorporate key tenets of the 
political thought of neo-conservatism into what could be seen as his own 
“theory”.  As a contextual background, this research first examined the evolving 
political thought of neo-conservatism, as well as the process of Jiang’s 
leadership of the CCP since 1989.  Jiang’s self-legitimiation, and that of the 
CCP, through the utilisation of key elements of the political thought of neo-
conservatism, in order to sustain and consolidate his own “era”, is then 
examined in a historiographical narrative form. 
 
Following his appointment as General Secretary of the CCP in 1989 
Jiang Zemin had to, primarily, secure his position as “the core” through the 
creation of informal and formal positions in the CCP which he held, and then 
support this with the elevation of allies and protégés to key positions in Party 
and governmental organisations.  Moreover, in order to further reinforce and 
legitimise his position as “the core”, Jiang had to develop his own “theory” for 
governing the country – not unlike Mao and Deng and done before him. 
In order to achieve these objectives, Jiang had to first create a 
sustainable power base in order to retain, and therefore legitimise, his position 
as General Secretary.  As mentioned in Chapter Four, until 1992 Sinologists 
vigorously debated the possibilities of Jiang losing his position as General 
Secretary due to the precariousness of his appointment.  This was simply 
because his appointment by Deng Xiaoping was made during a period of 
factional struggle leading up to and continuing after the 1989 Tiananmen 
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Incident.  As a result, a somewhat unknown former Mayor of Shanghai, with 
“dubious credentials”, was suddenly elevated to a position that had been 
coveted by Beijing-based hardliners, led by Li Peng.  It would appear, then, that 
the only support Jiang had was that of Deng Xiaoping, who himself was 
struggling with challenges from the hardliners within the Party over the dismissal 
of Zhao Ziyang and the continuation of his own economic reform program. 
During the period from 1989 – 1992, Jiang had to manoeuvre between 
the weakening reformers within the CCP, led by Deng Xiaoping, and the 
elder/conservative factions, led by Chen Yun and Li Peng, whose influence 
within the CCP was on the rise.  As Bachman (1991, p.252) notes, Jiang, as 
designated successor, had to maintain the trust of Deng Xiaoping.  However, 
Jiang lacked Deng’s resources and therefore had to develop independent power 
bases85 of his own. This study has revealed that in order to do this Jiang initially 
formed an “alliance”, or “axis”, with Li Peng and the conservatives within the 
Party.  At this time, Jiang focused more on the maintenance of these networks 
and the continuation of their conservative political stance than on the 
continuation of Deng’s economic reforms.   
Furthermore, Jiang had to compete with the rise of the princelings’ 
articulation of the direction they believed the CCP should take, which had been 
published in their 1991 document, Realistic Responses.  This was set in the 
context of the perceived upheavals that had occurred in China (for example, the 
                                                          
85 However, in order to further legitimise Jiang’s position as General Secretary, Deng had Jiang 
appointed as the Chair of the CMC also in 1989.  As Wu Anchia (1993, pp.35-36) notes, a Party 
leader’s ultimate authority relies to an extent of the strength and breadth of his personal links to 
the military.  Relying upon Deng’s influence throughout the military apparatus first, Jiang 
eventually appointed his own protégés to key positions in the CMC in order to strengthen his 
position. 
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Tiananmen Incident and the economic crisis of 1988) as well as those 
upheavals that had occurred in the rest of the world (the collapse of 
Communism in Eastern Europe and the then USSR, as well as the military 
strength of the USA that was evidenced during the 1990-1991 Gulf War). 
The ties that Jiang established with Li Peng and his associates, as well 
as Jiang’s recruitment of is own protégés to key CCP organisations and 
governmental departments, did indeed assist in his creation of a viable power 
base independent to that of Deng.  However, a dilemma existed in the fact that it 
was all but impossible for a successor to both maintain the trust of the top leader 
while concurrently building an independent power base.  
Due to Deng’s dissatisfaction with the prolonged policy and ideological 
debates that had constrained further economic reform, he embarked on his 
“Southern Sojourn” in the early months of 1992. This sojourn enabled Deng to 
not only steer attention back to the economic realm but also to signify Jiang as 
the designated successor whose stance would be to continue the economic 
reforms.  With Deng’s elevation of Zhu Rongji to assist in further economic 
reform in 1992, and the fact that Zhu could be seen as a potential “rival” to 
Jiang’s position as “the core”, Jiang had to be seen to be supportive of the 
renewed emphasis on these economic matters. 
Whilst it was advantageous for Jiang to be associated with Li Peng and 
the conservative elders during this early period of his tenure as General 
Secretary, Deng’s return to the “political centre stage” in early 1992 helped to 
guarantee his positions, as long as Jiang adhered to the now dominant Dengist 
agenda.  Indeed, without Deng, a careful reading of the sources reveals that 
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Jiang would not have been able to resist the influence of the princelings and 
other anti-reformists at the 1992 Fourteenth Party Congress.  However, Deng 
succeeded in not only blocking the princeling’s elevation to any real positions of 
power within the high echelons of the CCP, he also further legitimised Jiang’s 
position as “the core” by seeing that he was elected President.  Jiang, in return, 
successfully led the efforts to have Deng’s economic thought entrenched in the 
Chinese constitution, as exemplified by his affirmation of the theorem of the 
“primary stages of socialism”. 
This study has shown that by the end of 1992, Jiang had begun to 
further establish himself as “the core” of the Party leadership by moving beyond 
Deng’s patronage. Not only did he have sufficient “formalised” power as General 
Secretary, Chairman of the CMC and as President, Jiang also had established 
considerable “informalised” power through his creation of the Shanghaibang (the 
Shanghai Faction), with the appointment of protégés from the Shanghai region 
to key organisational and departmental posts.  Sinologists, such as Fewsmith, 
have suggested that China then entered a period of sustainable and secure 
governance due to the triumvirate of power concentrated between Jiang Zemin, 
Li Peng and Zhu Rongji.  However, this study shows that with the elevation of 
Zhu Rongji, also a former Mayor of Shanghai, Jiang began a new alliance, the 
Jiang-Zhu Rongji axis, which further diminished the influence of Li Peng and his 
associates within the CCP.  
Thus, although all three were instrumental in constructing the new 
working environment within the CCP, factionalism continued to occur. Indeed, 
the continual theme of stability and unity that had been relentlessly repeated 
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after 1992 suggests the extent of the institutional, political and societal problems 
that China faced (Fewsmith, 1995, p.253).  In the political arena, it would appear 
that Jiang’s emphasis on “democratic centralism” might be undermined by the 
call for further political liberalisation by Qiao Shi, and his protégé Tian Jiyun, in 
the NPC. 
 
Overall, the research has shown that since 1989 there has been an 
emergence of an alliance of reformers and conservatives in China, and the 
emergence of an even broader coalition between that alliance and the 
moderates, primarily focused on concerns about the development of the 
economy.  The continuation of this alliance has resulted in a general consensus 
on economic and political reforms amongst the “constructed” political elites; and 
the leadership has not been deeply divided on any significant issues.  No 
leadership faction, reformist or conservative, favoured a return to central 
planning, the elimination of foreign or private ownership, or the revival of class 
struggle.  The remaining disagreement amongst the leadership was largely over 
the speed of reforms, rather than the reforms to be undertaken (Tong, 1998, 
p.99).  The neo-conservatives within the CCP took an authoritarian-
developmentalist approach to the reforms, focusing on further marketisation on 
the one hand and the tightening of political control on the other.  Development, 
essentially, had become the sole criterion in evaluating the policies and political 
leadership in China. 
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In establishing himself as “the core” and legitimising his position within in 
the CCP hierarchy, Jiang had to determine his own theory for governing the 
country. As Zheng (1997, p.43) notes, Jiang did not simply want to defend 
“Deng’s flag”, in reference to Deng’s commitment to the development of the 
Chinese economy.  In addition, Jiang did not want to, nor could he do so if he 
wished, continue Mao’s emphasis upon class struggle.  Jiang had to develop a 
theory that complimented Deng’s economic reforms, especially as he was 
designated by Deng, yet one that retained a smattering of Mao Zedong’s 
“Thoughts” that could be applied pragmatically during the nineties. 
Jiang’s support, indeed his reemphasis, of the 1987 “primary stages of 
socialism” at the 1992 Party Congress assisted in the enunciation of his own 
“theory”.  The evidence supports the view that at the time Jiang’s support of the 
“primary stages of socialism” was multi-fold.  First, as Deng’s heir, his legitimacy 
was based on Deng’s legacy.  If Jiang had continued to tolerate the conservative 
attacks on Deng that persisted after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, his own 
position would have certainly destabilised.  Second, although Deng’s reforms 
resulted in enormous “negative” consequences, they did provide economic 
growth.  From 1992, with the assistance of Zhu Rongji, Jiang and other leaders 
without a “revolutionary credential” experience have been increasingly 
dependent upon economic development for their political legitimacy.  Therefore, 
if economic development was to be chaotic, then the leadership needed to show 
that it was necessary and only a brief and transitional, or a “primary”, stage.  
Thus, whilst Mao led the first “revolution” and Deng led the second “revolution”, 
the third generational leadership, namely Jiang, Zhu and to a lesser extent 
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Peng, were the “custodians” of this second revolution.  The theory, therefore, 
provided an explanation of China’s chaotic economic circumstances, and went 
on to propose how the Party would then be able to “discover” new institutions 
and methods to address and control them in the future.  Third, Jiang’s support of 
the “primary stages” principle guaranteed the continuation of the economic 
reform agenda and allowed Jiang to begin pursuing his own ideological 
construction.  Indeed, the argument here is that whilst it was necessary for Jiang 
to defend Deng, he also needed to be able to further expand and consolidate his 
own authority through the creation of his own “theory”, thus establishing his own 
“era”. 
 
The princelings’ ideological power had been reduced at the Fourteenth 
Party Congress, and their own political theorem of neo-conservatism (“hard” 
neo-conservatism) outlined in Realistic Responses was sidelined, allowing Jiang 
to effectively utilise and pursue select tenets of this thought in the establishment 
of his own theory (“soft” neo-conservatism).  Indeed, some of the neo-
conservative strains within Realistic Responses are similar to those neo-
conservative elements incorporated into Jiang’s theory. As raised in Chapter 
Two, the central tenets of neo-conservatism (centralism and strong government 
as well as the establishment of a market economy) are intertwined in both “hard” 
and “soft” variants of neo-conservatism. As previously argued in Chapter Two, 
several China scholars have stated that the reduced influence of the princelings 
also resulted in the “collapse” of the political thought of neo-conservatism as an 
ideological alternative to MLM.  Yet these scholars have failed to realise that 
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Jiang had simply modified key elements and produced a more considered and 
balanced interpretation of neo-conservatism that would be more conducive to 
China’s development in the 1990s and beyond.  This “managed” evolution of 
neo-conservatism revealed that it incorporated two schools of thought: “hard” 
neo-conservatism (espoused by the princelings); and “soft” neo-conservatism 
(as argued in Chapter Two), yet this has been neglected in studies by other 
Sinologists. 
 
A further area of neglect, yet pivotal to the central hypothesis of this 
research, is that there is ample evidence showing that Jiang did utilise neo-
conservatism in order to create the “Jiang Zemin Era”, a subject similarly that 
has not been recognised or closely examined by other China experts.  Before 
the Tiananmen Incident, China specialists usually opted for the one of three 
models when analysing the Deng Xiaoping era: factional struggle; 
modernisation; or East-West confrontation (Bachman, 1991, p.252). After the 
Tiananmen Incident, scholars continued to examine the Deng Xiaoping era, 
whereby any study undertaken of Jiang Zemin was reduced to the anticipated 
problems of succession in China.  Indeed, any valuable study focusing on the 
Jiang Zemin era began only after 1995.  However, even then there was still only 
limited discussion of Jiang’s performance as General Secretary, and rather 
significantly less on Jiang’s attempt to re-legitimise the CCP so that the CCP 
could be a purposeful and meaningful institution in the nineties and beyond.  
Therefore, with the rare exception of scholars such as Fewsmith, the argument 
that Jiang Zemin had incorporated the political thought of neo-conservatism 
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within his “ideological theorem” to establish and maintain a “Jiang Zemin Era” 
has been neglected in previous studies. 
 
Whilst Jiang did indeed incorporate neo-conservatism into his 
ideological platform, as revealed in his 1995 speech “Stressing Politics”, it 
nonetheless is anticipated that further research is indeed required to examine 
the full extent of Jiang’s incorporation of neo-conservatism as a means to 
increase his own legitimacy, and that of the CCP.  Until 1995, Jiang was 
securing his tenure as General Secretary, Chair of the CMC and President.  It 
was only towards the end of 1995 that Jiang had sufficient confidence in his 
position to proceed in a theoretical direction so as to create his own “era”. 
Indeed, events that occurred after 1995, such as the death of Deng 
Xiaoping, the Hong Kong handover and the 1997 Fifteenth Party Congress have 
further revealed Jiang’s strengthened grasp over the ideological and political 
apparatus in China, including his ideological preference for the political thought 
of “neo-conservatism” as an ideological guide.  Furthermore, the 2002 Sixteenth 
Party Congress, which encompassed the handing of the guard to a new “fourth 
generational leadership” who possessed ideological directions similar to that of 
Jiang’s, would further support the hypothesis that Jiang Zemin utilised neo-
conservatism to create his own era.  Indeed, Jiang’s adoption of “neo-
conservatism” set a precedent for the decisions made beyond the Sixteenth 
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